Soviet Finnish war 1939 1940 reasons. Official Finland did not follow a friendly German policy

02.07.2021 -

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany started a war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to splinter. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on the delimitation of spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a big war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be fired upon by artillery from the territory of Finland. Therefore, the task was to push the border further north. For a peaceful solution of the issue, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They did not want to agree.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was the incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery fire, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov called the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and handed a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and only the fact that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations saved from starting a war.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main points of the answer were as follows:

The shelling really was and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
The shelling was carried out from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Mainila.
It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What actually happened near the village of Mainila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. It can only be unequivocally stated that the shelling of the village of Mainila really took place, but it is impossible to document who carried it out. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and you need to evaluate each. The first version - Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians speak of 2 reasons:

The Finns were an instrument of politics in the hands of the British, who needed a war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we recall the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident there was already a world war, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and sooner or later this alliance would strike with all its might against England itself. Therefore, to assume such a thing is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not.
They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is a completely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. Brad. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for the war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long-term defense that exhausted the enemy. With such layouts, no one will disturb the bear's den.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation by the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was later presented to Soviet society as an example of the perfidy of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

The balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing nations approached the Winter War.

In all aspects, except for the infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But to conduct an offensive, surpassing the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. With all three aspects, the Soviet army had problems. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

The course of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7, 40th) and the second (January 7, 40th - March 12, 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and putting things in order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to hold it briefly. The army of the USSR actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was as follows - helping the people of Finland to overthrow the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. Even the figure of 3 weeks was called as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The plan of the Soviet command was approximately as follows:

Bring in the troops. We did it on November 30th.
Creation of a workers' government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on that later).
Lightning offensive on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
Declination of the real Finnish government towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. Blitzkrieg failed and the army got stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the early days of the war, until about December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - the Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they came across the Mannerheim Line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi) entered it, on December 6 - of the central front (direction Summa), on December 10 - of the western front (Gulf of Finland). And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to meet a well-fortified line of defense. And this is a huge question for the intelligence of the Red Army.

In any case, December was a disastrous month, which frustrated almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops moved inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

Locality. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. In such conditions, it is difficult to apply equipment.
Aviation application. Aviation in terms of bombing was practically not used. There was no point in bombing the villages attached to the front line, as the Finns retreated, leaving scorched earth behind. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they retreated with civilians.
Roads. Retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, arranged landslides, mined everything that was possible.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the people's government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on the territory already occupied by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish People's Government included:

Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs - Otto Kuusinen
Minister of Finance - Maury Rosenberg
Minister of Defense - Aksel Antila
Minister of the Interior - Tuure Lehen
Minister of Agriculture - Armas Eikia
Minister of Education - Inkeri Lehtinen
Minister of Affairs of Karelia - Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly - a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finland Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From that moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution has taken place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this system of fortifications that all world generals recognized its impregnability. It was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (it received such a name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was about the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, the difficult terrain of the Mannerheim Line should be noted. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to take the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success became known as the "Miracle of the Sum". Subsequently, the line was broken through on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who talked about Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and unleashing a war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role that it was assigned at the end of the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany withdrew from it, which refused to fulfill the requirements of the League of Nation for disarmament and simply withdrew from the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14 de facto the League of Nations ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second phase of the war

January 7, 1940 Headquarters of the North-Western Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a breather, and active operations were not conducted until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful strikes began along the Mannerheim Line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksi-Karhul sector. After that, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of the Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was the turning point of the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin to advance inland. They advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but most importantly, they advanced. In early March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

On this, in fact, the war ended, since it was obvious that Finland did not have a lot of forces and means to contain the Red Army. Since that time, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its conditions, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be tough, because the Finns were forced to start a war, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war drag on so long

The Soviet-Finnish war, according to the plan of the Bolsheviks, was to be completed in 2-3 weeks, and the troops of the Leningrad District alone were to give a decisive advantage. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor work of the command staff, but the big problem is the coherence between the branches of the armed forces. She was practically non-existent. If you study archival documents, then there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired on others.
Bad security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was also fought in the winter in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And while the army was not provided with winter clothing.
Underestimation of the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. It was plinthed to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without a war, blaming everything on the border incident of November 24, 1939.
Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (first of all) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, aircraft, and so on. The greatest effort was made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, in the conditions of the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded the solution of all problems, the restoration of order in the army and the speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent, this has been done. And fast enough. The offensive of the Soviet troops in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplined, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos on the situation at the front were with an addition - "an explanation of the reasons for the failures." Here are some quotes from Beria's memorandum to Stalin No. 5518 / B dated December 14, 1939:

During the landing on Saiskari Island, a Soviet aircraft dropped 5 bombs that landed on the Lenin destroyer.
On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired twice by its own aircraft.
During the occupation of the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing units, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several bursts of shots. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then further I want to give examples of how the Soviet army was equipped. To do this, let's turn to Beria's memorandum to Stalin No. 5516 / B dated December 14, 1939:

In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass the enemy's fortifications. It was not possible to do this, since the Headquarters received 3000 pairs of skis with broken mottling.
In the replenishment that arrived from the 363rd communications battalion, 30 vehicles require repair, and 500 people are dressed in summer uniforms.
To replenish the 9th Army, the 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 were in good condition, and 90 of the 150 tractors. 80% of the personnel were not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the background of such events, there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria's report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455 / B.

Helping Finland:

Sweden - 8 thousand people. Mostly reserve staff. They are commanded by regular officers who are on vacation.
Italy - the number is unknown.
Hungary - 150 people. Italy demands to increase the number.
England - 20 fighter planes are known, although the actual figure is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was supported by the Western countries of Finland is the speech of the Minister of Finland Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Gavas. The following is a literal translation from English.

The Finnish people are grateful to the English, French and other nations for their help..
Greensberg, Minister of Finland

Obviously, the Western countries opposed the USSR's aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I also want to give a photo of Beria's report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Making peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its conditions for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The terms of the peace were as follows:

The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and the islands.
Western and Northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexholm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
The island of Hanko with the maritime territory and the base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR annually paid 8 million German marks for rent.
The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of dead Soviet soldiers during the Soviet-Finnish war is still open. The official history does not give an answer to the question, speaking covertly about "minimal" losses and focusing on the fact that the tasks have been achieved. In those days, they did not talk about the scale of the losses of the Red Army. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the successes of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division for 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). Losses are as follows:

Commanders - 240.
Privates - 3536.
Rifles - 3575.
Light machine guns - 160.
Machine guns - 150.
Tanks - 5.
Armored vehicles - 2.
Tractors - 10.
Trucks - 14.
Horse composition - 357.

Belyanov's memorandum No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, privates - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a "warm-up" - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim line. And for these 2 weeks, of which only the last one was really combat, OFFICIAL figures - the loss of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people got frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on the losses of the USSR in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 killed and 158,863 injured and frostbitten. These figures are official, and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians call different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said about the dead from 150 to 500 thousand people. For example, the Book of Records of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that 131,476 people died, went missing or died from wounds in the war with the White Finns. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand soldiers of the Red Army died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are called the following: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, indicates both absolutely negative and absolutely positive moments. Negative - a nightmare of the first months of the war and a huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and the beginning of January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. So it really was. But there was also a positive moment in this: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of their army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army is the Civil War. We will not analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites now (after all, we are talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks lie not in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to cite one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble must be disbanded as soon as possible.
Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR hovered in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting from January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. It is very easy to prove this. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim Line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim Line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, already then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, it was said about 5393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. The captured fighters of the Red Army were divided into the following groups:

political leadership. It was precisely political affiliation that was important, without highlighting the title.
Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
junior officers.
Privates.
National minorities
Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards the representatives of the Russian people. The perks were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who has been in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern Camp. Within three months, ensure the fullness of the necessary measures to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, take cases to court.
Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshchenko, announcing that 5277 people had arrived in the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to him, the Southern Camp "accepts" 5157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

"Cuckoos" - so the Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit on trees and hit almost without a miss. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disorientated the soldiers.

