BATTLEZACAUCASUS

Based on the book by Tike V. “March to the Caucasus. The Battle for Oil 1942-1943." (M., 2005).

Edited by and.

Editorial Preface:

In our memoir literature, including mountaineering literature, there are quite a few stories about the war for the Caucasus. For example, in the book “From Elbrus to Antarctica” more than 100 pages are devoted to this. Read also in the 5th volume of “Climbers of the Northern Capital” the article “Fighting on the passes of the Caucasus"based on materials from the book by A.M. Gusev “Elbrus on Fire” (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1980) . However, all such literature describes events very fragmentarily, without giving a complete picture. But we sinners don’t read military-historical literature (because it’s boring). And from this point of view, the Editorial Board of the ACC considered it expedient to publish the most interesting excerpts from Wilhelm Thieke’s book, which presents a view “from the other side” and was written on the basis of documents of that time.

Oil is the blood of modern warfare! It is vital for tanks, airplanes, cars... If there is no oil, there is no fuel, and all this formidable equipment turns in an instant into a useless pile of metal. Therefore, it was the capture of the Caucasian oil fields during the second summer campaign in the East in 1942 that was supposed to provide the German military industry with the necessary oil reserves and become the key to victory - this is what Hitler and his entourage believed. But none of the Nazi leadership could have imagined what irreparable losses this seemingly carefully thought-out plan would result in for Germany.

In the Caucasus, from July 1942 to October 1943, fierce battles unfolded for positions, passes, mountain ranges, heights and ports, but, despite enormous sacrifices, the German troops failed to achieve their goal.

On the twenty-eighth of July, immediately after Rostov fell, I commandedField Marshal List, commander of Army Group A, arrived at the command post of the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps and announced to its commanderthanks to neral Conrad for the battles in Rostov.

At a command post located in one of the buildings in Rostov,neral Konrad learned about the further plan of the command regardingupcoming actions of the 49th Mountain Infantry.

– During the offensive, the 17th Army will cross the Caucasus,- said List, after a short pause, asked a direct question: in what direction does the corps command envisage its further actions?

- Through Maykop! – Conrad answered.

- The mountain rifle corps will presumably have two divisions advance through the high mountain passes west of Elbrus in the direction of Sukhumi to open the way to Transcaucasia for the advancing 17th Armyalong the narrow coastal strip through Tuapse!

During the conversation, General Conrad general outline outlined the OKB plan, whichry then will be subject to numerous changes over and over againdepending on the specific situation.

About the most important passage – Military-Sukhumi road– in Military Geo The graphic description says the following:

“Military-Sukhumi road. From the northern edge of the map to the Te resort Berda (156 km), passing for road transport. From here still34 km can be covered by horse-drawn transport. Then the following are possibleroutes: through the Dombay-Ulgen pass (3007 m,covered by a glacier, impassable for pack animals); through the Klukhorsky pass (2816 m) - to Askhara. Serpentine leads to the passThe 13-kilometer trail is caved in and steep in places. The pass is coveredsmall snow fields. In summer, shepherds drive flocks of sheep throughpass. It is passable for pack animals. After the pass beyond Askhara, the road is suitable for horse-drawn vehicles.

Evaluation of the description and maps led to the conclusion that only partscapable of moving in mountainous areas can operate there.Motorized corps units, heavy artillery, anti-tank artillery and rear columns after capture passes near Tuapse had to be followed through them to the coastal road horn.

At this time, tank and motorized formations from the bridgeheads on Don and Manych rushed south. And the mountain shooters followed them. They were still separated from the mountains by 500 kilometers, but with every step of the rangers More of a real mountain fever.

On August 5th, the commander of the 1st Mountain Division gave the order to formation of one high-mountain company to climb Elbrus.The conquest of Elbrus required high mountain climbing from the team.preparation. It consisted of experienced climbers, some of whom taughtparticipated in climbing peaks in the Himalayas.Captain Grotto, start

There are different opinions in assessments of the expedition to Elbrus. By at least it had value from a tactical point of view, since the massif and shelter on Elbrus represent an important stronghold.

If its value had been determined in a timely manner, it would have been much easieract against Russian positions in the area that are impregnable from the frontOrdzhonikidze, gain access to the Cross Pass and go aroundin Transcaucasia. The mastery of the Elbrus massif was of great importance forensuring the transition from the Kuban Valley to the Baksan Gorge through the associated passes Khotyu-Tau, Khasan-Choi-Syurulgen, Azau and Chiper-Azau.

The Soviet front collapsed under the attacks of German tank divisions.troops. The Soviet 46th Army of the Transcaucasian Front was pushed back to the high mountain passes west of Elbrus and retreated into the mountains in scattered units. And the German mobile divisions in in perfect order underthey walked to the border of the mountains and waited for the approach of the mountain rifle and ranger divisions. The hour of the mountain rangers has come!

Along with the advanced detachments formed in the divisions, advanced detachments were independently created in each of the regiments. Razgruthey took the property from the rear from trucks, loaded mountain rangers onto them,pack animals and all the essentials. The race to the mountains has begun.Soon the advanced detachments were already at the foot of the mountains.

The First Mountain Rifle Division was to advance along the Military-Sukhumi Road, the southern part of which in the Kodori Valley, 16 kilometers southeast of Sukhumi, connects with the coastal road. ChetThe 1st Mountain Division had to advance through difficultaccessible valley of the Bolshaya Laba to the sources of the Bzybi, which flows into 64 kilometers northwest of Sukhumi into the Black Sea.

10 August 1942 advanced detachment of Laval came out to the foothills near Nevinnomyssk.On August 5, the city was taken by the 3rd Panzer Division. DuringFor five days, Soviet troops retreated to the mountains.

On August 11, Laval's advanced detachment approached Cherkessk and capturedthere is an undestroyed bridge across the Kuban.

A mountain rifle battalion moved along the Military-Sukhumi roadvon Hirschfeld. The battalion was formed from the two best companies of the 98th and99th Mountain Rifle Regiment, had an additional special heavybad weapons. At the confluence of the Teberda and Kuban rivers north of Mikoyan-Shahara, the resistance of large enemy forces was overcome, whichry suffered heavy losses.The newly emerged large industry

The new village of Mikoyan-Shahar was taken.plin for capturing high mountain passes.

After the capture of Mikoyan-Shahar, von Hirschfeld's group was constantly onstepped on the enemy's heels. On August 14, she staged a “private battle onencirclement" for the capture of the village of Teberda. As a result of this “battle”, 23 guns were captured, among them 7 heavy ones, a large numbermortars and machine guns, two tanks, 96 trucks and 180 armored vehicles. VeThen von Hirschfeld’s group, south of the village, captured a small parade grounddarm across the river, restored the destroyed bridge and created conditions forcontinuation of the offensive.

On August 15, von Hirschfeld's group went on the offensive again.South of Tverda a real mountain battle began. The mountain road, which became worse and worse, was increasingly surrounded by spruce forests and slopesmountains, and soon it turned into just a path. Hiding behind the rocks andtrees, the enemy's rear cover was fought back. Twice platoons of mountain rangers were forced to wade along the icy mountain river. Many timesI had to go around the barriers.Strongly stretched out, marchesThe companies dug, followed by pack columns. U lumber camps

the forward guard reached the “Serpentine Shelter” at the foot of Klukhor.After reconnaissance of the area and allocation of security in the directionpass Dombay-Ulgen on August 16, it was necessary to move on, but soon it turned out that the pass could not be taken from the front,there were Soviettroops. Major von Hirschfeld, an excellent tactician, decided to introduce prothe enemy was misled by an attack from the front, unnoticed by him sent to

bypassed one of the groups subordinate to him and threw the enemy off the pass.The general impression was that the Russians felt very insecure in this unexpected situation, since, in general, we

stood behind them. AgainstNick retreated in two groups, each of which alternately covered another by fire. Pessinger's group immediately launched an attack from the front,got ahead of the enemy's cover, and we opened fire on the retreatingRussian.

The pass is ours! Night has come. We are all dead tiredWe were so tired that even the hard rocky ground did not interfere with sleep.On the evening of August 17, 1942, the Klukhorsky pass was taken by storm

. The highest point on the Military-Sukhumi road was atGerman hands. Neuhauser's group received two days' rest, and Captain Pössinger's battle group followed on the heels of the enemy. Elbrus.Although the Grotto was not hampered by enemy guards, it had to

overcome blown-up bridges, steep cliffs and impassable scree.At an altitude of almost 3000 meters below the wild southwestern slope of the ElbeRussian massif at the edge of the Ullu-Kam glacier campedgroup of 20 people. Pack group with weapons, ammunitionand lagged behind in food supplies. It was necessary to wait for her arrival.Before midnight, Grot sent a reconnaissance patrol of eight men under the command of intelligence officer Oberleutnant Schneider on a mission scout out the situation, location and capacity of shelters in the area

Elbrus.

