Soviet-Finnish war reasons briefly. How did it happen that Finland decided to repulse the offensive of the Red Army? Kuusinen's "People's Government"

In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, was actually forgotten for many years. This was facilitated by its not too successful results, and a kind of “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more than afraid to offend any of the "friends", and after the Great Patriotic War Finland was considered an ally of the USSR.

Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unknown war”, today this war is very “famous”. One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention the many articles in various magazines and collections. Here are just a "celebrity" this is very peculiar. The authors, who have made it their profession to denounce the Soviet "evil empire", cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied ...

By the end of the 1930s, there was a state clearly unfriendly to us near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identification mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank troops was a blue swastika. Those who say that it was Stalin who, by his actions, pushed Finland into the Nazi camp, prefer not to remember this. As well as why the peaceful Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and in alliance with England and France.

Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy probed the issue of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but in Helsinki they answered with a categorical refusal.

The accusers of the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that controls its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to an exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis to impose a naval blockade of the Island of Freedom, much less to launch a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries, the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and fully complied with the norms of international law. Nevertheless, the US was ready to start World War 3 if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as a "sphere of vital interests." For our country in 1939, such a sphere included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Kadet Party P. N. Milyukov, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, in a letter to I. P. Demidov expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”

On November 26, a well-known incident occurred near the village of Mainila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet servicemen were killed and 9 wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The Finnish side's allegations that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are taken as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Mainila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the government of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.

I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive zone on December 4-10. However, attempts to break it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the parties switched to positional struggle.

What are the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, in underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the size of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to carry out full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.

Soviet intelligence was also not up to par, which could not reveal complete and reliable information about the Finnish fortifications.

Finally, the Soviet leadership harbored unfounded hopes for the "class solidarity of the Finnish working people." It was widely believed that the population of the countries that had entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately "revolt and go over to the side of the Red Army", that the workers and peasants would come out to greet the Soviet soldiers with flowers.

As a result, the proper number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. So, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important sector of the front, the Finnish side had in December 1939 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 settlement battalions. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle and machine gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 calculated rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, then the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet - 169 thousand people. In general, 425 thousand soldiers of the Red Army acted along the entire front against 265 thousand Finnish troops.

Defeat or victory?

So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, such a war is considered won, as a result of which the winner is in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?

As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly to the USSR and ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this regard, the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unbelted hooligan understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was established there. Despite the persecution of the Finnish authorities, by the time it was banned in December of that year, it had 40,000 members. Such a mass character indicates that not only supporters of the communists joined the Society, but also simply sane people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with a great neighbor.

According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

It should be noted that if during the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km, and even in exchange for twice the territory, then as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.

It should also be taken into account that at the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the value of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which she agreed to cede to us, it was about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would have gone to many billions.

But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers in the Nystadt peace, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.”.

Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer to the USSR 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons, a significant number of cars.

Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded.

Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times higher than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Take, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, often the Russians lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the fortress of Port Arthur, the losses of the Japanese far exceeded the Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation developed during the Soviet-Finnish war, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.

As a result, the Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got a reason to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and about urgent measures to increase the combat capability of the army and navy.

Speaking in parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. For Russia, this is a great victory.”. However, do not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very big. But still a victory.

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1. Parts of the Red Army cross the bridge to the territory of Finland. 1939

2. Soviet fighter guarding a minefield in the area of ​​the former Finnish border outpost. 1939

3. Artillery crew at their guns in a firing position. 1939

4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain Kapustin I.V., who landed with a landing force on the island of Seiskaari, to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939

5. The soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian isthmus. 1939

6. Outfit of border guards on patrol. Karelian isthmus. 1939

7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the outpost of the Finns Beloostrov. 1939

8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border outpost Japinen. 1939

9. Fighters deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian isthmus. 1939

10. Soldiers of the 7th Army are firing at the enemy with rifles. Karelian isthmus. 1939

11. The reconnaissance group of skiers receives the task of the commander before leaving for reconnaissance. 1939

12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborgsky district. 1939

13. Fighters-skiers on a hike. 1940

14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the combat area with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940