Stories about "cuckoos" is one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It is hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at temperatures below -30 degrees, is able to sit on a tree for days, while making accurate shots.

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. This military conflict was preceded by long negotiations over the exchange of territories, which ultimately ended in failure. In the USSR and Russia, this war, for obvious reasons, remains in the shadow of the war with Germany that soon followed, but in Finland it is still the equivalent of our Great Patriotic War.

Although the war remains half-forgotten, heroic films are not made about it, books about it are relatively rare and it is poorly reflected in art (with the exception of the famous song "Take Us, Suomi Beauty"), there are still disputes about the causes of this conflict. What was Stalin counting on when starting this war? Did he want to Sovietize Finland or even include it in the USSR as a separate union republic, or was the Karelian Isthmus and the security of Leningrad his main goals? Can the war be considered successful or, given the ratio of sides and the scale of losses, a failure?

background

A propaganda poster from the war and a photo of the Red Army party meeting in the trenches. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

In the second half of the 1930s, unusually active diplomatic negotiations were going on in pre-war Europe. All major states were feverishly looking for allies, feeling the approach of a new war. The USSR did not stand aside either, which was forced to negotiate with the capitalists, who, in Marxist dogma, were considered the main enemies. In addition, the events in Germany, where the Nazis came to power, an important part of whose ideology was anti-communism, pushed for active action. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany had been the main Soviet trading partner since the early 1920s, when both defeated Germany and the USSR found themselves in international isolation, which brought them closer.

In 1935, the USSR and France signed an agreement on mutual assistance, clearly directed against Germany. It was planned as part of a more global eastern pact, according to which all Eastern European countries, including Germany, were to enter a single system of collective security, which would fix the status quo and make aggression against any of the participants impossible. However, the Germans did not want to tie their hands, the Poles also did not agree, so the pact remained only on paper.

In 1939, shortly before the expiration of the Franco-Soviet treaty, new negotiations began, to which Britain joined. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of the aggressive actions of Germany, which had already taken part of Czechoslovakia for itself, annexed Austria and, apparently, did not plan to stop there. The British and French planned to conclude an alliance treaty with the USSR to contain Hitler. At the same time, the Germans began to make contacts with a proposal to stay away from a future war. Stalin probably felt like a marriageable bride when a whole line of “suitors” lined up for him.

Stalin did not trust any of the potential allies, however, the British and French wanted the USSR to fight on their side, which caused Stalin to fear that in the end it would be mainly the USSR that would fight, and the Germans promised a whole bunch of gifts just for the USSR to stay aside, which was much more in line with the aspirations of Stalin himself (let the damned capitalists fight each other).

In addition, negotiations with Britain and France stalled due to the Poles' refusal to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory in the event of war (which was inevitable in a European war). In the end, the USSR decided to stay out of the war by signing a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Negotiations with the Finns

Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from talks in Moscow. October 16, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Against the backdrop of all these diplomatic maneuvers, long negotiations began with the Finns. In 1938, the USSR offered the Finns to allow it to establish a military base on the island of Hogland. The Soviet side was afraid of the possibility of a German strike from Finland and offered the Finns an agreement on mutual assistance, and also gave guarantees that the USSR would stand up for Finland in the event of aggression from the Germans.

However, the Finns at that time adhered to strict neutrality (according to the laws in force, it was forbidden to join any alliances and place military bases on their territory) and feared that such agreements would drag them into an unpleasant story or, which is good, bring them to war. Although the USSR offered to conclude the treaty in secret, so that no one would know about it, the Finns did not agree.

The second round of negotiations began in 1939. This time, the USSR wanted to lease a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland in order to strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea. Negotiations also ended in vain.

The third round began in October 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the outbreak of World War II, when all the leading European powers were distracted by the war and the USSR had a free hand to a large extent. This time the USSR offered to arrange an exchange of territories. In exchange for the Karelian Isthmus and a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the USSR offered to give up very large territories of Eastern Karelia, even larger than those given by the Finns.

True, it is worth considering one fact: the Karelian Isthmus was a highly developed territory in terms of infrastructure, where the second largest Finnish city of Vyborg was located and a tenth of the Finnish population lived, but the lands offered by the USSR in Karelia were, although large, but completely undeveloped and there were no there was nothing but woods. So the exchange was, to put it mildly, not quite equivalent.

The Finns agreed to give up the islands, but they could not afford to give up the Karelian Isthmus, which was not only a developed territory with a large population, but also the Mannerheim defensive line was located there, around which the entire Finnish defensive strategy was based. The USSR, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the isthmus, since this would allow moving the border from Leningrad at least a few tens of kilometers. At that time, there were about 30 kilometers between the Finnish border and the outskirts of Leningrad.

Mainil incident

In the photographs: a Suomi submachine gun and Soviet soldiers dig a pole at the Mainil frontier post, November 30, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

Negotiations ended without results on 9 November. And already on November 26, an incident occurred near the border village of Mainila, which was used as a pretext for starting a war. According to the Soviet side, an artillery shell flew from Finnish territory to Soviet territory, which killed three Soviet soldiers and a commander.

Molotov immediately sent a formidable demand to the Finns to withdraw their troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers. The Finns, on the other hand, stated that, according to the results of the investigation, it turned out that no one from the Finnish side fired and, probably, we are talking about some kind of accident on the Soviet side. The Finns responded by suggesting that both sides withdraw their troops from the border and conduct a joint investigation into the incident.

The next day, Molotov sent a note to the Finns accusing them of perfidy and hostility, and announced the rupture of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Two days later, diplomatic relations were broken off and the Soviet troops went on the offensive.

At present, most researchers believe that the incident was organized by the Soviet side in order to obtain a casus belli for an attack on Finland. In any case, it is clear that the incident was only a pretext.

War

In the photo: Finnish machine-gun crew and propaganda poster from the war. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

The main direction for the strike of the Soviet troops was the Karelian Isthmus, which was protected by a line of fortifications. This was the most suitable direction for a massive strike, which also made it possible to use tanks, which the Red Army had in abundance. It was planned to break through the defenses with a powerful blow, capture Vyborg and head towards Helsinki. A secondary direction was Central Karelia, where massive hostilities were complicated by the undeveloped territory. The third blow was delivered from the northern direction.

The first month of the war was a real disaster for the Soviet army. It was disorganized, disoriented, chaos and misunderstanding of the situation reigned in the headquarters. On the Karelian Isthmus, the army managed to advance several kilometers in a month, after which the soldiers ran into the Mannerheim line and were unable to overcome it, since the army simply did not have heavy artillery.

In Central Karelia, things were even worse. The local forest areas opened wide scope for partisan tactics, for which the Soviet divisions were not ready. Small detachments of Finns attacked columns of Soviet troops moving along the roads, after which they quickly left and lay in forest caches. Road mining was also actively used, because of which the Soviet troops suffered significant losses.

Further complicating the situation was the fact that the Soviet troops did not have enough camouflage coats and the soldiers were a convenient target for Finnish snipers in winter time. At the same time, the Finns used camouflage, which made them invisible.