Elbrus.Shelter 11, Germans Provided with inaccurate maps and completely unawarelocal conditions,Captain Grot with the signalman at 3:00 on August 17 went forSchneider's reconnaissance patrol in order to obtain as soon as possibleintelligence data. The remainder of his small detachment received orders towait for the pack column and, as soon as it arrives, follow him. At sunrise, Captain Grot and his signalman were at altitudeKhotyu-Tau pass (3546 meters). A wonderful view of thethe royal peaks of the Central Caucasus from Ushba and Dykh-tau toKoshtan-tau.In front of them lay stretching for 17 kilometers from the west. and to the east the tongues of the Azau, Gara-Bashish, Terskol and Jika glaciers Ugon-Kes. The grotto couldn’t believe his eyes when in the middle of this eroded noah, crossed by numerous faults of the icy desert, insix kilometers away from me on a rock, 650 meters higher, I saw a coveredmetal hotel sparkling in the sun. There was no Schneider patrol it is seen. At night, he left not a trace on the solid ice of the Azau glacier. Grotto

was confident that Schneider and his men had captured significantgiven and apparently an uninhabited building. In a clearly visible place onalong the path, he placed a written order to the main group to immediately followfollow him.

Meanwhile, the following happened: by morning Schneider reachedthis peculiar building, reminiscent of an airship, and in a timely manner

discovered that it was occupied by the enemy.makes sense! In front of Russian machine guns! First, he ordered his faithful signalman, the Munich fireplace cleaner Steiner, to lie down next to Schwartz. Then he took a white handkerchief from his backpack and, wavingthem, with a view complete despair, barely alive from fatigue, walked heavilythrough the loose snow to the nearest Russian machine-gun emplacement. Grottoallowed himself to be captured without resistance.Red Army soldiers, armed with rifles with fixed bayonets, led him to the hotel, whereThere was a group of officers standing there. The command post was located at the weather station.Grot, with an experienced eye, noticed an old experienced mine commanderrifle company. Her full-blooded platoon, consisting of the Kyrgyz mountainsmilitary riflemen, occupied a hotel and exemplarily prepared defensestelial positions. With the help of what was drawn in the report notebooksketch and the peculiar broken language of the eastern front, which allowed, if necessary, establish mutual understanding between people, in those cases when it was necessary to overcome the European-Asian languageforge border, fighting for his life and the success of the operation, Grotmanaged to explain to the Russian commander that he was surrounded on all sides. They're approaching from everywheresuperior forces, and he, the captain, is sent toas an envoy, is authorized to provide the owners with free

retreat to prevent bloodshed.The unthinkable happened: after a long meeting, which was held civil meteorologists with their working headquarters, Russian subsectionnie and scientists, having seized weapons, began to descend into the Baksan valley. Theyleft four armed, narrow-eyed soldiers.Their task was towas uttered in a whisper, and the captain did not understand it. Fate decreed thisin such a way that all four turned out to be peaceful peasants from the fruit paradise of Osh and Fergana. Grot fed them pies and gave them tea in the kitchen weather stations.It started a friendship. The rifles were put asideSteiner and Schwartz were called. Steiner took an imperial from his jacket pocket

Chinese militaryflag, Schwartz climbed to the meteorological flagpolestation and raised a flag on it as a sign of victory.The magnificent stronghold fell into the hands without a single shot.from the Germans. Schneider's reconnaissance patrol approached, closely following

adventurous. Over the course of the evening, frontline people fromthere were 150 places in 40 rooms and, in addition, large supplies of food and property. Having placed the necessary security the next dayUnfortunately, the climbers of the 1st and 4th divisions rested to gain strength for the climb to the top.

On August 19 and 20 there was a snowstorm and heavy hail. NotDespite this, the team tooktraining march to height 5000 meters to get used to the thin air. From trying to recover the trip on August 19 had to be abandoned. On the evening of August 20 on the radiofollowed a categorical order from the commander of the 1st Mountain Rifle Division to conquer the peak of Elbrus in a day. August 21 promised to befavorable, but in the morning it turned out that the forecasts were deceptive.

At night, a strong wind howled around the house. At 3:00 the team went toascent. It started snowing. The glow of the sky in the gray pre-dawnThe twilight did not bode well. Soon the snowstorm began, you see there was no bridge. Despite this, the group moved on, sixzok three people each, four of them are from the 4th Mountain Division Zia. A small group remained guarded at the Elbrus hotel.An enemy counterattack was still expected.

Elbrus, Germans

At 11:00, Chief Sergeant Kümmerle erected a flagpole with a Germanmilitary flag on an icy peak. Next to it were installedstandards of the 1st Mountain Division with edelweiss and 4th Mountain Divisionkovaya division - with gentian. The summit conquerors shook hands

hands.Then followed a careful descent along the same route. Already inWhile descending from the summit, it was noticeable that the military flag was torn by the wind

rum, it seemed that the gods were defending themselves from the invasion of their borders.At the same time (at 11:30) a Soviet mountaineering company formed from Pamiris, commanded by a famous Russian mountaineer,sailing at an altitude of 5000 meters, abandoned due to a snow stormordered her passage through the saddle of Elbrus to the Elbrus stateteenager Both for a weak hotel garrison and for an unarmedclimbing groups

possible meeting with Soviet mountain riflea company would be an unpleasant surprise.To reliably secure the eastern flank of the 49th Mountain Infantrycorps in the Elbrus area, the Grot company was reinforced by two combat groupsfrom the 99th Mountain Rifle Regiment climbed into a mountainous country rugged by gorges and closed the Azau Pass.Located at an altitude of 3000 meters near the Baksan glacier, the former royal hunting castle Krugozor is severalpassed from hand to hand several times, but in the end, German mountain rangers established a foothold there and took control of the deep Baksan Gorge. On coming out of it, the 1st Tank Army of Colonel General von was already fighting

Kleist. Of course, the enemy did not give up trying to take Elbrus again sky hotel(Shelter 11 – editor’s note). Again and again his troops approached her. In these opas walkie-talkiesThe best Soviet climbers took part. CaptainGusev headed these unusual cha

desirable operations from a military and mountain point of view. But they failedchi due to the vigilance of the garrison of the Elbrus hotel, the numberwhich by that time had grown to a company.In mid-September the enemy launched an offensive underaviation support. It was repulsed with heavy losses. Supportsnal point in the Elbrus hotel turned out to be impregnable if it

defend correctly. It remained continuously in German hands until the withdrawal.its garrison in early January 1943. Only at the end of winter the Soviets climbers repeated the German ascent on August 21, 1942 to replace the symbols.The reconnaissance of the Donguz pass undertaken by the Germans in early September

Orun at an altitude of 3198 m was discovered by the Russians, andsuffered heavy losses.August 14, when the 1st Mountain Division was already inlived in Teberda, the forward detachment of the 4th Mountain Rifle Division acrossLabinskaya went to the village of Opornaya, located at the foot of the mountains.The roads in the 4th Mountain Division's sector were very bad. NotDespite this, the division commander, General Eglseer, an experienced Austriana mountain rifle officer, did not lose confidence. He immediatelyHe immediately led all his units that had managed to arrive on the offensive to the south, into the Bolshaya Laba valley.

Here the fight against the enemy and natural conditions began. Many times I had to cross a fast mountain river. We had to build bridges, lay trails, and set up a cable car. Hardlysupplies were ensured.Nowit became clearer than ever that many transitions throughinformation about the actual condition of the roads, the German commander-in-chiefThe organization did not abandon its initially set tasks. And mountainthe rangers had to go further south along the impassable mountain valleys,yourself with a big dream that palm trees are about to appear on the beach in the distanceBlack Sea coast near Sukhumi.