15. Fighters for cooking in the woods at the stake in between fights. 1939

16. Cooking lunch in the field at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940

17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940

18. Signalers for the restoration of the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian isthmus. 1939

19. Fighters - signalmen restore the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns in Terioki. 1939

20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terioki station. 1939

21. Soldiers and commanders talk with the inhabitants of Terioki. 1939

22. Signalers on the negotiating front line in the area of ​​Kemyar station. 1940

23. Rest of the Red Army after the battle in the Kemerya area. 1940

24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army is listening to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terioki. 1939

25. View of the Suoyarva station, taken by the Red Army. 1939

26. Soldiers of the Red Army are guarding a gas station in the town of Raivola. Karelian isthmus. 1939

27. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939

28. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939

29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940

30. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939

31. Sappers for the repair of the bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939

32. A Red Army soldier lowers a letter into a field mail box. 1939

33. A group of Soviet commanders and fighters inspects the banner of Shutskor recaptured from the Finns. 1939

34. Howitzer B-4 on the front line. 1939

35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at a height of 65.5. 1940

36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939

37. View of the destroyed bridge near the town of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939

38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940

39. Red Army soldiers at the captured guns left after the battles with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940

40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940

41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.

42. Soviet soldiers on a pillbox taken on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940

43. Parts of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940

44. Soldiers of the Red Army on the fortifications in the city of Vyborg. 1940

45. The ruins of the city of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940

46. ​​Soldiers of the Red Army clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940

47. Icebreaking ship "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940

48. Soviet skiers move to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.

49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis to take off before a sortie during the Soviet-Finnish war.

50. Finnish Foreign Minister Weine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940

51. The crossing of the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939

52. Finnish prisoners are talking with a Soviet political worker. The picture was taken in the Gryazovets camp of the NKVD. 1939-1940

53. Soviet soldiers are talking with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939

54. Finnish aircraft Fokker C.X. shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939

55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, Junior Lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) unloads a mine.

56. The calculation of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at the Finnish fortifications. December 2, 1939

57. The commanders of the Red Army are considering the captured Finnish tank Vickers Mk.E. March 1940

58. Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) at the I-16 fighter. 1940

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 became a rather popular topic in the Russian Federation. All authors who like to walk through the "totalitarian past" like to remember this war, to recall the balance of forces, the losses, the failures of the initial period of the war.

Reasonable causes of war are denied or hushed up. The decision to war is often blamed on Comrade Stalin personally. As a result, many of the citizens of the Russian Federation who have even heard about this war are sure that we lost it, suffered huge losses and showed the whole world the weakness of the Red Army.

Origins of Finnish statehood

The land of the Finns (in Russian chronicles - "Sum") did not have its own statehood, in the XII-XIV centuries it was conquered by the Swedes. On the lands of the Finnish tribes (sum, em, Karelians) three crusades were made - 1157, 1249-1250 and 1293-1300. The Finnish tribes were subjugated and forced to accept Catholicism. The further invasion of the Swedes and the Crusaders was stopped by the Novgorodians, who inflicted several defeats on them. In 1323, the Peace of Orekhov was concluded between the Swedes and Novgorodians.

The lands were controlled by Swedish feudal lords, the castles (Abo, Vyborg and Tavastgus) were the centers of control. The Swedes had all the administrative, judicial power. The official language was Swedish, the Finns did not even have cultural autonomy. Swedish was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated layer of the population, Finnish was the language of ordinary people. The church, the Abo episcopate, had great power, but paganism retained its position among the common people for quite a long time.

In 1577, Finland received the status of a Grand Duchy and received a coat of arms with a lion. Gradually, the Finnish nobility merged with the Swedish.

In 1808, the Russian-Swedish war began, the reason was the refusal of Sweden to act together with Russia and France against England; Russia has won. According to the Friedrichsham Peace Treaty of September 1809, Finland became the property of the Russian Empire.

In a little over a hundred years, the Russian Empire turned the Swedish province into a practically autonomous state with its own authorities, monetary unit, post office, customs and even an army. Since 1863, Finnish, along with Swedish, has become the state language. All administrative posts, except for the governor-general, were occupied by local residents. All taxes collected in Finland remained in the same place, Petersburg almost did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Grand Duchy. The migration of Russians to the principality was prohibited, the rights of Russians living there were limited, and Russification of the province was not carried out.