The 163rd Soviet division was advancing in the Karelian direction, the task of which was to reach the city of Oulu, which would cut Finland in two. The shortest direction between the Soviet border and the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was specially chosen for the offensive. In the area of the village of Suomussalmi, the division was surrounded. Only the 44th division, which had arrived at the front, reinforced by a tank brigade, was sent to help her.

The 44th division moved along the Raat road, stretching for 30 kilometers. After waiting for the division to stretch out, the Finns defeated the Soviet division, which had a significant numerical superiority. Barriers were placed on the road from the north and south, which blocked the division in a narrow and well-shootable area, after which, by the forces of small detachments, the division was dissected on the road into several mini-"boilers".

As a result, the division suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, frostbite and prisoners, lost almost all equipment and heavy weapons, and the division command, which got out of the encirclement, was shot by the verdict of the Soviet tribunal. Soon, several more divisions were surrounded in this way, which managed to escape from the encirclement, suffering huge losses and losing most of the equipment. The most notable example is the 18th Division, which was surrounded in South Lemetti. Only one and a half thousand people managed to break out of the encirclement, with a regular strength of the division of 15 thousand. The command of the division was also shot by the Soviet tribunal.

The offensive in Karelia failed. Only in the northern direction did the Soviet troops act more or less successfully and were able to cut off the enemy from access to the Barents Sea.

Finnish Democratic Republic

Campaign leaflets, Finland, 1940. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

Almost immediately after the start of the war in the border town of Terioki, occupied by the Red Army, the so-called. the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, which consisted of high-ranking communist figures of Finnish nationality who lived in the USSR. The USSR immediately recognized this government as the only official one and even concluded a mutual assistance agreement with it, according to which all the pre-war requirements of the USSR regarding the exchange of territories and the organization of military bases were fulfilled.

The formation of the Finnish People's Army also began, which was planned to include soldiers of Finnish and Karelian nationalities. However, during the retreat, the Finns evacuated all their inhabitants, and they had to replenish it at the expense of soldiers of the corresponding nationalities who were already serving in the Soviet army, of which there were not very many.

At first, the government was often featured in the press, but the failures on the battlefields and the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the Finns led to the prolongation of the war, which was clearly not included in the original plans of the Soviet leadership. Since the end of December, the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has been mentioned less and less in the press, and since mid-January they no longer remember it, the USSR again recognizes the one that remained in Helsinki as the official government.

End of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

In January 1940, active hostilities were not conducted due to severe frosts. The Red Army brought heavy artillery to the Karelian Isthmus to overcome the defensive fortifications of the Finnish army.

In early February, the general offensive of the Soviet army began. This time it was accompanied by artillery preparation and was much better thought out, which made it easier for the attackers. By the end of the month, the first few lines of defense were broken through, and in early March, Soviet troops approached Vyborg.

The original plan of the Finns was to hold back the Soviet troops for as long as possible and wait for help from England and France. However, no help came from them. Under these conditions, the further continuation of resistance was fraught with the loss of independence, so the Finns went to negotiations.

On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which satisfied almost all the pre-war demands of the Soviet side.

What did Stalin want to achieve?

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Until now, there is no unequivocal answer to the question, what were the goals of Stalin in this war. Was he really interested in moving the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad for a hundred kilometers, or did he count on the Sovietization of Finland? In favor of the first version is the fact that in the peace treaty, Stalin made the main emphasis on this. The creation of the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Otto Kuusinen speaks in favor of the second version.

For almost 80 years, disputes about this have been going on, but, most likely, Stalin had both a minimum program, which included only territorial demands in order to move the border from Leningrad, and a maximum program, which provided for the Sovietization of Finland in the event of a favorable combination of circumstances. However, the maximum program was quickly withdrawn due to the unfavorable course of the war. In addition to the fact that the Finns stubbornly resisted, they also evacuated the civilian population in the places of the offensive of the Soviet army, and Soviet propagandists had practically no opportunity to work with the Finnish population.

Stalin himself explained the need for war in April 1940 at a meeting with the commanders of the Red Army: “Did the government and the party do the right thing in declaring war on Finland? Could the war have been avoided? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally. There, in the West, the three biggest powers are at each other's throats; when is the question of Leningrad to be decided, if not under such conditions, when our hands are busy and we have a favorable situation in order to hit them at that moment?

The results of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

The USSR achieved most of its goals, but this came at a great cost. The USSR suffered huge losses, much larger than the Finnish army. The figures in various sources differ (about 100 thousand killed, died from wounds and frostbite and missing), but everyone agrees that the Soviet army lost a significantly larger number of soldiers killed, missing and frostbite than the Finnish.

The prestige of the Red Army was undermined. By the beginning of the war, the huge Soviet army not only outnumbered the Finnish one many times over, but was also much better armed. The Red Army had three times more artillery, 9 times more aircraft and 88 times more tanks. At the same time, the Red Army not only failed to take full advantage of its advantages, but also suffered a number of crushing defeats at the initial stage of the war.

The course of hostilities was closely followed both in Germany and in Britain, and they were surprised by the inept actions of the army. It is believed that it was precisely as a result of the war with Finland that Hitler was finally convinced that an attack on the USSR was possible, since the Red Army was extremely weak on the battlefield. In Britain, they also decided that the army was weakened by the purges of officers and were glad that they did not draw the USSR into allied relations.

Reasons for failure

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

In Soviet times, the main failures of the army were associated with the Mannerheim Line, which was so well fortified that it was practically impregnable. However, in reality this was a very big exaggeration. A significant part of the defensive line was made up of wood-and-earth fortifications or old structures made of low-quality concrete that were outdated for 20 years.

On the eve of the war, the defensive line was strengthened by several “millionaire” pillboxes (so they were called because the construction of each fortification cost a million Finnish marks), but it still was not impregnable. As practice has shown, with competent preparation and support of aviation and artillery, even a much more advanced line of defense can be broken through, as happened with the French Maginot line.

In fact, the failures were due to a number of blunders of the command, both higher and people in the field:

1. underestimation of the enemy. The Soviet command was sure that the Finns would not even bring to war and would accept Soviet demands. And when the war began, the USSR was sure that victory was a matter of a few weeks. The Red Army had too much advantage both in personal strength and in firepower;

2. disorganization of the army. The command staff of the Red Army was largely replaced a year before the war as a result of mass purges in the ranks of the military. Some of the new commanders simply did not meet the necessary requirements, but even talented commanders had not yet had time to gain experience in commanding large military units. Confusion and chaos reigned in the units, especially in the conditions of the outbreak of war;

3. insufficient elaboration of offensive plans. In the USSR, they were in a hurry to quickly resolve the issue with the Finnish border, while Germany, France and Britain were still fighting in the West, so the preparations for the offensive were carried out in a hurry. The Soviet plan called for the main attack on the Mannerheim Line, with virtually no intelligence on the line. The troops had only extremely approximate and schematic plans for defensive fortifications, and later it turned out that they did not correspond to reality at all. In fact, the first assaults on the line were carried out blindly, in addition, light artillery did not cause serious damage to the defensive fortifications, and heavy howitzers, which at first were practically absent in the advancing troops, had to be brought up to destroy them. Under these conditions, all attempts to storm turned into huge losses. Only in January 1940 did normal preparations for a breakthrough begin: assault groups were formed to suppress and capture firing points, aviation was involved in photographing the fortifications, which finally made it possible to obtain plans for defensive lines and develop a competent breakthrough plan;