After the capture of the Klukhor Pass by von Hirschfeld's battle grouppursuit group with numerous With powerful machine gun and mortar platoons it went further south. Main forces were still left behind. The main forces followed along the Teberda valley98th Mountain Rifle Regiment, trying to catch up with the advance detachment.The 99th Mountain Rifle Regiment marched along the Kuban valley, providing security in the Elbrus area.Walked far ahead, almost meeting no resistance,von Hirschfeld's battle group, but it experienced great difficultieswith supplies. The advance detachment established that the Military Sukhumi roadhectares from the Klukhor Pass to the village of Klych at the confluence of the Klych and Gvandra streams is just a broken country road. In the village of Klychvon Hirschfeld's battle group was already on August 21, the day when the The German flag was raised on the Elbrus bus.Near the village of Klych astrong Soviet defense. The Germans' exit from the mountains was blocked. Afterwardsdi subtropical vegetation, German mountain rangers had tolie down for a long time. From the south the wind brought clean air from the Black Sea. Before There was less than 50 kilometers of coastline. Close to the long-awaited targets, von Hirschfeld’s battle group was forced to wait until they pulled upother forces will appear with which one can dare to commit

last throw.Captain von Hirschfeld, of course, could not know that at Headquarters Verof the Supreme High Command in Moscow, Stalin energetically knocked ontable and ordered to stop further retreat and stop the German onslaught at least in the mountains and at the Baksan-Terek line. Hethreatened to put the commanders on trial, branded the command staff with disgrace until the regiment commander, inclusive, for mistakes in command, scolded the front's supply was worthless and threatened to take drastic measures if his orders will not be carried out properly.Commander of the 46th ArrayHe accused the Transcaucasian Front of doing too little to defend the passes. Too fast, for example, 3rd InfantryThe corps retreated through the passes of the Military-Sukhumi road.Therefore the Sovietthe command was forced to organize the defense of the

But then the German plan became known at Headquarters, according to which the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps was to open Cherno in the Sukhumi areasea ​​coast for the corps fighting to the west, and free forthem the way to Transcaucasia.

In the Soviet book “The Battle for the Caucasus,” the authors divided the fighting into many stages. In their opinion, on August 18, intensifiedresistance of Soviet troops.Having retreated to the Caucasus, Soviet troops were under management Central Committeeparty and Supreme Glavnoko orders of the Armed Forces Soviet Unionstrengthened the defense.Centers for training mortar and machine gunners were created foractions in mountainous areas, groups of carriers were formedworkers, the supply service was being established. In Transcaucasia, enterprises returned to the production of weapons and ammunition. CommandThe Transcaucasian Front demanded to immediately send into battlemountain rifle and retrained rifle units, establish contact with scattered broken units, reorganize them and send them to the battle. The Soviet Air Force partially took over the tasks of

supply.With the results of these new organizational changes, the group backgroundHirschfeld was able to meet her near the village of Klych. Although the colonelKress constantly sent new companies, a rush to the free plain from

it was not possible to accomplish.A new attempt was to clear the way. While the battle groupvon Hirschfeld with the reinforced 3rd Battalion of the 99th Mountain Infantryregiment pinned down the enemy from the front, Colonel Kress sent the 2nd battalionLyon 98th Mountain Rifle Regiment to cover the main Soviet forcesfrom the east. But the outreach team, led by Major Salminger,was counterattacked by Soviet units, scattered and overturned. Therefore, carry out the planned joint offensive of the 3rd battalion

The 99th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 98th Regiment failed.Until August 26, both battalions strengthened their positions near the village of Klych. Gradually the enemy pressure intensified. Presenting a big problemlogistics was difficult, it was even more difficultevacuate numerousmany wounded along a broken country road.Working for days without rest

military doctorsand junior medical staff. Increased activity of Soviet troops also manifested itself on the right flank of the 1st Mountain Rifle Division. Here they succeeded at nightbreak through to the Marukh Pass and withdraw on August 25 to the north a weak German guard, consisting of units13th Mountain Regiment, 4th Mountain Division. and the corps commander admitted that at the junction of two mountain rifledivisions, a dangerous situation is developing due to the breakthrough of at least five enemy battalions at the Marukh Pass.

Elbrus, Lanz, 1942

Bauer's 2nd Highland Battalion, which has just arrived in Teberda from the 1st Mountain Rifle Division was tasked: August 26 cross the Mukhinsky pass to the west to preventfurther advance of the enemy to the north, and then recapturehe has the Marukh Pass.

But soon the battalion met a strong resistance the enemy and stopped. Intelligence reported that Marukhsky Pere the shaft is busyIt will not be possible to take it with large enemy forces and take it on the move. The assault on the Marukh Pass was carefully preparedspecifically.At an altitude of 3145, located between the valleys, it was carried out General Lanz's meeting with

Lieutenant Colonel Eisgruber, battalion commanders and forward observers of the mountain artillery.The cloudy evening on September 4 turned into a clear frosty night. Soldiers of the 2nd Highland Battalion lay down on the saddle of Mount MarukhLyon and provided an excellent firing point. An icy wind blew across the ridge of the pass and pushed the drifting snow. The third and fourth companies dug in

into the snow caves and waited for the results of the reconnaissance.Then it came togethersaying: “The road is clear.” An outflanking maneuver of two high-mountain companies began.Deflecting to the east, two companies managed to reachrear to the enemy, whose entire attention was focused on findingWe are marching in front of him with the 1st battalion of the 98th regiment. Along the cut down icesteps, the 4th company crossed the saddle of Mount Marukh. Along the slope, along the southern wall of this glacier-covered saddle, she finally reached took up to the intended firing position. Seemed ghostlymountains, their glaciers and ridges on a clear frosty night. INmoonlightmatoThe peaks and snow fields covered with eternal snow glittered. There was dead silence. Only crampons on boots climbing ina mountain of soldiers creaked on the ice. Hours of night ascent completedit happened when they reached the starting position for the assault.

500 metersBelow them were the Russians defending the pass. They feeltion, heavy machine guns were installed. Below them, in the hollows and beyondmortar men with their mortars were stationed in lumps.

Dawn was slowly approaching. Soviet soldiers below on the passThey had not yet noticed that the German mountain riflemen were standing behind them.The bypass groups disciplinedly waited for the attack to begin. Between twohigh-mountain companies established visual communication.Then MajorBauer gave a sign. And immediately the entire 3rd company opened fire.Mortars and chayellow machine guns turned the mountain behind the enemy into a blazing

hell fire When the Russians tried to organize a defense, theyseven mountain guns fired.Then the 4th company began an attack on the flank, descended from the ridge along the ropesand rope ladders and rushed at the enemy, pinned to the ground fire from mountain rangers of the 3rd company and mountain guns. From a higher level The Russians fought back position after position. At 11.00 went on the offensive and the 1st Battalion, 98th Regiment. The defenders of the Marukh Pass, attacked from the front and from the eastern flank, had no chance. Way to goyes it was closed. The sound of gunfire died down. Only a few Russians succeeded in

the fissured slope to break through to the west, because herethe terrain did not allow creating a complete encirclement ring. German losses were seven dead and eight wounded.Was 300 killed Soviet soldiers and 557 prisoners were counted.

Along with great the number of small arms captured 19 heavy machine guns, 13 heavy mortars, 117 anti-tank rifles and a large numberin ammunition. While the 1st Mountain Rifle Division was fighting for the exit from Klychskaya tolines, group 4-1st Mountain Rifle Division under the command of regimentsNika Stettner von Grabenhofer, fought over the passes Adzapsh (2570 m) and Sancharo (2592 m). Colonel Buchner, followingwith the 13th Mountain Rifle Regiment in the second echelon along Zelenchukskaya valley to the left of Stettn era, was transferred through the Umpyrsky pass from the leftthe first flank of the 4th Mountain Division to the right in order to take possession of the ramparts of Pseshkho and Aishkho and create conditions for further offensive on Adler.Operating in two different main battle groups separated from one another by a distance of coast.

How did Stettner try to achieve this goal? On August 23, the 2nd battalion of the 13th regiment occupied labor without a fight.but accessible Adzapsh pass, located at an altitude of 2579 meters. Tre The third battalion of the 91st regiment captured the defended pass a little later Sancharo (2592). 25August the 3rd battalion of the 91st regiment took the 2726-meterAlistrakhu pass and turned the main forces to the west, to the route of the 2nd ba

talion of the 13th regiment. Both battalions rushed to the valley of the Bzyb River. On August 26, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment approached a smallmountain village of Pshu, to which Stettner's rangersgave the name "Wilderness by the Stream". Before the stream flows into the Bzyb KrupStrong enemy forces delayed further advance.Battle group forestablished defenses on three sides to ensure the delivery of ammunition and food.There were constant reports from intelligence agencies.patrols operating far ahead and on the flanks. Interrogations of prisoners confirmed reports that in front of Stettner's battle group he finds This is only a cover, trying to gain time to ensure the construction of the Sovietdefensive linein the southern spurs of the mountains. After

carefully weighing all factors, Colonel von Stettnerdecided to immediately attack the southern passes. On the morning of August 27, the enemy in front of Kampfgruppe von Stettnermoved away.Immediately 2nd

the battalion of the 13th regiment rushed along the Bzyb valleyto the east to capture the bridge 8 kilometers from the “Wilderness by the Stream”, which was an important crossing for further movement to the southern passes. Here he again encountered large enemy forces and was stopped.At this time, the 3rd Battalion of the 91st Regiment with all its pack animals was walking along the trail. After an hour and a half non-stop march, the road tothe pass at 1600 turned south and became significantly worse. Gusthat small forest, thickets of wild laurel, rhododendron bushes, fallen old trees and rushing streams blocked the road with from the very beginning of the march. Then a steep climb along a serpentine road, along a pile of

denies of stones, through passages reminiscent of a fireplace, demanded from peopledeeds and animals expend their last strength. Increasingly, it became necessary to the ability to unload animals and provide them with time to rest.At 9:30 the forward guard met a Caucasian shepherd. He's ska

The commander of the 3rd battalion of the 91st regiment, Major Groter, had just foundwho was with the forward guard, immediately sent the forward guard to the passa platoon of thirty mountain riflemen of the 12th company. They went light. To shorten the road and climb to a 400-meter height using ropes. Butthere it turned out that the real section of the pass was located further south. And theyLet's go further south! Finally, the path got lost in a dense forest amongnumerous serpentines. Further on both sides there were cliffs indeep gorges. There will be a strong point here!