In 1811, the principality was given the Russian province of Vyborg, which was formed from the lands that had ceded to Russia under the treaties of 1721 and 1743. Then the administrative border with Finland approached the capital of the empire. In 1906, by decree of the Russian emperor, Finnish women, the first in all of Europe, received the right to vote. Cherished by Russia, the Finnish intelligentsia did not remain in debt and wanted independence.

Beginning of independence

On December 6, 1917, the Sejm (Parliament of Finland) declared independence; on December 31, 1917, the Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland.

On January 15 (28), 1918, a revolution began in Finland, which grew into a civil war. The White Finns called for help from German troops. The Germans did not refuse, in early April they landed a 12,000th division (“Baltic Division”) under the command of General von der Goltz on the Hanko Peninsula. Another detachment of 3 thousand people was sent on April 7. With their support, the supporters of Red Finland were defeated, on the 14th the Germans occupied Helsinki, on April 29 Vyborg fell, in early May the Reds were completely defeated. The Whites carried out mass repressions: more than 8 thousand people were killed, about 12 thousand rotted in concentration camps, about 90 thousand people were arrested and put in prisons and camps. A genocide was unleashed against the Russian inhabitants of Finland, killed everyone indiscriminately: officers, students, women, old people, children.

Berlin demanded that the German prince, Friedrich Karl of Hesse, be placed on the throne; on October 9, the Sejm elected him King of Finland. But Germany was defeated in World War I and so Finland became a republic.

First two Soviet-Finnish wars

Independence was not enough, the Finnish elite wanted an increase in territory, deciding to take advantage of the Time of Troubles in Russia, Finland attacked Russia. Karl Mannerheim promised to annex Eastern Karelia. On March 15, the so-called “Wallenius Plan” was approved, according to which the Finns wanted to seize Russian lands along the border: the White Sea - Lake Onega - the Svir River - Lake Ladoga, in addition, the Pechenga region, the Kola Peninsula, Petrograd had to move to Suomi become a "free city". On the same day, detachments of volunteers received an order to begin the conquest of Eastern Karelia.

On May 15, 1918, Helsinki declared war on Russia, until the autumn there were no active hostilities, Germany concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Bolsheviks. But after her defeat, the situation changed, on October 15, 1918, the Finns captured the Rebolsk region, and in January 1919, the Porosozersk region. In April, the Olonets Volunteer Army launched an offensive, it captured Olonets and approached Petrozavodsk. During the Vidlitsa operation (June 27-July 8), the Finns were defeated and expelled from Soviet soil. In the autumn of 1919, the Finns repeated the attack on Petrozavodsk, but at the end of September they were repulsed. In July 1920, the Finns suffered several more defeats, negotiations began.

In mid-October 1920, the Yuryev (Tartu) peace treaty was signed, Soviet Russia ceded the Pechengi-Petsamo region, Western Karelia to the Sestra River, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula.

But this was not enough for the Finns, the Great Finland plan was not implemented. The second war was unleashed, it began with the formation of partisan detachments in October 1921 on the territory of Soviet Karelia, on November 6, Finnish volunteer detachments invaded the territory of Russia. By mid-February 1922, Soviet troops liberated the occupied territories, and on March 21 an agreement on the inviolability of the borders was signed.

Svinhufvud, Per Evind, 3rd President of Finland, March 2, 1931 - March 1, 1937

In Helsinki, they did not give up hope of profiting at the expense of Soviet territories. But after two wars, they drew conclusions for themselves - it is necessary to act not with volunteer detachments, but with an entire army (Soviet Russia has grown stronger) and allies are needed. As the first Prime Minister of Finland, Svinhufvud, put it: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland."

With the aggravation of Soviet-Japanese relations, Finland began to establish contacts with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. Helsinki reacted negatively to the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations and the treaty of mutual assistance with France. Hopes for a big conflict between the USSR and Japan did not come true.

The hostility of Finland and its readiness for war against the USSR was not a secret either in Warsaw or in Washington. Thus, in September 1937, the American military attache in the USSR, Colonel F. Faymonville, reported: "The most pressing military problem of the Soviet Union is preparation to repel a simultaneous attack by Japan in the East and Germany, together with Finland in the West."