4. The Red Army was not sufficiently prepared to conduct combat operations in a specific area in the winter. There were not enough camouflage robes, not even warm uniforms. All this goodness lay in warehouses and began to arrive in parts only in the second half of December, when it became clear that the war was beginning to take on a protracted character. By the beginning of the war, there was not a single unit of combat skiers in the Red Army, which were used with great success by the Finns. The submachine guns, which turned out to be very effective in rough terrain, were generally absent in the Red Army. Shortly before the war, the PPD (Degtyarev submachine gun) was withdrawn from service, as it was planned to replace it with more modern and advanced weapons, but they did not wait for the new weapon, and the old PPD went to warehouses;

5. the Finns enjoyed all the advantages of the terrain with great success. Soviet divisions, stuffed to capacity with equipment, were forced to move along the roads and practically could not operate in the forest. The Finns, who had almost no equipment, waited until the clumsy Soviet divisions stretched out along the road for several kilometers and, blocking the road, launched simultaneous strikes in several directions at once, cutting the divisions into separate parts. Locked in a narrow space, Soviet soldiers became easy targets for Finnish skiers and snipers. It was possible to break out of the encirclement, but this led to huge losses of equipment that had to be abandoned on the road;

6. the Finns used the scorched earth tactics, but they did it competently. The entire population was evacuated in advance from the areas that were to be occupied by parts of the Red Army, all property was also taken out, and the deserted settlements were destroyed or mined. This had a demoralizing effect on the Soviet soldiers, whom the propaganda explained that they were going to liberate the brother-workers and peasants from the unbearable oppression and bullying of the Finnish White Guard, but instead of crowds of joyful peasants and workers welcoming the liberators, they met only ashes and mined ruins.

However, despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army demonstrated the ability to improve and learn from their own mistakes right in the course of the war. The unsuccessful start of the war contributed to the fact that things were already taken up in a normal way, and in the second stage the army became much more organized and efficient. At the same time, some mistakes were repeated again a year later, when the war with Germany began, which also developed extremely unsuccessfully in the first months.

Evgeny Antonyuk
Historian

After the Civil War of 1918-1922, the USSR received rather unsuccessful and poorly adapted borders for life. Thus, the fact that Ukrainians and Belarusians were separated by the line of the state border between the Soviet Union and Poland was not taken into account at all. Another of these "inconveniences" was the proximity of the border with Finland to the northern capital of the country - Leningrad.

In the course of the events preceding the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union received a number of territories that made it possible to significantly move the border to the west. In the north, this attempt to move the border encountered some resistance, which was called the Soviet-Finnish, or Winter, War.

Historical digression and the origins of the conflict

Finland as a state appeared relatively recently - on December 6, 1917 against the backdrop of the collapse of the Russian state. At the same time, the state received all the territories of the Grand Duchy of Finland along with Petsamo (Pechenga), Sortavala and territories on the Karelian Isthmus. Relations with the southern neighbor also did not work out from the very beginning: a civil war died down in Finland, in which anti-communist forces won, so there was clearly no sympathy for the USSR, which supported the Reds.

However, in the second half of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, relations between the Soviet Union and Finland stabilized, being neither friendly nor hostile. Defense spending in Finland declined steadily in the 1920s, reaching its peak in 1930. However, the arrival of Carl Gustav Mannerheim as Minister of War changed the situation somewhat. Mannerheim immediately set a course to re-equip the Finnish army and prepare it for possible battles with the Soviet Union. Initially, the line of fortifications, at that time called the Enckel line, was inspected. The condition of its fortifications was unsatisfactory, so the re-equipment of the line began, as well as the construction of new defensive contours.

At the same time, the Finnish government took energetic steps to avoid conflict with the USSR. In 1932, a non-aggression pact was concluded, the term of which was to end in 1945.

Events 1938-1939 and causes of conflict

By the second half of the 1930s, the situation in Europe was gradually heating up. Hitler's anti-Soviet statements forced the Soviet leadership to take a closer look at neighboring countries that could become Germany's allies in a possible war with the USSR. The position of Finland, of course, did not make it a strategically important springboard, since the local character of the terrain inevitably turned the fighting into a series of small battles, not to mention the impossibility of supplying huge masses of troops. However, Finland's close position to Leningrad could still turn it into an important ally.

It was these factors that forced the Soviet government in April-August 1938 to begin negotiations with Finland regarding guarantees of its non-alignment with the anti-Soviet bloc. However, in addition, the Soviet leadership also demanded that a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland be provided for Soviet military bases, which was unacceptable for the then government of Finland. As a result, the negotiations ended in vain.

In March-April 1939, new Soviet-Finnish negotiations took place, in which the Soviet leadership demanded the lease of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Finnish government was forced to reject these demands as well, as it feared the "Sovietization" of the country.

The situation began to escalate rapidly when on August 23, 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, in a secret addendum to which it was indicated that Finland was in the sphere of interests of the USSR. However, although the Finnish government did not have data regarding the secret protocol, this agreement made him seriously think about the future prospects of the country and relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.

Already in October 1939, the Soviet government put forward new proposals for Finland. They provided for the movement of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus 90 km to the north. In return, Finland was supposed to receive about twice as much territory in Karelia, in order to significantly secure Leningrad. A number of historians also express the opinion that the Soviet leadership was interested in, if not Sovietizing Finland in 1939, then at least depriving it of protection in the form of a line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, already then called the "Mannerheim Line". This version is very consistent, since further events, as well as the development by the Soviet General Staff in 1940 of a plan for a new war against Finland, indirectly indicate precisely this. Thus, the defense of Leningrad, most likely, was only a pretext for turning Finland into a convenient Soviet foothold, like, for example, the Baltic countries.

However, the Finnish leadership rejected the Soviet demands and began to prepare for war. The Soviet Union was also preparing for war. In total, by mid-November 1939, 4 armies were deployed against Finland, which included 24 divisions with a total number of 425 thousand people, 2300 tanks and 2500 aircraft. Finland had only 14 divisions with a total strength of about 270 thousand people, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

In order to avoid provocations, the Finnish army in the second half of November received an order to withdraw from the state border on the Karelian Isthmus. However, on November 26, 1939, an incident occurred, for which both sides blame each other. Soviet territory was shelled, as a result of which several servicemen were killed and wounded. This incident occurred near the village of Mainila, from which it got its name. Clouds gathered between the USSR and Finland. Two days later, on November 28, the Soviet Union denounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and two days later, Soviet troops were ordered to cross the border.

The beginning of the war (November 1939 - January 1940)

On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops went on the offensive in several directions. At the same time, the fighting immediately took on a fierce character.

On the Karelian Isthmus, where the 7th Army was advancing, on December 1, at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops managed to capture the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). Here the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic was announced, headed by Otto Kuusinen, a prominent figure in the Comintern. It was with this new "government" of Finland that the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. At the same time, in the first ten days of December, the 7th Army managed to quickly master the forefield and ran into the first echelon of the Mannerheim Line. Here, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and their advance practically stopped for a long time.

To the north of Lake Ladoga, in the direction of Sortavala, the 8th Soviet Army advanced. As a result of the first days of fighting, she managed to advance 80 kilometers in a fairly short time. However, the Finnish troops that opposed her managed to carry out a lightning operation, the purpose of which was to encircle part of the Soviet forces. The fact that the Red Army was very strongly tied to the roads played into the hands of the Finns, which allowed the Finnish troops to quickly cut off its communications. As a result, the 8th Army, having suffered serious losses, was forced to retreat, but until the end of the war held part of the Finnish territory.