At 10:00 the leading platoon reached this place and quickly took up defensive positions.At 10:05 the platoon opened fire on the first Soviet soldiers to appear, who did not at all expect to be fired at from such a close range. But they didn’t think of giving up so quickly.Followedwith them the units tried to bypass the position of the forward platoon andreach the road through the pass behind the Germans. But the wasps have already arrived

tactical platoons of the 12th company of the 91st regiment and stopped this attempt.Until August 30, Stettner's battle group consolidated on the captured

positions. Soviet units attacked every now and then.From this description, the reader can assess the general course of the offensive of Stettner's battle group, which, ultimately, was tostop him, already seeing the final goal. To the Black Sea coastthere were only 30 kilometers, but to go through them without receiving major damagefastenings was impossible. Here, very close to the goal of the campaign, there is a combatvon Stettner's group was forced to stop. Finding out the possibilitythe importance of sufficient and rapid supply of units, Colonel radio asked the question: “Do you have planes to provide supplies?”

nie? No, the main aviation forces were at Stalingrad. And the intelligence officernay squadron of Württemberg captain Beck, attached to the 49th mountainrifle corps, was fully loaded with reconnaissancedachas and evacuation of the seriously wounded. In the 1st Mountain Division

things were the same as with Stettner.September 2, 1942 Field Marshal List, Pol GeneralColonel Ruoff and General Konrad met in Krasnodar. During theit became clearthat the advance of the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps through the passes had failed. He had too little strength to overcomeof increasing resistance in the coastal areas of Chernyseas. Continuing the offensive with existing forces could lead toto the death of the mountain rifle corps, sincewas forced to stop near Tuapse and could not provide him with assistance.

Despite this, Hitler did not give up the idea of ​​forcing the mining industry again.rifle corpsadvance. After long discussions between the Fuhrer's headquarters and the mountain corps, a proposal was finally acceptedthe position of the corps command. He was given the order to move to defense at the commanding heights of the Abkhaz Caucasus.

At 11:30 on August 31, Colonel Stettner from the Bzyb River valley spoke via a newly installed communication line with division headquarters, onwalking 80 kilometers away from him. General Eglseer stated that the combatThe group must withdraw due to supply difficulties. Defense is necessary dimo will occupy north of the Bzyb River on the heights in front of “Glukhomanya”.

The division command also assumed that the withdrawal would continue.For Kampfgruppe von Stettner this was a difficult decision. After all it was about giving away so easily what had been won with great difficulty. The main reasonI really had to look hardsupply issues. The total volume of cargo needed for the 4th Mountain Division daily was about 30 tons, of whichthe majority fell to Kampfgruppe von Stettner.

If the weather worsened, it was impossible to ensure their delivery.The withdrawal has begun. On the evening of September 1, the main forces of the 3rd battalion of the 91st regiment were on the southern bank of the Bzyb, but could not cross

It was impossible because of the spill.The sappers arrived. At night they restored the bridge and began to buildconstruction of two more bridges. By the morning of September 2 it was not possible to transportnot a single person or animal yet from von Stettner's battle group. In the afternoon, the 3rd Battalion of the 91st Regiment took up a semicircle of defense near the bridge. Them Meanwhile, work on the construction of the bridge continued further. In this damned situation, Soviet units attacked and tried to surround the one standing further toeast of the 2nd battalion of the 13th regiment. Him onunits of the 3rd battalion of the 91st regiment came to help and overturnedwhether the enemy. At 9:30 on September 2, the cover radioed about the withdrawal. from the pass 1600. By evening the bridge was finally ready. Units startedcross to the other side, but in the dark the crossing became almost impossible possible. Mules constantly fell into a fast river more than20 meterspour.When the moon rose around midnight, it became easier, but by morning the north

Only units of the 3rd battalion of the 91st regiment crossed the new bank.By this time, the sappers had built two more crossings. Now we couldand loaded artillery platoons to cross. battle group background Stettner crossed to the other side and occupied a new defense

line on both sides of “Glukhomani”.The enemy knew about the plight of Kampfgruppe von Stettner,arose in connection with the crossing, again and again attacked the newly occupied positions, using shock troops for this. And only kindlinga large number of false campfires was temporarily weakened byvice But then continuous air raids began. On the evening of September 5 losses of the Stettner group from bombing in the Gluhoman area There were 16 killed, 45 wounded, and 106 pack animals were killed.

There was no longer any doubt: the Soviets wanted to destroy the battle grouppu von Stettner in the "Wilderness" valley.On September 7, the enemy onslaught was so strong that14:00 Stettner voluntarily, without waiting for the appropriate order from division headquarters, ordered a gradual retreat. And on time! Barely escaped encirclement, September 8, the last units of the battle group background

Stettner reached the saving passes of Adzapsh, Sancharo and Ali-fear.Just like in the 4th Mountain Division, and even earlier, the battleKress's group from the 1st Mountain Division was forced to withdraw

you are from the Klych valley. On the twenty-seventh of August, von Hirsch battalionsFeld and Salminger took up defense along the line of the Elbrus passes.From mid to late September, the onslaught of Soviet troops on occupied areas

In the meantime, the passes of the Main Range were constantly increasing. From some

• performances had to be abandoned.
• Then, after many rainy and foggy days, the mountain winter came. The fighting was constrained by snow and ice.

Defense of the Caucasus (Battle for the Caucasus) is a major defensive-offensive operation of Soviet troops during the second period of the Great Patriotic War in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. From July 25 to December 31, 1942, an offensive was carried out by the Germans, who managed to capture part of the territories;, however, after the defeat at Stalingrad, they were forced to retreat again, as they suffered serious losses and feared that Soviet troops would surround them. In 1943, the Soviet army planned an operation, as a result of which German troops were to be surrounded in the Kuban territory and defeated, but the operation failed - the Germans were evacuated to Crimea.

Background and balance of power

By June 1942, the Soviet army was in a weakened state after the failure at Kharkov. The German command, seeing that the Soviet troops could not provide worthy resistance, decided to launch an offensive in the Caucasus, taking advantage of the situation. After a series of battles, German troops were able to conquer several cities, including Rostov-on-Don, which opened the way for Hitler to the Caucasus.

The Caucasus, like Ukraine, was a very important strategic point that German troops sought to capture as early as possible. The Caucasus and Kuban contained large reserves of Soviet oil, grain and other crops, which could provide serious support for the German army to conduct further battles on the territory of the USSR. In addition, Hitler hoped that by reaching the sea he would be able to turn to Turkey for help. Moreover, the German command also counted on the help of the residents themselves, since they were aware that part of the local population did not accept Soviet power.

After the fall of Rostov-on-Don, communication between the Soviet command and the Caucasus could only be carried out by sea or by rail passing through Stalingrad. That is why Stalingrad became an important point that the Germans needed to capture. Despite the fact that Hitler threw enormous forces into the fight at Stalingrad, he was never able to take the city. The Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad. They suffered significant losses and, largely thanks to this, later they never managed to conquer the Caucasus.

Progress in the defense of the Caucasus

The battle took place in two stages. During the first stage, the German army, not without difficulty, managed to take a number of cities: Stavropol, Armavir, Maykop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok and part of Novorossiysk. In September 1942, the German army approached the Malgobek area, where it was stopped by Soviet troops.

The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus took place from July to December 1942. The German army was able to approach the foothills of the Caucasus Range and the Terek River, but this victory was not easy - Hitler’s troops suffered colossal losses. The original plan to capture Transcaucasia was never completed, despite the fact that the Germans were still leading in this operation - Soviet troops were able to stop the German offensive in time and force the army to stop fighting, since most of the army was simply destroyed. Türkiye also failed, because it never decided to enter the war and come to the aid of Hitler.

The German offensive failed largely due to the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad. Hitler, who laid too big hopes to take this city, he simply did not foresee the possibility that the Soviet army could defend Stalingrad and, consequently, one of the routes to the Caucasus.