There were constant provocations on the border between the USSR and Finland. For example: on October 7, 1936, a Soviet border guard who was making a detour was killed by a shot from the Finnish side. Only after a long wrangling did Helsinki pay compensation to the family of the deceased and plead guilty. Finnish planes violated both land and water borders.

Moscow was especially concerned about Finland's cooperation with Germany. The Finnish public supported Germany's actions in Spain. German designers designed submarines for the Finns. Finland supplied Berlin with nickel and copper, receiving 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, they planned to purchase combat aircraft. In 1939, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center was established in Finland, its main task was intelligence work against the Soviet Union. The Center collected information about the Baltic Fleet, the Leningrad Military District, and the Leningrad industry. Finnish intelligence worked closely with the Abwehr. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, the blue swastika became the identification mark of the Finnish Air Force.

By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, which could receive 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had.

Helsinki was ready to fight against the USSR not only in alliance with Germany, but also with France and England.

The problem of defending Leningrad

By 1939, we had an absolutely hostile state on the northwestern borders. There was a problem of protecting Leningrad, the border was only 32 km away, the Finns could shell the city with heavy artillery. In addition, it was necessary to protect the city from the sea.

From the south, the problem was solved by concluding an agreement on mutual assistance with Estonia in September 1939. The USSR received the right to place garrisons and naval bases on the territory of Estonia.

Helsinki, on the other hand, did not want to solve the most important issue for the USSR through diplomacy. Moscow proposed an exchange of territories, an agreement on mutual assistance, joint defense of the Gulf of Finland, sell part of the territory for a military base or lease it. But Helsinki did not accept any option. Although the most far-sighted figures, for example, Karl Mannerheim, understood the strategic necessity of Moscow's demands. Mannerheim proposed to move the border away from Leningrad and receive good compensation, and offer Yussarö Island for a Soviet naval base. But in the end, the position of not compromising prevailed.

It should be noted that London did not stand aside and provoked the conflict in its own way. Moscow was hinted that they would not intervene in a possible conflict, and the Finns were told that they had to hold their positions and give in.

As a result, on November 30, 1939, the third Soviet-Finnish war began. The first stage of the war, until the end of December 1939, was unsuccessful, due to a lack of intelligence and insufficient forces, the Red Army suffered significant losses. The enemy was underestimated, the Finnish army mobilized in advance. She occupied the defensive fortifications of the Mannerheim Line.

The new Finnish fortifications (1938-1939) were not known to intelligence, they did not allocate the required number of forces (for a successful breach of the fortifications, it was necessary to create superiority in the ratio of 3:1).

Position of the West

The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations, violating the rules: 7 out of 15 countries that were members of the Council of the League of Nations voted for the exclusion, 8 did not participate or abstained. That is, they were expelled by a minority of votes.

The Finns were supplied by England, France, Sweden and other countries. More than 11,000 foreign volunteers have arrived in Finland.

London and Paris eventually decided to start a war with the USSR. In Scandinavia, they planned to land an Anglo-French expeditionary force. Allied aviation was supposed to launch airstrikes on the oil fields of the Union in the Caucasus. From Syria, the Allied troops planned to attack Baku.

The Red Army thwarted large-scale plans, Finland was defeated. Despite the persuasion of the French and the British to hold on, on March 12, 1940, the Finns sign peace.

USSR lost the war?

Under the Moscow Treaty of 1940, the USSR received the Rybachy Peninsula in the north, part of Karelia with Vyborg, northern Ladoga, and the Khanko Peninsula was leased to the USSR for a period of 30 years, a naval base was created there. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Finnish army was able to reach the old border only in September 1941.

We received these territories without giving up ours (they offered twice as much as they asked for), and for free - they also offered monetary compensation. When the Finns remembered the compensation and cited the example of Peter the Great, who gave Sweden 2 million thalers, Molotov replied: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.” Moscow also insisted on 95 million rubles in compensation for damage to equipment and property from the lands seized by the Finns. Plus, 350 sea and river transports, 76 steam locomotives, 2 thousand wagons were also transferred to the USSR.