The least successful were the actions of the Red Army in central Karelia, where the 9th Army was advancing. The task of the army was to conduct an offensive in the direction of the city of Oulu, with the aim of "cutting" Finland in half and thereby disorganizing the Finnish troops in the north of the country. On December 7, the forces of the 163rd Infantry Division occupied the small Finnish village of Suomussalmi. However, the Finnish troops, having superiority in mobility and knowledge of the area, immediately surrounded the division. As a result, Soviet troops were forced to take up all-round defense and repulse sudden attacks by Finnish ski units, as well as suffer significant losses from sniper fire. The 44th Infantry Division was advanced to help the encircled, which soon also found itself surrounded.

Having assessed the situation, the command of the 163rd Infantry Division decided to fight back. At the same time, the division suffered losses of approximately 30% of its personnel, and also abandoned almost all equipment. After its breakthrough, the Finns managed to destroy the 44th Infantry Division and practically restore the state border in this direction, paralyzing the actions of the Red Army here. This battle, known as the Battle of Suomussalmi, resulted in rich booty taken by the Finnish army, as well as an increase in the general morale of the Finnish army. At the same time, the leadership of two divisions of the Red Army was subjected to repression.

And if the actions of the 9th Army were unsuccessful, then the troops of the 14th Soviet Army, advancing on the Rybachy Peninsula, acted most successfully. They managed to capture the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and large nickel deposits in the area, as well as reach the Norwegian border. Thus, Finland lost access to the Barents Sea for the duration of the war.

In January 1940, the drama also played out south of Suomussalmi, where the scenario of that recent battle was repeated in general terms. The 54th Rifle Division of the Red Army was surrounded here. At the same time, the Finns did not have enough forces to destroy it, so the division was surrounded until the end of the war. A similar fate awaited the 168th Rifle Division, which was surrounded in the Sortavala area. Another division and a tank brigade were surrounded in the Lemetti-Yuzhny area and, having suffered huge losses and lost almost all materiel, nevertheless made their way out of the encirclement.

On the Karelian Isthmus, by the end of December, the fighting to break through the Finnish fortified line subsided. This was explained by the fact that the command of the Red Army was well aware of the futility of continuing further attempts to strike at the Finnish troops, which brought only serious losses with minimal results. The Finnish command, understanding the essence of the lull at the front, launched a series of attacks in order to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. However, these attempts were failed with heavy losses for the Finnish troops.

However, in general, the situation remained not very favorable for the Red Army. Its troops were drawn into battles on foreign and poorly explored territory, in addition, in adverse weather conditions. The Finns did not have superiority in numbers and equipment, but they had a well-established and well-established tactics of guerrilla warfare, which allowed them, acting with relatively small forces, to inflict significant losses on the advancing Soviet troops.

The February offensive of the Red Army and the end of the war (February-March 1940)

On February 1, 1940, a powerful Soviet artillery preparation began on the Karelian Isthmus, which lasted 10 days. The purpose of this preparation was to inflict maximum damage on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops and wear them down. On February 11, the troops of the 7th and 13th armies moved forward.

Fierce battles unfolded along the entire front on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet troops delivered the main blow to the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. However, here, as well as two months ago, the Red Army again began to get bogged down in battles, so the direction of the main attack was soon changed to Lyakhda. Here, the Finnish troops could not hold back the Red Army, and their defenses were broken through, and a few days later - the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finnish command was forced to begin to withdraw troops.

On February 21, Soviet troops approached the second line of Finnish defense. Fierce fighting again unfolded here, which, however, ended by the end of the month with a breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in several places. Thus, the Finnish defense collapsed.

At the beginning of March 1940, the Finnish army was in a critical situation. The Mannerheim Line was broken through, the reserves were practically depleted, while the Red Army developed a successful offensive and had practically inexhaustible reserves. The morale of the Soviet troops was also high. At the beginning of the month, the troops of the 7th Army rushed to Vyborg, the fighting for which continued until the ceasefire on March 13, 1940. This city was one of the largest in Finland, and its loss could be very painful for the country. In addition, in this way, the Soviet troops opened the way to Helsinki, which threatened Finland with the loss of independence.

Considering all these factors, the Finnish government set a course for the beginning of peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. On March 7, 1940, peace negotiations began in Moscow. As a result, it was decided to cease fire from 12 noon on March 13, 1940. Territories on the Karelian Isthmus and in Lapland (the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala and Salla) departed to the USSR, and the Hanko Peninsula was also leased.

Results of the Winter War

Estimates of the losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war vary significantly and, according to the data of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, they amount to approximately 87.5 thousand people killed and died from wounds and frostbite, as well as about 40 thousand missing. 160 thousand people were injured. Finland's losses were significantly smaller - about 26 thousand dead and 40 thousand wounded.

As a result of the war with Finland, the Soviet Union managed to ensure the security of Leningrad, as well as strengthen its position in the Baltic. First of all, this concerns the city of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, on which Soviet troops began to be based. At the same time, the Red Army gained combat experience in breaking through the enemy’s fortified line in difficult weather conditions (the air temperature in February 1940 reached -40 degrees), which no other army in the world had at that time.

However, at the same time, the USSR received in the north-west, albeit not a powerful, but an enemy who, already in 1941, let German troops into its territory and contributed to the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of Finland's intervention in June 1941 on the side of the Axis, the Soviet Union received an additional front with a fairly large extent, diverting from 20 to 50 Soviet divisions in the period from 1941 to 1944.

Britain and France also kept a close eye on the conflict and even had plans to attack the USSR and its Caucasian fields. At present, there is no complete data on the seriousness of these intentions, but it is likely that in the spring of 1940 the Soviet Union could simply “quarrel” with its future allies and even get involved in a military conflict with them.

There are also a number of versions that the war in Finland indirectly influenced the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. Soviet troops broke through the Mannerheim Line and practically left Finland defenseless in March 1940. Any new invasion of the Red Army into the country could well be fatal for it. After defeating Finland, the Soviet Union would have come dangerously close to the Swedish mines at Kiruna, one of Germany's few sources of metal. Such a scenario would have brought the Third Reich to the brink of disaster.

Finally, the not very successful offensive of the Red Army in December-January strengthened the belief in Germany that the Soviet troops were essentially incompetent and did not have good command staff. This delusion continued to grow and reached its peak in June 1941, when the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR.

As a conclusion, it can be pointed out that as a result of the Winter War, the Soviet Union nevertheless acquired more problems than victories, which was confirmed in the next few years.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

We will briefly talk about this war, already because Finland was the country with which the Nazi leadership then associated its plans for further advance to the east. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Germany, in accordance with the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, observed neutrality. It all started with the fact that the Soviet leadership, given the situation in Europe after the Nazis came to power in Germany, decided to increase the security of their northwestern borders. The border with Finland then passed only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, that is, at a distance of a long-range artillery gun.

The Finnish government pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union (Ryti was then prime minister). The President of the country in 1931-1937, P. Svinhufvud, declared: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland."

In the summer of 1939, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel-General Halder, visited Finland. He showed particular interest in the Leningrad and Murmansk strategic directions. In Hitler's plans, the territory of Finland was given an important place in a future war. With the help of German specialists, airfields were built in the southern regions of Finland in 1939, designed to receive such a number of aircraft, which was many times more than what the Finnish air force had. In the border areas and mainly on the Karelian Isthmus, with the participation of German, British, French and Belgian specialists and financial assistance from Great Britain, France, Sweden, Germany and the United States, a powerful long-term fortification system, the Mannerheim Line, was built. It was a powerful system of three lines of fortifications up to 90 km deep. The fortifications stretched in width from the Gulf of Finland to the western shore of Lake Ladoga. Of the total number of defensive structures, 350 were reinforced concrete, 2400 were wooden and earth, well camouflaged. Sections of barbed wire fences consisted of an average of thirty (!) Rows of barbed wire. Giant "wolf pits" 7-10 meters deep and 10-15 meters in diameter were dug out at the alleged breakthrough sites. For each kilometer, 200 minutes were set.