As a result of numerous losses, by the beginning of 1943 the German army was numerically inferior to the Soviet one several times.

The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered a counter-offensive of Soviet troops, which became extremely successful for the Soviet Union. Territories previously captured by the Germans were recaptured, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Rostov region, Stavropol region and other areas Oil fields and grain crops were again returned to Soviet control, which provided a tremendous advantage in the war.

Despite the fact that the Soviet army was able to achieve serious successes, it cannot be considered that the victory definitely belonged to the Soviet Union, since the main goal that Stalin set for his army - to capture and destroy the Germans in Kuban - was never achieved. The German army fled to Crimea, however, despite this, the Caucasus returned again to the command of the USSR.

The meaning and results of the battle for the Caucasus

The successes of the Soviet Union in the battle for the Caucasus can be considered one of the most important parts of the general counter-offensive of the USSR in the second period of the war. At this time, the Soviet army not only began to recapture its territories and return captured people, but also greatly increased its combat power and could engage in battles with the German army on equal terms. The return to the control of the USSR of such an important strategic point as the Caucasus can be considered one of the greatest victories of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, the battle for the Caucasus had Negative consequences. Part of the population was accused of assisting the enemy and many of the local residents were later exiled to Siberia.

With the victory at Stalingrad and the battle in the Caucasus, the victorious march of the Soviet Union in the Second World War began.

On July 25, 1942, the Battle of the Caucasus began - one of the most dramatic battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Attack near Kushchevskaya

In the first days of the offensive in the Caucasus, German and Romanian troops met serious resistance in the area of ​​​​the villages of Shkurinskaya and Kushchevskaya, where they were detained for almost three days. One of the culminating moments of the battle was the attack on August 2, 1942, carried out by the Cossacks of the 17th Cavalry Corps on horseback. German troops were attacked on the march and did not have time to give a serious rebuff. The enemy's first line wavered and the battle began in Kushchevskaya, which changed hands three times. The feat of the Cossack Konsantin Iosifovich Nedorubov is noteworthy, who, together with his son, taking a good position near the embankment, destroyed several dozen enemy soldiers with automatic weapons fire and grenades. Subsequently, Nedorubov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; he is known as one of the five full Knights of St. George who became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Lieutenant Zubkov's battery

By September 11, 1942, German troops managed to capture most of Novorossiysk. However, the city and port were under constant Soviet artillery fire. One of the most effective stationary Soviet batteries was the 394th battery of four 100-mm guns, located at Cape Penai under the command of Lieutenant Andrei Emmanuilovich Zubkov. Initially, it was built to repel a possible attack from the sea, but since 1942. successfully operated against ground targets. In total, during the battles, the battery carried out 691 firings, firing more than 12 thousand shells. The battery was subjected to massive enemy artillery and air strikes. The crews suffered serious losses, and the guns were constantly damaged. Gun barrels and armor shields were replaced several times. In 1975, a museum and memorial complex was opened on the site of the legendary battery.

"Mountain Katyusha"

The Battle of the Caucasus was marked by the first use of M-8-8 rocket launchers, called “Mountain Katyushas”. The lightweight collapsible installation was located on a small site in the mountains and could simultaneously launch eight 82-mm rockets. Production of the first M-8-8 was launched in the workshop of the Riviera sanatorium in Sochi.

The first case of the use of mountain Katyushas at sea was the landing on the night of February 4 near Novorossiysk (the future Malaya Zemlya bridgehead). Then the seiner "Mackerel", equipped with twelve M-8-8 mounts, swept away the front line of the enemy's anti-landing defense.

Rare PPSh-41

Among the types of small arms used only in the battle for the Caucasus, one can note the machine guns of the Georgy Semenovich Shpagin system (PPSh-41, issued by the Bakinsky machine-building plant them. Felix Dzerzhinsky in the first half of 1942. The submachine gun was equipped with a sector sight for a distance of up to 500 meters. There was no interchangeability of disk magazines, which were customized for each submachine gun. On the barrel casing there is a mark in the form of the letters “FD” enclosed in an oval. Probably only a few tens of thousands of similar PPSh were produced, which found use only in the battle for the Caucasus. The further use of submachine guns produced in Baku in the Great Patriotic War has not yet been traced. One of these PPSh was found at Shelter 11 on Elbrus, where Lieutenant Grigoryants’ company died in September 1942.

In the Mucklgobeck direction

The battle for the Caucasus, which unfolded over a vast area, was marked by a number of tank battles. An example of successful combat against a superior enemy was the actions of the 52nd Tank Brigade in September-October 1942 in the Malgobek direction. On September 12, the German command threw about 120 tanks into the breakthrough, which were driven back with heavy losses. So the KV, under the command of Lieutenant Petrov, destroyed 14 German tanks during this battle. Subsequently, the 52nd Tank Brigade successfully operated against a numerically superior enemy, using tank ambush tactics and competently interacting with infantry and artillery.

Air battles over Kuban

While in April-May 1943 there was a certain calm on the front line, large-scale battles broke out in the air over the Kuban. The heaviest of them are in the Myskhako area, the villages of Krymskaya, Kievskaya and Moldavanskaya. Both sides suffered heavy losses, however, as a result, the enemy's advantage in aviation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was broken. It was for the battles over Kuban that the first Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Alexander Ivanovich Pokryshkin, the future three-time Hero of the Soviet Union and an air marshal.

Last operation

On September 9, 1943, the last battle for the Caucasus began - the Novorossiysk-Taman operation. Within a month, German troops on the Taman Peninsula were defeated. As a result of the offensive, the cities of Novorossiysk and Anapa were liberated, and the preconditions were created for a landing operation in Crimea. In honor of the liberation of the Taman Peninsula on October 9, 1943, a salute of 20 salvoes from 224 guns was given in Moscow.

The history of the battle for the Caucasus - how the situation developed on the fronts before it began, what was the balance of power. How the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus went, the victories and defeats of the Soviet command. What is famous about the second stage of the battle in the Caucasus, the main battles and results.

The Battle of the Caucasus 1942-1943 – a serious turning point in the course of the war

The battle for the Caucasus was of decisive importance for the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. Lose Soviet Union this battle and, quite possibly, the entire Second World War would have been lost. It was one of the longest and lasted from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943.

Time is inexorable. Today there are very few WWII veterans left - participants in that great struggle against the enemy. They try their best to surround them with care and attention, especially on the memorable dates of these events. Poems are dedicated to heroes in which their exploits are glorified. Children's drawing competitions are held on the theme of the Battle of the Caucasus, where children often depict warriors with orders and medals. These pictures once again remind us of how important it is to take care of the world.

Heroes and ordinary participants in the battle for the Caucasus can be seen in the photo on May 9 during the procession of the Immortal Regiment.

This victory came at a huge cost to us. What we call "the battle" was in reality a series of military operations. The battle for the Caucasus has a strategic division into two stages - the first was defensive (throughout 1942), and the second offensive (from the beginning of 1943).

Military-political situation in the first half of 1942

The beginning of the 1942 military campaign for our country was unsuccessful. Serious miscalculations were made in the planning and conduct of operations along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

Previous Events

Having carried out several successful operations in the winter of 1941, in particular, near Moscow, Yelets, Rostov and other settlements, the military leadership of the Soviet Union made erroneous conclusions about the unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht army for combat operations in winter conditions (which were partly true). The military potential of the Hitlerite group is Eastern Front overall was greatly underrated.

Attempts to seize the initiative in the winter and spring of 1942 through numerous private offensive operations led to failure. Thus, the Rzhev-Vyazemsk, Smolensk, Kharkov operations, also in the Crimea, the battle for the Demyansk cauldron and others, in a number of cases, were marked by local successes. As a result, Soviet troops even managed to capture some of the territories, but overall they ended in failure with a huge number of losses in manpower and equipment.

By the summer, the Red Army switched to positional defense. Another strategic mistake was the assumption put forward by the Soviet command that the Nazis’ summer campaign would again develop in the old directions (Moscow, Leningrad), assigning secondary importance to the south. It was there that the main battles were expected. The attack on the Caucasus came as a surprise.

The importance of the Caucasus during the war

By 1942, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Crimea, Donbass were lost, Leningrad was under siege. The economic base of the USSR narrowed. A number of industrial areas were lost, and the evacuated enterprises had not yet reached the required capacity. Significant agricultural areas were lost. As a result, steel production decreased by 10 million tons, grain harvests decreased by more than 3 times. We should not forget about the significant reduction in mobilization resources due to the loss of vast territories.

Under the current conditions, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia turned out to be key industrial and agricultural regions for the Soviet Union. They accounted for 86.5% of all-Union oil production, 65% of natural gas, 56.5% of manganese ore. In addition, the trade route through the Persian Gulf, Iran and the Caspian Sea was second only to the Northern Sea Route for Lend-Lease supplies.