The Red Army gained important combat experience and saw its shortcomings.

It was a victory, albeit not a brilliant one, but a victory.

Sources:
Civil war and intervention in the USSR. M., 1987.
Dictionary Dictionary in three volumes. M., 1986.
Winter war 1939-1940. M., 1998.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. M., 2004.
international relations (1918-2003). M., 2000.
Meinander H. History of Finland. M., 2008.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2006.

Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–40 (another name is winter war) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal reason for the hostilities was the so-called Mainil incident - shelling from the Finnish territory of the Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which occurred, according to the Soviet side, on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact, concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. According to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the primordially Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that in 1932 a non-aggression pact was signed between Finland and the USSR, relations between the two countries were rather tense. In Finland, they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), could provide its territory to another hostile country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city in the USSR - Leningrad - was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of a war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland retreats to the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve an exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of the USSR to lease several islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories given to it (not least because of the unwillingness to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see Fig. and ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to arm the demilitarized Aland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the proposal of the USSR on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached an impasse. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to start preparing for hostilities. Newspaper article "Truth" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intended to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

Less than a month remained before the Mainilsky incident, which served as a formal pretext for war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not exist at all, and there were only allegations of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. Documents confirming this or that version have not been preserved. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side firmly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and led by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, began to form "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, she did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to deploy military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army got the opportunity to make the most of the advantage in manpower and the overwhelming advantage in technology. In terms of time, the operation had to meet the period from two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on the stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold the enemy up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated the strength of Finland, while Finland placed too much on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland, general mobilization took place. The USSR, however, decided to confine itself to parts of the Leningrad Military District, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies advanced on Finland. The 7th army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in Karelia, the 14th - in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed on the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defenses to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to successfully move forward, but was also stopped, and part of its forces were surrounded and forced to withdraw. The most difficult and bloody battles unfolded in the sector of the 7th Army, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army was to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely scarce data about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. The underestimation of the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, units of the Red Army, with losses, were able to overcome only the support strip of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were also unsuccessful. By the end of December, it became obvious that it was pointless to attempt an offensive in this style. There was a relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant strengthening of the troops, their saturation with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods were developed to deal with defensive structures, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches, to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of the commander of the 1st rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at that moment also carried out measures to increase the combat capability of its own troops. Both captured in battles and new equipment and weapons delivered from abroad, the units received the necessary replenishment.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th army near Suomussalmi. From mid-December, the 44th division advanced to help the encircled 163rd division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting, in a rapidly changing situation, the division command misjudged the situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division still managed to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses ... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the ranks.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns have been trying to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were not successful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Finns and introduced tank formations into the breakthrough. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire length of the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help either: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

Parallel to the fighting, there were also battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an inland lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between the Western countries and the USSR reached a critical point.

Recommended literature:
1. Irincheev Bair. Forgotten front of Stalin. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown Wars of the XX century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b .: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter war. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939-1940. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. "Winter War": work on the mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the generalization of the experience of the Finnish campaign / Ed. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were crisis relations between the USSR and Finland. For a number of years, the Soviet-Finnish war, alas, was not brilliant, and did not bring glory to Russian weapons. And now consider the actions of the two sides, which, alas, could not agree.

It was alarming in these last days of November 1939 in Finland: the war continued in Western Europe, it was restless on the border with the Soviet Union, the population was being evacuated from large cities, newspapers stubbornly repeated about the evil intentions of the eastern neighbor. Part of the population believed these rumors, the other hoped that the war would bypass Finland.

But the morning of November 30, 1939, cleared everything up. The coastal defense guns of Kronstadt, which opened fire on the territory of Finland at 8 o'clock, marked the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War.

The conflict was brewing. For two decades between

There was mutual distrust between the USSR and Finland. If Finland was afraid of possible great-power aspirations on the part of Stalin, whose actions as a dictator were often unpredictable, then the Soviet leadership was not without reason concerned about Helsinki's largest connections with London, Paris and Berlin. That is why, in order to ensure the security of Leningrad, during the negotiations that took place from February 1937 to November 1939, the Soviet Union offered Finland various options. Due to the fact that the Finnish government did not consider it possible to accept these proposals, the Soviet leadership took the initiative to resolve the controversial issue by force, with the help of weapons.