Marshal Mannerheim was responsible for the creation of a system of defensive structures along the Soviet border in southern Finland, hence the unofficial name - "Mannerheim Line". Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951) - Finnish statesman and military figure, President of Finland in 1944-1946. During the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, he served in the Russian army. During the Finnish Civil War (January-May 1918) he led the white movement against the Finnish Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim became commander in chief and regent of Finland (December 1918 - July 1919). He was defeated in the presidential election in 1919 and resigned. In 1931-1939. headed the Council of State Defense. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commanded the actions of the Finnish army. In 1941, Finland entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Having become president, Mannerheim signed a peace treaty with the USSR (1944) and spoke out against Nazi Germany.

The clearly defensive nature of the powerful fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" near the border with the Soviet Union indicated that the Finnish leadership then seriously believed that the mighty southern neighbor would certainly attack the small three-millionth Finland. In fact, this happened, but this could not have happened if the Finnish leadership had shown more statesmanship. The outstanding Finnish statesman Urho-Kaleva Kekkonen, who was elected president of this country for four terms (1956-1981), later wrote: that it treated it rather favorably."

The situation that had developed by 1939 required that the Soviet northwestern border be moved away from Leningrad. The time for solving this problem was chosen by the Soviet leadership quite well: the Western powers were busy with the outbreak of war, and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. The Soviet government at first hoped to resolve the issue of the border with Finland peacefully, without bringing the matter to a military conflict. In October-November 1939, negotiations were held between the USSR and Finland on issues of mutual security. The Soviet leadership explained to the Finns that the need to move the border was not caused by the possibility of Finnish aggression, but by the fear that their territory could be used in that situation by other powers to attack the USSR. The Soviet Union offered Finland to conclude a bilateral defensive alliance. The Finnish government, hoping for the help promised by Germany, rejected the Soviet offer. German representatives even guaranteed Finland that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany would later help Finland to compensate for possible territorial losses. England, France and even America also promised their support to the Finns. The Soviet Union did not claim to include the entire territory of Finland in the USSR. The claims of the Soviet leadership mainly extended to the lands of the former Vyborg province of Russia. It must be said that these claims had a serious historical justification. Even Ivan the Terrible in the Livonian War sought to break through to the Baltic shores. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, not without reason, considered Livonia an ancient Russian fiefdom, illegally seized by the crusaders. The Livonian War lasted for 25 years (1558-1583), but Tsar Ivan the Terrible could not achieve Russia's access to the Baltic. The work begun by Tsar Ivan the Terrible was continued and, as a result of the Northern War (1700-1721), Tsar Peter I brilliantly completed. Russia received access to the Baltic Sea from Riga to Vyborg. Peter I personally took part in the battle for the fortress city of Vyborg. A well-organized siege of the fortress, which included a blockade from the sea and a five-day artillery bombardment, forced the 6,000-strong Swedish garrison of Vyborg to capitulate on June 13, 1710. The capture of Vyborg allowed the Russians to control the entire Karelian Isthmus. As a result, according to Tsar Peter I, "a strong pillow was arranged for St. Petersburg." Petersburg has now become reliably protected from Swedish attacks from the north. The capture of Vyborg created the conditions for the subsequent offensive actions of the Russian troops in Finland.

In the autumn of 1712, Peter decides on his own, without allies, to seize Finland, which was then one of the provinces of Sweden. Here is the task that Peter set for Admiral Apraksin, who should lead the operation: “To go not to ruin, but to take possession, although we don’t need it (Finland) at all, to hold it, for two main reasons: first, it would be something to give up in peace, about which the Swedes are already clearly starting to talk; Another thing is that this province is the womb of Sweden, as you yourself know: not only meat and so on, but also firewood, and if God allows it to reach Abov in the summer, then the Swedish neck will bend softer. The operation to capture Finland was successfully carried out by Russian troops in 1713-1714. The final beautiful chord of the victorious Finnish campaign was the famous naval battle at Cape Gangut in July 1714. The young Russian fleet for the first time in its history won a battle with one of the strongest fleets in the world, which was then the Swedish fleet. The Russian fleet in this major battle was commanded by Peter I under the name of Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. For this victory, the king received the rank of vice admiral. Peter equated the Gangut battle in importance with the Battle of Poltava.

According to the Treaty of Nishtad in 1721, the Vyborg province became part of Russia. In 1809, by agreement between Emperor Napoleon of France and Emperor Alexander I of Russia, the territory of Finland was annexed to Russia. It was a kind of "friendly gift" from Napoleon to Alexander. Readers with at least some knowledge of 19th-century European history will surely know about this event. Thus, the Grand Duchy of Finland arose as part of the Russian Empire. In 1811, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian province of Vyborg to the Grand Duchy of Finland. So it was easier to manage this territory. This state of affairs did not cause any problems for more than a hundred years. But in 1917, the government of V.I. Lenin granted Finland state independence and since then the Russian Vyborg province has remained part of the neighboring state - the Republic of Finland. That is the background of the question.

The Soviet leadership tried to resolve the issue peacefully. On October 14, 1939, the Soviet side proposed to the Finnish side to transfer to the Soviet Union part of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and also transfer the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula on lease. All this in area was 2761 sq. km. instead of Finland, a part of the territory of Eastern Karelia was offered with a size of 5528 sq. km. however, such an exchange would have been unequal: the lands of the Karelian Isthmus were economically developed and strategically important - there were powerful fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" providing cover for the border. The lands offered to the Finns in return were poorly developed and had neither economic nor military value. The Finnish government refused such an exchange. Hoping for help from the Western powers, Finland counted on separating East Karelia and the Kola Peninsula from the Soviet Union by military means. But these plans were not destined to come true. Stalin decided to start a war with Finland.

The plan of military operations was developed under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov.

The plan of the General Staff took into account the real difficulties of the upcoming breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications and provided for the forces and means necessary for this. But Stalin criticized the plan and ordered it to be redone. The fact is that K.E. Voroshilov convinced Stalin that the Red Army would deal with the Finns in 2-3 weeks, and the victory would be won with little bloodshed, as they say, let's throw hats on. The plan of the General Staff was rejected. The development of a new, "correct" plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. A plan designed for an easy victory, which did not even provide for the concentration of at least minimal reserves, was developed and approved by Stalin. Faith in the ease of the upcoming victory was so great that they did not even consider it necessary to inform the Chief of the General Staff B.M. about the outbreak of war with Finland. Shaposhnikov, who was on vacation at the time.

To start a war, not always, but often they find, or rather, create some kind of pretext. It is known, for example, that before the attack on Poland, the German fascists staged an attack by the Poles on a German border radio station with German soldiers dressing up in the uniform of Polish military personnel, and so on. A somewhat lesser fantasy was the reason for the war with Finland, invented by Soviet artillerymen. On November 26, 1939, they fired at Finnish territory for 20 minutes from the border village of Mainila and declared that they had come under artillery fire from the Finnish side. This was followed by an exchange of notes between the governments of the USSR and Finland. In the Soviet note, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov pointed to the great danger of a provocation committed by the Finnish side and even reported on the victims to which it allegedly led. The Finnish side was asked to withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus by 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.