The balance of forces and means before the start of the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus

For fascist Germany The Caucasus was also vitally important, mainly due to the lack of oil and petroleum products. The technical equipment of the army grew, and so did their consumption. Germany's own industry was struggling. Even the captured oil-bearing territories of Europe, as well as the production of synthetic, or “ersatz fuel” from coal, alcohol, benzene and others, barely met the needs.

Plans of the German command

During the unsuccessful Kharkov offensive operation of the Soviet troops, the Nazis reached the Don and occupied Rostov. On the basis of the fascist army group “South”, two army groups were created - “A” and “B”.

Group “A” included 3 armies - one tank and two infantry. Their task at the first stage was to cross the Don, occupy part of the Kuban, the North Caucasus, and the eastern coast of the Azov and Black Seas. On the second, they were supposed to go around the Main Caucasus Range from the west and east and through the passes into Transcaucasia. In addition, with access to the border of Turkey, force it to enter into a war with “Soviet Russia”.

Field Marshal List was appointed commander. He was instructed to solve the combat mission by consistently implementing the plan Operation Edelweiss. List was later recalled by Hitler from the front and a new commander, Colonel General Kleist, was appointed in his place. Thus, from November 1942, the reins of power passed to him.

Group B was intended to attack Stalingrad. It is obvious that the Stalingrad direction was initially secondary.

In the Caucasian direction, 3 fronts were deployed: Southern, North Caucasian, Transcaucasian.

Southern Front had 5 armies, whose task was to prevent the crossing of the Don and the development of an offensive in the Kuban and the Caucasus. General Malinovsky was appointed commander.

North Caucasus Front consisted of one army and two separate corps. They were tasked with defending the northeastern and eastern coasts of the Black and Azov Seas. The commander was Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny.

Transcaucasian Front consisting of two armies and one cavalry corps, defended the Black Sea coast with our naval bases located in Georgia. Part of the forces was located in northern Iran to cover the Iranian-Turkish border.

All three fronts were not fully equipped, and there were problems with logistics support.

The Black Sea Fleet experienced difficulties due to the loss of Crimea and its main base - the city of Sevastopol. At this time, Novorossiysk became his replacement. In addition, enemy aircraft from Crimean airfields caused significant damage.

The Caucasus as a theater of military operations began to be equipped back in 1941, but the work proceeded extremely slowly and ineffectively. In addition, nothing was done in terms of fortification on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. It seemed that they were not going to fight in the mountains at all. Everything had to be corrected in a short time and during the course of hostilities.

Developments in the defense of the Caucasus

By July 25, Wehrmacht formations unexpectedly reached the Don. Soviet units had to urgently prepare for defense.

Alignment of forces at the 1st stage of the battle

The superiority of Army Group A over the troops of the Southern Front turned out to be as follows:

• in personnel by 1.5 times;
• in tanks 9.3 times;
• in airplanes 7.7 times.

The enemy had the advantage necessary for an offensive to force a water barrier only in tanks and aircraft. But the troops of the Southern Front defended a strip 320 kilometers wide, and their forces were stretched thin. There was no opportunity to form strong second echelons and reserves. All these prerequisites led to the fact that in some places the Nazis, through skillful maneuvering, were able to create the necessary advantage.

German offensive

In the first two days, the Nazis managed to cross the Don in certain sectors of the front and break through the defenses. Further, developing the offensive, enemy formations reached Bataysk. In some places, the preconditions arose for the encirclement of parts of the Southern Front. In addition, with the entry of German tank units into the steppe, it became possible to cut the front into two parts.

Under these conditions, our command decided to retreat. However, due to the rapid advance of the Nazis, our troops failed to organize an organized retreat, much less maneuverable defense. The retreat turned into flight. Thus, the combat effectiveness of the Southern Front was partially lost, therefore July 28th it was disbanded and included in the North Caucasus.

After this date, a partial regrouping of both our and German troops took place. The Nazis continued to rapidly develop their offensive and by the end of August 19 they had practically completed their immediate task. Most of the Kuban was captured, the cities of Maykop, Stavropol, Armavir, Elista, and Krasnodar fell. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. The Azov flotilla was forced to evacuate and subsequently became part of the Black Sea Fleet.

Battles for Novorossiysk, Malgobek and in the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range. Defense of Tuapse

The Red Army was able to organize serious resistance only on the approaches to Tuapse, thereby preventing a large group of our troops from being surrounded and blocking the path to the Black Sea.

Further plans of the command of the German Army Group A consisted of a simultaneous offensive along three main transport arteries:

• along the Black Sea coast Anapa-Poti-Batumi;
• through the Main Caucasus Range in the direction of Sukhumi-Kutaisi;
• from the east, bypassing the ridge through Pyatigorsk-Prokhladnoye-Ordzhonikidze in the direction of Grozny, Makhachkala and Baku.

The Soviet leadership took a number of measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. First of all, the Transcaucasian Front was strengthened with two rifle corps and eleven separate rifle brigades from the Headquarters reserve. A number of formations were transferred from the Makhachkala and Baku region to occupy defensive lines along the Terek and Urukh rivers.

At the end of August, Lavrentiy Beria arrived in the Caucasus to provide general supervision of defense preparations. According to his instructions, work was carried out on the engineering equipment of protective lines, strongholds, and nodes of engineering barriers on the passes of the Caucasus Range, the engineering and sapper group was significantly strengthened, and the main mountain roads.

On August 19, the German offensive resumed with simultaneous attacks on Anapa and Temryuk and the Taman Peninsula. It was not possible to take Anapa the first time. The Germans succeeded only on August 31st. At the same time, they cut off marine units from the main forces on the Taman Peninsula. As a result of the partially successful actions of September 11, almost all Novorossiysk.Subsequent attempts to capture the city were completely unsuccessful. His the defense lasted almost a year.

On August 23, 1942, attempts to attack Mozdok began. Two days later the city fell. Subsequently, having crossed the Terek, the Germans managed to advance 10 km with heavy losses. However, this offensive was not continued. A little further they managed to pass along railway Prokhladnoye-Ordzhonikidze-Grozny in the direction of the Grozny oil region. However, the troops did not allow them further than Malgobekanashi. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive in this area as well.

Simultaneously with offensive actions in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, the Wehrmacht organized attempts to cross the Main Caucasus Ridge. The soldiers of the German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps even managed to plant a fascist flag on Elbrus. In February 1943, it was removed from the mountain top and installed by the Soviets.

Towards the end of September 1942, the situation in the North Caucasus was relatively stabilized, thanks to successful defensive actions, as well as due to the transfer of part of the German forces to the area of ​​the Battle of Stalingrad. The enemy's offensive potential was exhausted. Therefore, by the end of September, the Germans launched only isolated attacks in the Novorossiysk and Grozny directions.

On September 25, 1942, an attempt was made to advance towards Tuapse. After five days of stubborn fighting, there was a danger of the city being captured, but the enemy was stopped by two counterattacks. Subsequently, the Germans made two more attempts - in October and November, which were also unsuccessful. As a result of prolonged positional defensive battles, the enemy was stopped and forced to switch to defense in December 1942.

At the end of October, a series of successful actions allowed the enemy to capture Nalchik and Gizel. The Soviet command partially minimized these losses when counterattacks and encirclement large group The Germans were liberated by Gisel.

In addition, in a number of sectors of the Mozdok front, during November the prerequisites were created for counter-offensive actions. However, due to miscalculations in the development of the operation and an incorrect assessment of the enemy, it was not possible to break into the Nazi defenses until mid-December. The offensive was delayed until January 1943.

Results of the 1st stage of the battle for the Caucasus

The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus in 1942 for the Red Army turned out to be very difficult and bloody. Our troops suffered heavy losses. Despite their stubborn resistance, the enemy continued to advance deeper into the country. The main positive results of the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered the following:

• Operation Edelweiss failed, the Caucasian nut was too tough for Hitler;
• the Germans never managed to capture the oil-bearing regions of our country;
• The Wehrmacht was unable to penetrate the Middle East;
• Türkiye never entered the war;
• the enemy lost more than 100 thousand killed.

The defeat of the German group during the counteroffensive

By January 1943, the Red Army managed to create an advantage in manpower and equipment in the zones of action of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts.

Alignment of forces at the beginning of the 2nd stage of the battle

IN numerically superiority was:

• in personnel by 1.4 times;
• in guns and mortars by 2.1 times;
• in tanks 1.8 times;
• in airplanes 1.7 times.

Some problems arose with the logistical support of the fronts. Firstly, difficult terrain and unstable weather. Secondly, the main routes for delivering material and personnel from the depths of the country were possible only by sea. Therefore, the main burden fell on the Caspian Flotilla and, to a lesser extent, on the Black Sea Fleet.