The fighting in the first period of the war proceeded unfavorably for the Soviet side. The calculation on the transience of achieving the goal with small forces was not crowned with success. Finnish troops, relying on the fortified Mannerheim Line, using a variety of tactics and skillfully using terrain conditions, forced the Soviet command to concentrate larger forces and launch a general offensive in February 1940, which led to victory and the conclusion of peace on March 12, 1940.

The 105-day war was hard on both sides. Soviet wars, following the orders of the command, in the difficult conditions of the snowy winter off-road, showed mass heroism. In the course of the war, both Finland and the Soviet Union achieved their goals not only by military actions of the troops, but also by political means, which, as it turned out, not only did not weaken mutual intolerance, but, on the contrary, aggravated it.

The political nature of the Soviet-Finnish war did not fit into the usual classification, limited by the ethical framework of the concepts of "just" and "unjust" war. It was unnecessary for both sides and mostly unrighteous on our part. In this regard, one cannot but agree with the statements of such prominent statesmen of Finland as Presidents J. Paasikivi and U. Kekkonen that Finland's fault was its intransigence during pre-war negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the latter's fault was that he did not use to the end political methods. He gave priority to a military solution to the dispute.

The illegal actions of the Soviet leadership are that the Soviet troops, without declaring war on a broad front, crossed the border, violated the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1920 and the non-aggression pact of 1932, extended in 1934. The Soviet government also violated its own convention concluded with neighboring states in July 1933. Finland also joined this document at that time. It defined the concept of aggression and clearly stated that no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature could justify or justify a threat, blockade or attack against another participating State.

By signing the name of the document, the Soviet government did not allow that Finland itself could commit aggression against its great neighbor. She feared only that her territory could be used by third countries for anti-Soviet purposes. But since such a condition was not stipulated in these documents, then, therefore, the contracting countries did not recognize its possibility and they had to respect the letter and spirit of these agreements.

Of course, Finland's unilateral rapprochement with Western countries, and especially with Germany, burdened Soviet-Finnish relations. Post-war President of Finland U. Kekkonen considered this cooperation to be a logical consequence of foreign policy aspirations for the first decade of Finland's independence. The common starting point of these aspirations, as considered in Helsinki, was the threat from the east. Therefore, Finland sought to ensure the support of other countries in crisis situations. She carefully guarded the image of the "outpost of the West" and avoided bilateral settlement of contentious issues with her eastern neighbor.

Due to these circumstances, the Soviet government allowed the possibility of a military conflict with Finland since the spring of 1936. It was then that the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the resettlement of the civilian population was adopted

(we were talking about 3400 farms) from the Karelian Isthmus for the construction of training grounds and other military facilities here. During 1938, the General Staff, at least three times, raised the issue of transferring the forest area on the Karelian Isthmus to the military department for defense construction. On September 13, 1939, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Voroshilov specifically addressed the Chairman of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov with a proposal to intensify these works. However, at the same time, diplomatic measures were taken to prevent military clashes. Thus, in February 1937, the first visit to Moscow by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland since its independence, R. Hopsty, took place. In reports about his conversations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov, it was said that

“within the framework of the existing Soviet-Finnish agreements, it is possible

uninterruptedly develop and strengthen friendly good-neighborly relations between the two states, and that both governments strive and will strive for this.

But a year passed, and in April 1938 the Soviet government considered

promptly invite the Government of Finland to negotiate

regarding the joint development of measures to strengthen security

sea ​​and land approaches to Leningrad and the borders of Finland and

to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance for this purpose. Negotiation,

lasting several months, were inconclusive. Finland

this proposal was rejected.

Soon for informal talks on behalf of the Soviet

government in Helsinki arrived B.E. Matte. He brought fundamentally

new Soviet proposal, which was as follows: Finland concedes

to the Soviet Union a certain territory on the Karelian Isthmus,

receiving in return a large Soviet territory and compensation for financial

expenses for the resettlement of Finnish citizens of the ceded territory. Answer

the Finnish side was negative with the same rationale - sovereignty and

Finnish neutrality.