In a reply note received on November 29, the Finnish government suggested that the Soviet side come to the place and, by the location of the shell craters, make sure that it was precisely the territory of Finland that was shelled. Further, the note said that the Finnish side agreed to the withdrawal of troops from the border, but only from both sides. This ended the diplomatic preparation, and on November 30, 1939, at 8 o'clock in the morning, units of the Red Army went on the offensive. The "unknown" war began, about which the USSR did not want not only to talk, but even to mention it. The war with Finland in 1939-1940 was a cruel test of the Soviet armed forces. It showed the almost complete unpreparedness of the Red Army for waging a big war in general and a war in the difficult climatic conditions of the North in particular. It is not our task to give any complete account of this war. We will limit ourselves to describing the most important events of the war and its lessons. This is necessary because 1 year and 3 months after the end of the Finnish war, the Soviet armed forces were to experience a powerful blow from the German Wehrmacht.

The balance of power on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war is shown in the table:

The USSR threw four armies into battle against Finland. These troops were deployed along the entire length of its border. In the main direction, on the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army was advancing, consisting of nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades, and with a large amount of artillery and aviation attached. The number of personnel of the 7th Army was at least 200 thousand people. The 7th Army was still supported by the Baltic Fleet. Instead of competently disposing of this strong grouping in operational and tactical terms, the Soviet command did not find anything more reasonable than to strike head-on at the most powerful fortifications in the world at that time, which made up the Mannerheim Line. During the twelve days of the offensive, drowning in snow, freezing in a 40-degree frost, suffering huge losses, the troops of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the supply line and stopped in front of the first of the three main fortification lines of the Mannerheim Line. The army was drained of blood and could not advance further. But the Soviet command planned to end the war with Finland victoriously within 12 days.

After replenishment with personnel and equipment, the 7th Army continued the fighting, which was fierce in nature and looked like a slow, with heavy losses in people and equipment, gnawing through the fortified Finnish positions. Commander of the 7th Army, first commander of the 2nd rank Yakovlev V.F., and from December 9 - commander of the 2nd rank Meretskov K.A. (After the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army on May 7, 1940, the rank of "commander of the 2nd rank" began to correspond to the rank of "lieutenant general"). At the beginning of the war with the Finns, there was no question of creating fronts. Despite powerful artillery and air strikes, the Finnish fortifications withstood. On January 7, 1940, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the North-Western Front, which was headed by the commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 13th Army was added to the 7th Army (corporal commander V.D. Grendal). The number of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 400 thousand people. The Mannerheim Line was defended by the Finnish Karelian Army led by General H.V. Esterman (135 thousand people).

Before the start of hostilities, the Finnish defense system was studied superficially by the Soviet command. The troops had little idea of the peculiarities of fighting in conditions of deep snow, in forests, in severe frost. Prior to the start of the fighting, senior commanders had little idea of how tank units would operate in deep snow, how soldiers without skis would attack waist-deep in snow, how to organize the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks, how to fight against reinforced concrete pillboxes with walls up to 2 meters and so on. Only with the formation of the North-Western Front, as they say, they came to their senses: reconnaissance of the fortification system began, daily training began in the methods of storming defensive structures; uniforms unsuitable for winter frosts were replaced: instead of boots, soldiers and officers were given felt boots, instead of overcoats - sheepskin coats, and so on. There were many attempts to take at least one line of enemy defense on the move, many people died during the assaults, many were blown up by Finnish anti-personnel mines. The soldiers were afraid of mines and did not go on the attack, the resulting “mine fear” quickly turned into “finophobia”. By the way, at the beginning of the war with the Finns, there were no mine detectors in the Soviet troops, the production of mine detectors began when the war was nearing its end.

The first breach in the Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus was broken by 14 February. Its length along the front was 4 km and in depth - 8-10 km. The Finnish command, in order to avoid the entry of the Red Army into the rear of the defending troops, took them to the second line of defense. The Soviet troops failed to break through it immediately. The front here temporarily stabilized. On February 26, the Finnish troops tried to launch a counteroffensive, but suffered significant losses and stopped the attacks. On February 28, Soviet troops resumed their offensive and broke through a significant part of the second line of the Finnish defense. Several Soviet divisions passed through the ice of the Vyborg Bay and on March 5 surrounded Vyborg, the second most important political, economic and military center of Finland. Until March 13, there were battles for Vyborg, and on March 12, representatives of the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty in Moscow. The hard and shameful war for the USSR ended.

The strategic goals of this war were, of course, not only in mastering the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to the two armies operating in the main direction, that is, on the Karelian Isthmus (7th and 13th), four more armies participated in the war: the 14th (commander Frolov), the 9th (comcors M.P. Dukhanov, then V.I. Chuikov), 8th (commander Khabarov, then G.M. Stern) and 15th (commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev). These armies operated almost along the entire eastern border of Finland and in its north on the front from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea, more than a thousand kilometers long. According to the plan of the high command, these armies were supposed to pull off part of the Finnish forces from the area of the Karelian Isthmus. If successful, Soviet troops in the southern sector of this front line could break through to the north of Lake Ladoga and reach the rear of the Finnish troops defending the Mannerheim Line. The Soviet troops of the central sector (Ukhta region), also in case of success, could go to the area of the Gulf of Bothnia and cut the territory of Finland in half.

However, in both areas, the Soviet troops were defeated. How was it possible in the conditions of a harsh winter, in dense coniferous forests covered with deep snow, without a developed road network, without reconnaissance of the area of upcoming hostilities, to advance and defeat the Finnish troops, adapted to life and combat activities in these conditions, moving quickly on skis, well equipped and armed with automatic weapons? It does not require marshal wisdom and more combat experience to understand that it is impossible to defeat such an enemy under these conditions, and you can lose your people.

In the relatively short Soviet-Finnish war with the Soviet troops, there were many tragedies and almost no victories. During the fighting north of Ladoga in December-February 1939-1940. mobile Finnish units, small in number, using the element of surprise, defeated several Soviet divisions, some of which disappeared forever in the snowy coniferous forests. Overloaded with heavy equipment, the Soviet divisions stretched out along the main roads, having open flanks, deprived of the possibility of maneuver, fell victim to small units of the Finnish army, losing 50-70% of their personnel, and sometimes more, if you count the prisoners. Here is a concrete example. The 18th division (56th corps of the 15th army) was surrounded by the Finns in the first half of February 1940 along the road from Uoma to Lemetti. She was transferred from the Ukrainian steppes. Soldiers were not trained to act in winter conditions in Finland. Parts of this division were blocked in 13 garrisons, completely cut off from each other. Their supply was carried out by air, but was organized unsatisfactorily. The soldiers suffered from cold and malnutrition. By the second half of February, the encircled garrisons were partially destroyed, the rest suffered heavy losses. The surviving soldiers were exhausted and demoralized. On the night of February 28-29, 1940, the remnants of the 18th division, with the permission of the Headquarters, began to exit the encirclement. To break through the front line, they had to abandon equipment and seriously wounded. With heavy losses, the fighters broke out of the encirclement. The soldiers carried the seriously wounded division commander Kondrashov in their arms. The banner of the 18th division went to the Finns. As required by law, this division, which had lost its flag, was disbanded. The division commander, already in the hospital, was arrested and soon shot by the verdict of the tribunal, the commander of the 56th corps, Cherepanov, shot himself on March 8. The losses of the 18th division amounted to 14 thousand people, that is, more than 90%. The total losses of the 15th Army amounted to about 50 thousand people, which is almost 43% of the initial number of 117 thousand people. There are many similar examples from that “unknown” war.