Both fronts had the task of encircling and not letting the enemy out of the North Caucasus and Kuban with coordinated strikes with the support of the Black Sea Fleet and two air armies. It was not possible to complete this task.

The German command understood the complexity of the situation. In the Stalingrad direction, the Nazi troops suffered a crushing defeat. There was a risk of getting another encirclement of Army Group “A” in the North Caucasus direction. Therefore, the decision was made to retreat. It was planned to be carried out by a sequential withdrawal to pre-selected lines, of which there were four planned, with cover by strong rearguards (classical maneuverable defense).

At the beginning of January, parts of the Wehrmacht began to retreat. At the beginning, the situation turned out well for the Germans. They managed to significantly break away from the Soviet troops. At this stage, our command did not have a sufficient number of mobile formations that could constrain the maneuver by actions on the flanks. There were only cavalry corps, which could not cope with this task.

The Nazis managed to stay ahead of our units and formations for several days. Therefore, it was decided not to scatter forces and resources, but to concentrate on the right flank and reach possible escape routes.

In the first weeks of the persecution, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Mineral water. On January 21, Stavropol was cleared of fascist units. And yet, pushing the enemy out of the North Caucasus was unprofitable; it had to be locked in, and our troops acted late. Under these conditions, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was reorganized on January 24 into the North Caucasus Front under the command of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov.

The Red Army failed to immediately capture Bataysk and Krasnodar; the battles near Tuapse became protracted. There were not enough forces to block the Nazis' retreat to Rostov.

In the current situation, plans required adjustment. As a result, the Soviet command decided to concentrate its main efforts on preventing the enemy from retreating to Rostov, the Taman Peninsula and his retreat to Crimea through the Kerch Strait. In addition, Krasnodar had to be captured as soon as possible.

On February 14, Rostov was liberated. Almost simultaneously, to the south, our troops defeated the encircled Krasnodar enemy group and liberated the city itself.

In the sky over Kuban from April 17 to 24 The largest air battle unfolded, from which Soviet aviation emerged victorious.

Decisive battles on the Taman Peninsula

The retreat to the Taman Peninsula could not be prevented. In this sector, the front narrowed and the enemy managed to thicken the battle formations. Our troops met stubborn resistance. The Nazis concentrated a group of 400 thousand on the peninsula. They wanted to hold this bridgehead at any cost. On its territory, the Nazis erected a well-known defensive line - the “Blue Line”.

Soon the protracted Novorossiysk-Taman operation began, which became the final one in the battle for the Caucasus.

The fighting continued there from February to October 1943. The enemy units did achieve some success here. After the start of the offensive of our troops in Ukraine in September of the same year, the Nazis managed to evacuate over two hundred thousand personnel, all horses, equipment and supplies from the Taman Peninsula to Crimea.

In early February, a landing was carried out south of Novorossiysk. The Marines managed to capture part of the coastal areas. Subsequently, this bridgehead will be called “Malaya Zemlya”. Fierce fighting there continued until the liberation of Novorossiysk. This only happened on September 16th.

By October 9, 1943, the Taman Peninsula was completely liberated. Thus ended the battle for the Caucasus.

Residents of the mountainous regions helped our army as guides. Maps of that time did not fully reflect mountain roads and trails. In addition, a paper map could not replace an experienced mountaineer.

After summing up the results of this great historical battle in May 1944, the Medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus"

Results of the 2nd stage of the battle for the Caucasus

The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus was generally positive for the Soviet Union. The results are as follows:

• all the republics of the North Caucasus, most of the territory of Kuban, the eastern coast of the Black and Azov Seas were liberated;
• the main cultivated areas and the Maikop oil regions were returned;
• a major military defeat was inflicted on Nazi Germany.

The negative aspects include the fact that the Germans managed to retain most of Army Group “A”; they were never able to lock it in the Caucasus.

_______________________

Our victory is woven from many battles. Among them, the battle in the Caucasus of 1942-1943 became the longest in the entire Great Patriotic War. The Russian soldier has once again shown that no matter where he fights, be it the forests of the Moscow region, the swamps near Leningrad, the Kuban steppes or the Caucasus mountains, he will survive and win.

The heroic defense of the Caucasus became part of military history Soviet Union, and later Russia. This battle took its rightful place in the list of feats of Russian weapons.

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Battle for the Caucasus (defensive period from July 25 to December 31, 1942)

Year after year, the events of the Great Patriotic War move further and further away from us. The means of armed struggle and views on its conduct are changing. However, its results and the most important lessons still have enormous theoretical and practical significance today. The experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces in the fight against German aggressors is an inexhaustible source for further development domestic military science. In this regard, the modern generation of commanders needs to deeply study and carefully select from the past everything that has not lost value even today, that can be creatively used in training troops.

During the years of the last war, the Soviet Armed Forces carried out offensive and defensive strategic operations as a set of coordinated and interconnected strikes, operations and combat operations of associations and formations of various types of armed forces in order to achieve strategic goals. The main criteria on the basis of which a particular operation can be classified as strategic include the following: solution of important strategic tasks and achievement of major military-political goals, large spatial scope of military operations and participation in them significant amount forces and means, as well as planning by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) and coordination of the actions of fronts, fleet forces and other types of armed forces by its representatives. All these criteria can be fully attributed to one of the battles of the Great Patriotic War - the battle for the Caucasus.

The battle for the Caucasus was one of the longest in the Great Patriotic War. It lasted 442 days (from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943) and went down in the history of military art as a complex of defensive and offensive operations carried out over a vast territory in difficult conditions of steppe, mountainous and mountain-wooded terrain, in coastal areas . Its content included the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation, which lasted more than five months, the North Caucasus strategic offensive operation, the Novorossiysk landing operation, the Krasnodar and Novorossiysk-Taman offensive operations, which lasted a total of more than nine months. During these operations, troops of the Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts, together with units of the internal and border troops of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), in cooperation with the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, Azov and Caspian military flotillas, in fierce battles and battles, exhausted the formations of the German Army Group “A” stopped their advance and, having defeated them, expelled them from the Caucasus.

The task is to stop the enemy, to wear him down in defensive battles...

In the strategic plans of the German leadership, the capture of the Caucasus, where before the war up to 95% of all oil in the USSR was produced, was given an important place. At a meeting in Poltava in June 1942, Hitler said: “If we fail to capture the oil of Maykop and Grozny, then we will have to stop the war!” That is why, apparently, the plan of the German command on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1942 included delivering the main blow in the Caucasian direction with a simultaneous attack on Stalingrad.

The plan for the operation, codenamed “Edelweiss,” was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov and seize the North Caucasus. In the future, it was envisaged that one group of troops would bypass the Main Caucasus Range from the west and capture Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and the other would attack from the east with the goal of capturing Grozny and Baku. Simultaneously with this bypass maneuver, it was planned to overcome the ridge in its central part through passes with access to the regions of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi. With a breakthrough in Transcaucasia, the enemy hoped to paralyze the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, achieve complete dominance in the Black Sea, establish direct contact with the Turkish army and thereby create the preconditions for an invasion of the Near and Middle East.

To solve such large-scale problems, the German command concentrated Army Group A (commander Field Marshal V. List) in the Caucasian direction, consisting of the German 1st, 4th Tank, 17th and 11th armies, 3rd Romanian army. They were supported by units of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, Army Group A consisted of over 170 thousand people, 1130 tanks, about 4.5 thousand guns and mortars, and up to 1 thousand aircraft. At this time, the 6th Army from Army Group B was aimed at Stalingrad.

These groups had high combat effectiveness and were impressed by recent victories. Many of their formations took part in the defeat of Soviet troops near Kharkov and southwest of Voronezh; in the June battles, moving towards the lower reaches of the Don, they immediately captured a number of bridgeheads on its left bank.

The German Army Group A was opposed by the troops of the Southern and part of the forces of the North Caucasus fronts. At first glance, they included many armies - the 51st, 37th, 12th, 18th, 56th combined arms and 4th air force. However, all of these armies, except the 51st, suffered significant losses in previous battles and numbered only 112 thousand people, 120 tanks, about 2,200 guns and mortars and 130 aircraft. They were inferior to the enemy in men by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 2 times, in tanks by more than 9 times, and in aviation by almost 8 times. To this must be added the lack of stable control of formations and units, which was disrupted during their hasty retreat to the Don.

The Soviet troops were faced with a very difficult task of stopping the enemy, exhausting him in defensive battles and preparing the conditions for going on the offensive. Back on July 10-11, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the Southern and North Caucasian fronts to organize defense along the river. Don. However, the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the fronts was complicated by the fact that the armies of the Southern Front fought intense battles with the advancing large German forces in the Rostov direction. They essentially had neither the time nor the means to prepare the defense of the left bank of the Don.