In this situation, Finland took defensive measures. It was

military construction was strengthened, exercises were held, at which

The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General F.

Halder, the troops received new models of weapons and military equipment.

Obviously, it was these measures that gave rise to the commander of the second rank K.A.

Meretskov, who in March 1939 was appointed commander of the troops

Leningrad Military District, to assert that the Finnish troops from the very

the beginnings allegedly had an offensive mission on the Karelian Isthmus from

the goal is to wear down the Soviet troops, and then strike at Leningrad.

France or Germany, occupied with the war, could not provide support

Finland, another round of Soviet-Finnish negotiations began. They are

took place in Moscow. As before, the Finnish delegation was headed by

Paasikivi, but at the second stage the minister was included in the delegation

Finance Gunner. Rumors circulated in Helsinki at the time that the Social Democrat

Ganner had known Stalin since pre-revolutionary times in

Helsinki, and even once did him a favor.

During the negotiations, Stalin and Molotov withdrew their previous proposal

on the lease of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but offered the Finns to push back

border for several tens of kilometers from Leningrad and rent for

creation of a naval base on the Heiko Peninsula, yielding twice to Finland

a large territory in Soviet Karelia.

non-aggression and recall of their diplomatic representatives from Finland.

When the war began, Finland turned to the League of Nations with a request for

support. The League of Nations, in turn, called on the USSR to stop military

actions, but received an answer that the Soviet country was not conducting any

war with Finland.

organizations. Many countries have raised funds for Finland or

provided loans, in particular the United States and Sweden. Most weapons

delivered by the UK and France, but the equipment was mostly

obsolete. Sweden's contribution was the most valuable: 80,000 rifles, 85

anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns and 112 field guns.

The Germans also expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the USSR. The war has dealt

a tangible blow to Germany's vital supplies of timber and nickel

from Finland. The strong sympathy of Western countries made real

intervention in the war of northern Norway and Sweden, which would entail

abolishing the import of iron ore into Germany from Norway. But even

faced with such difficulties, the Germans respected the terms of the pact.

The Soviet-Finnish war and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through the minefields, in tight ranks and holding hands. Any Russian person who has recognized the incommensurability of losses, it turns out, must simultaneously admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

Again I will quote the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim:
« It happened that the Russians in the battles of early December marched with songs in dense rows - and even holding hands - into the minefields of the Finns, not paying attention to the explosions and the accurate fire of the defenders.

Do you represent these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures named by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24923 people killed and died from wounds of the Finns. Russian, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why pity these Russes?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book "Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940". with reference to Nikita Khrushchev, they give the following data:

"Out of a total of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR's losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment ... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with "meat".
About the reasons for the defeat, Mannerheim writes as follows:
"At the final stage of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower."

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such meager losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and write about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in The Great Slandered War claims:
« Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded. The primary source of this figure is the translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff of Finland Helge Seppäl, published in the newspaper “Za rubezhom” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish edition of “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost in the “winter war” more than 23,000 people killed; over 43,000 people were wounded. During the bombing, including of merchant ships, 25,243 people were killed.

The last figure - 25,243 killed in the bombing - is in doubt. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to read the Finnish original of Seppälä's article.

Mannerheim, as you know, estimated the losses from the bombing:
"More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice as many were injured."

The largest numbers of Finnish losses are given by the Military History Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army in it amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official figures, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 captured

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Losses. In the number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet, even those with whom relatives cut off contact in 1939-1940 are taken into account.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers ranked these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how considered the Finnish losses is absolutely incomprehensible. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the strength of the Armed Forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war, Finland experienced a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even insignificant losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished ”Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to the calculation of Aritz, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 increased by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves up to the age of 45, which did not happen in any of the countries, not even in Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. In Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses in the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
In total, 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish site http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died in the period 1939-1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not converge.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR claims that hot Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army casualties. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as shutskor, were not included in the general statistics of losses. And they had a lot of paramilitaries.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Whatever the case, two explanations arise:
The first - if the Finnish data on their losses are correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they "raised their paws" almost without suffering losses.
The second - if we consider that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply underestimated their own losses on a large scale.