Under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty, the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the area north of Lake Ladoga, the territory in the Kuolajärvi region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula went to the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR acquired a 30-year lease on the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border is now about 150 kilometers. But the territorial acquisitions did not increase the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR. The loss of territories pushed the Finnish leadership into an alliance with Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the Finns in 1941 threw back the Soviet troops to the pre-war lines and captured part of Soviet Karelia.

before and after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

The Soviet-Finnish war became a bitter, difficult, but to some extent useful lesson for the Soviet armed forces. The troops, at the cost of great bloodshed, gained some experience in modern warfare, especially the skills of breaking through fortified areas, as well as conducting combat operations in winter conditions. The highest state and military leadership was convinced in practice that the combat training of the Red Army was very weak. Therefore, concrete measures began to be taken to improve discipline in the troops, to supply the army with modern weapons and military equipment. After the Soviet-Finnish war, there was some decline in the pace of repression against the command staff of the army and navy. Perhaps, analyzing the results of this war, Stalin saw the disastrous consequences of the repressions unleashed by him against the army and navy.

One of the first useful organizational measures immediately after the Soviet-Finnish war was the dismissal of Klim Voroshilov, a well-known political figure, Stalin's closest ally, "the favorite of the people," from the post of People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Stalin became convinced of Voroshilov's complete incompetence in military affairs. He was transferred to the prestigious position of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, the government. The position was invented specifically for Voroshilov, so he could well consider this a promotion. Stalin appointed S.K. to the post of People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, who was the commander of the Northwestern Front in the war with the Finns. In this war, Timoshenko did not show special military talents, rather, on the contrary, he showed military leadership weakness. However, for the most bloody operation for the Soviet troops to break through the "Mannerheim Line", carried out illiterately in operational and tactical terms and costing incredibly large victims, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We do not think that such a high assessment of Timoshenko's activities during the Soviet-Finnish war found understanding among the Soviet military personnel, especially among the participants in this war.

The official data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, subsequently published in the press, are as follows:

total losses amounted to 333,084 people, of which:
killed and died of wounds - 65384
missing - 19690 (of which over 5.5 thousand prisoners)
wounded, shell-shocked - 186584
frostbite - 9614
got sick - 51892

The losses of Soviet troops during the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" amounted to 190 thousand people killed, wounded, captured, which is 60% of all losses in the war with the Finns. And for such shameful and tragic results, Stalin gave the front commander the Golden Star of the Hero ...

The Finns lost about 70 thousand people, of which about 23 thousand were killed.

Now briefly about the situation around the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war, England and France provided assistance to Finland with weapons and materials, and also repeatedly offered its neighbors, Norway and Sweden, to let Anglo-French troops through their territory to help Finland. However, Norway and Sweden firmly took a position of neutrality, fearing to be drawn into a global conflict. Then England and France promised to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland by sea. Some people from the Finnish leadership suggested continuing the war with the USSR and waiting for the arrival of the expeditionary force in Finland. But the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, soberly assessing the situation, decided to stop the war, which led his country to relatively large casualties and weakened the economy. Finland was forced to conclude the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940.

The relations of the USSR with England and France deteriorated sharply because of the help of these countries to Finland and not only because of this. During the Soviet-Finnish war, England and France planned to bombard the oil fields of the Soviet Transcaucasus. Several squadrons of the British and French Air Forces from airfields in Syria and Iraq were to bomb the oil fields in Baku and Grozny, as well as the oil berths in Batumi. They only had time to take aerial photographs of targets in Baku, after which they went to the Batumi region to photograph the oil berths, but were met by Soviet anti-aircraft gunners. This happened in late March - early April 1940. In the context of the expected invasion of German troops in France, plans for the bombing of the Soviet Union by Anglo-French aircraft were revised and ultimately were not implemented.

One of the unpleasant results of the Soviet-Finnish war was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, which lowered the authority of the Soviet country in the eyes of the world community.

The Finnish war lasted 105 days. During this time, over a hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were injured or dangerously frostbitten. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor, and whether the losses were unjustified.

look back

It is impossible to understand the causes of that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Prior to gaining independence, the "Land of a Thousand Lakes" never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.

The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860, its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known wars - until 1901, the Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality grows from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.

After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the "whites" won; chasing the "reds", the hot guys crossed the old border, the First Soviet-Finnish War (1918-1920) began. Bloodless Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, preferred to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: according to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

How historically fair such a verdict turned out to be is difficult to say; The Vyborg province that fell to Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the times of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps, among other things, as a token of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is judgment

Look at the map. The year is 1939, Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea lanes will be blocked by another member of the Axis, Japan.

Thus, the only potentially protected channel for exports, through which the Soviet Union receives the gold so necessary to complete the industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, is the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round not freezing harbors of the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was being laid, even under the tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on different sides barricade). Moreover, at a distance of three days from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

But that's another half of the geographical troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is located within a radius of one march-throw of a potential enemy. A metropolis, on the streets of which an enemy shell has never fallen before, can be fired from heavy guns from the very first day of a probable war. The ships of the Baltic Fleet are deprived of their only base. And no, up to the Neva itself, natural defensive lines.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in a joke. But three quarters of a century ago, when forced national building continued in Suomi on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, you would not be in the mood for jokes.

In 1918, Karl-Gustav-Emil Mannerheim pronounces the well-known "sword oath", publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called while serving in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland was not going to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do it alone. The ties of the young state with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of their native Scandinavia. In 1918, when intense discussions were going on in the country that had just gained independence about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, the brother-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm, Prince Friedrich-Karl of Hesse, was declared the King of Finland; for various reasons, nothing came of the Suom monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guards” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, moreover, that the total number of local "reds" and "whites", significantly inferior to the Germans in combat qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. The ships of the Kriegsmarine freely entered the Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the "Country of a Thousand Lakes" were modernized to receive heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project ... It should be said that later Germany already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) really used the territory and water area of Suomi for laying mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombing Leningrad.

Yes, at that moment the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of the 1939 model did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The assets include the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army by Poland during the Western campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful reflection of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were rated very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are not comparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, was not going to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. The field marshal had enough of one Karelia.

Negotiation

Stalin was anything but a fool. If in order to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, then it should be so. Another issue is that the goal can not necessarily be achieved only by military means. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of the 39th, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guards” - not out of revenge for the old defeat, no, in politics, following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a fight with a real enemy, small in number, but drilled by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us ...

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a man of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki have been neither shaky nor fluctuating; in the fall of the 39th they were transferred to Moscow. Instead of the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of "Western partners"), and on November 13 they departed for home. Two weeks left before the Winter War.

On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; according to the Soviet side, about a dozen fighters and commanders were killed and wounded. Was the Mainil incident a deliberate provocation (which is evidenced, for example, by the absence of a list of names of the victims), or did one of the thousands of armed people who stood tensely for long days opposite the same armed enemy finally lose their nerve - in any case , this incident served as a pretext for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible "Mannerheim Line", and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but they did not like to remember all this for a long time. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was heavy.

Soviet Finnish war 1939 1940 reasons. Official Finland did not follow a friendly German policy

Reason for war

The balance of forces and means

The course of the war

First stage

Formation of the Kuusinen government

Mannerheim line

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

Second phase of the war

Why did the war drag on so long

Help Finland from other countries

Making peace

USSR losses

Results and consequences of the war

Prisoners of war and their fate

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

background

Negotiations with the Finns

Mainil incident

War

Finnish Democratic Republic

End of the war

What did Stalin want to achieve?

The results of the war

Reasons for failure

Historical digression and the origins of the conflict

Events 1938-1939 and causes of conflict

The beginning of the war (November 1939 - January 1940)

The February offensive of the Red Army and the end of the war (February-March 1940)

Results of the Winter War

Recent Entries