By this time, troop control in the Caucasian direction had not been restored. In addition, close attention VGK rates and the General Staff at that time was devoted to the Stalingrad direction, where the enemy was rushing to the Volga.

Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the armies of the Southern Front (commanded by Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky) by July 25 retreated to the southern bank of the Don in a strip 330 km long, from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river. They were weakened and outnumbered, with only 17 tanks. Some of them had no contact with front headquarters.

Troops of the North Caucasus Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny, meanwhile, continued to defend the coasts of the Azov and Black Seas to Lazarevskaya, and the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, led by Army General I.V. Tyulenev, covered the Black Sea coast from Lazarevskaya to Batumi, the border with Turkey and provided communications for Soviet troops in Iran. The 44th Army was located in the Makhachkala region and covered the coast of the Caspian Sea.

The Black Sea Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky), after the loss of Sevastopol and Kerch, was based in the ports of the Caucasus coast, which were in the zone of action of German aviation. It was supposed to interact with ground forces in the defense of coastal areas, provide sea transportation, and also strike at enemy sea communications.

In such extremely unfavorable conditions for the Soviet troops, the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation unfolded.

North Caucasus strategic defensive operation

On July 26, 1942, the enemy, starting active actions, began to intensively transport his units to the southern bank of the Don. In the current situation, Headquarters is taking measures to repel the enemy’s offensive. In order to combine efforts and improve command and control of troops in the North Caucasus, the armies of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts were united into one North Caucasian Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were operationally subordinate to him. The newly created front was given the task of stopping the enemy’s advance and restoring the situation along the left bank of the Don. Such a task was practically impossible, since the enemy had complete initiative and led an organized offensive with superior forces. In addition, it turned out to be extremely difficult to ensure control of the combat operations of front troops in a strip more than 1000 km long. Therefore, the Headquarters allocated two operational groups as part of the North Caucasus Front: Don, led by Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky and Primorskaya, led by Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko.

The troops of the Transcaucasian Front received the task of occupying and preparing for defense the approaches to the Caucasus from the north. In this regard, the Front Military Council developed a combat action plan, which Headquarters approved on August 4. Its essence was to stop the enemy’s advance at the Terek line and the passes of the Main Caucasus Range. The troops of the 44th Army were entrusted with the defense of Baku and Grozny, covering the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads. The defense of the Black Sea coast was entrusted to the 46th Army.

The fighting in the North Caucasus at the end of July - beginning of August took on an extremely dynamic character. Possessing numerical superiority and command of the initiative, the German corps quickly advanced towards Stavropol, Maikop and Tuapse. Under these conditions, in order to restore the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops and ensure the defense of the Caucasus from the north, on August 8, Headquarters united the 44th and 9th armies into the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front, and on August 11, it included the 37th Army. Lieutenant General I.I. was appointed commander of the group. Maslennikov. An important place was also given to strengthening cover in the direction of Maikop, Tuapse, as well as the defense of Novorossiysk. The measures taken since mid-August had a positive effect on increasing resistance to the enemy.

Nevertheless, the enemy had sufficient forces to develop a simultaneous offensive both in the direction of Baku and Batumi by formations of the 1st Tank and 17th Field Armies, and to capture the passes of the Main Caucasus Range by units of the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps. At the end of August, the Germans managed to capture Mozdok, and they intended to develop an offensive against Grozny. However, this plan was thwarted by active defensive actions of the Soviet troops.

In mid-August, intense fighting broke out in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range. At first, they were clearly not in favor of the Soviet troops, who poorly organized defense in the foothills. The Germans, with forces specially trained for operations in the mountains, were able to quickly capture almost all the passes west of Mount Elbrus, creating a threat to access to Sukhumi and coastal communications. After the intervention of the Headquarters in the course of hostilities and its demands to strengthen the defense of the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military roads, the situation here improved somewhat. The enemy, repelling counterattacks from formations of the Northern Group of Forces, was forced to go on the defensive.

At the same time, there were battles near Novorossiysk and Tuapse. By mid-September the enemy managed to capture most of Novorossiysk, but his attempts to break through to Tuapse along the coast were thwarted. Back on September 1, the Headquarters made an important organizational decision - to unite the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts. The united front was called the Transcaucasian Front. The Directorate of the North Caucasus Front formed the basis of the Black Sea Group of the Transcaucasian Front, which significantly increased the stability of defense on the coastal section of the front.

In October-December, the German command again attempted to conduct an offensive in the Tuapse and Grozny directions, however, having encountered stubborn resistance from Soviet troops, it was unable to achieve noticeable success.

In the autumn months of 1942, the armies of the Transcaucasian Front, having received reinforcements, significantly intensified their actions, launching a series of counterattacks that forced the enemy to constantly change their intentions and more and more often go on the defensive. Gradually the situation stabilized, and then the initiative began to shift to the side of the Soviet troops.

During the North Caucasus strategic defensive operation (July 25 - December 31, 1942), troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts, forces of the Black Sea Fleet carried out Armaviro-Maikop (August 6-17), Novorossiysk (August 19 - September 26), Mozdok -Malgobek (September 1-28), Tuapse (September 25 - December 20), Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze (October 25 - November 11) defensive operations. As a result, their enemy was stopped east of Mozdok, on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range, in the southeastern part of Novorossiysk. Intense battles were fought at a front from 320 to 1000 km and to a depth of 400 to 800 km.

Defensive operations were carried out in extremely difficult conditions and in conditions unfavorable for the Soviet troops. The enemy managed to achieve significant successes during these battles, capture the rich agricultural regions of the Don and Kuban, the Taman Peninsula, reach the foothills of the Main Caucasus Range, capturing part of its passes. However, the Soviet troops, having withstood the powerful onslaught of the enemy, decided main task- stopped and did not allow the Germans to access Baku and Grozny oil. In stubborn defensive battles, they inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, bleeding his strike force dry.

It is necessary to note the great role of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff in directing military operations in the Caucasus. Their Special attention was focused on restoring the stability of the command and control system and immediately taking measures to improve it. Despite the difficult situation in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, Headquarters in every possible way strengthened the troops of the North Caucasus direction with its reserves. Thus, from July to October 1942, the fronts operating in the Caucasus received about 100 thousand marching reinforcements, a significant number of formations and units of military branches and special troops, and a considerable amount of weapons and equipment.

The defense of the Caucasus took place in the difficult conditions of the mountain theater, which required the troops to master specific forms and methods of fighting with the use of all types of weapons. The troops gained experience in conducting combat operations in different directions, building deep-echelon combat formations, and interacting with all branches of the military. The organization of formations and units was improved. They were reinforced with engineering equipment, transport, including pack vehicles, equipped with mountain equipment, and received more radio stations.

During defensive operations ground troops interacted with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla, whose ships covered their flanks from the sea, supported them with naval and coastal artillery fire, carried out anti-landing defense of the coast, and disrupted the enemy’s supply by sea.

In addition, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov, Volga and Caspian military flotillas provided great assistance to the troops, carrying out sea transportation of reserves, delivery of military cargo, and timely evacuation of the wounded and material assets. In the second half of 1942, the fleet transported more than 200 thousand people and 250 thousand tons of various cargo, sank 51 enemy ships with a total displacement of 120 thousand tons.

In November 1942, the enemy's offensive capabilities in the Caucasus were depleted, and the activity of Soviet troops increased noticeably. There was a turning point in the course of the battle, which was decisively facilitated by a sharp change in the situation at Stalingrad, where the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts, which went on a counteroffensive, surrounded a large enemy group and were preparing to eliminate it.

As a result of defensive operations carried out by Soviet troops in the Caucasus, the enemy was seriously defeated, and the initiative in this strategic direction began to pass into the hands of the Soviet command. Despite the fact that in the Caucasian direction, enemy troops managed to occupy a significant part of the territory of the North Caucasus, they were unable to overcome the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops, capture the oil sources of the Grozny and Baku regions and other sources of valuable strategic raw materials. In addition, the plans of the Hitlerite leadership, through a breakthrough in the Transcaucasus, to draw Turkey into the war against the USSR, to unite with their troops operating in North Africa, and to continue aggression towards the Middle East, failed. In a difficult situation, the Soviet command retained some naval bases that supported the fleet's operations, and also created the conditions for the troops to launch a decisive offensive. The plans of the fascist German command to seize the Caucasus were thwarted by the efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces with the active assistance of the entire Soviet people, including the peoples of the Caucasus.

The defense of the Caucasus, undoubtedly, was an important source of development of domestic military science. Defensive operations carried out by Soviet troops, even today, represent a certain instructiveness, practical significance and special relevance for military theory and practice in preserving the independence and integrity of the Fatherland.

Sergey Grebenyuk, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of the Department of the Research Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces