The strategic plan of the Soviet High Command was based on two strikes. Intention
Tests
1. What are the reasons for the major failures of the Red Army in the first months of the Great Patriotic War.
A) the German attack was sudden;
B) Soviet soldiers did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime;
C) the troops were not put on alert;
D) there was a lack of experienced command personnel.
2. On August 8, 1941, the Supreme Commander of the Soviet troops was appointed:
A) G.K. Zhukov
B) I.V. Stalin
C) S.K. Timoshenko
3. For the first time in the Second World War, German troops were forced to go on the defensive in battle:
4. On September 18, 1941, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, four rifle divisions were renamed into guards. The battle in which these divisions distinguished themselves took place under:
A) Yelney;
B) Smolensk;
B) Leningrad.
5. The defense of Moscow was led by:
A) A.M. Vasilevsky;
B) G.K. Zhukov ;
C) K.K. Rokosovsky.
6. The strategic plan of the Soviet command in the summer campaign of 1942:
A) conducting active defensive battles, followed by a transition to a counteroffensive in all decisive directions;
B) going on the defensive along the entire front line;
C) a tactical retreat to the Volga with the aim of drawing the enemy deep into Soviet territory.
7. Indicate what tactics was the basis of the Kursk operation of the Soviet troops:
A) wear down the enemy in defensive battles, followed by a counteroffensive;
B) advance offensive of the Soviet troops;
C) going on the defensive due to the clear advantage of the enemy
8. 2438 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the operation on:
A) the release of the Eagle;
B) crossing the Dnieper
C) the liberation of Kyiv.
9. Match the names with the facts:
P.M. Gavrilov air ram
N.F. Gastello heroic battles on the outskirts of Moscow
G.K. Zhukov strengthening the defense of Leningrad
V.G. Klochkov heroic defense of Sevastopol
F.S. Oktyabrsky heroic defense of the Brest Fortress
10. Align events and dates:
Defensive stage of the battle for Moscow July 10 - September 10, 1941
The offensive stage of the battle for Moscow October 30, 1941-July 4, 1942.
11. The USSR surpassed Germany in the production of military products in:
A) the end of 1942;
B) mid-1943;
B) early 1944
12. The following changes took place in the confessional policy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War:
A) the patriarchate was restored;
B) dioceses were restored, churches were opened;
C) the law on the separation of church and state was repealed
D) the activity of priests at the front was allowed.
13. In the second half of September 1943, Operation Concert was carried out by Soviet partisans. Her goal:
A) mass departure to partisan detachments of concert brigades;
B) undermining enemy communications, disabling railways ;
C) the destruction of the highest ranks of the Nazi army.
14. The plan of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad had the code name:
A) Typhoon
B) "Citadel"
B) Uranus.
15. The offensive Belarusian operation, developed by the Soviet high command, was codenamed:
A) "Bagration"
B) "Kutuzov"
B) "Suvorov"
16. Japan did not enter the war against the USSR in 1941 due to:
A) the situation on the Soviet-German front;
B) US entry into the war with Japan;
C) the unpreparedness of the Kwantung Army;
D) the fact that the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
17. The statement of the USSR about the country's entry into the war against Japan was made at the conference:
A) in Tehran
B) in Moscow;
B) in Yalta
D) in Potstdam.
18. August 5, 1943 The first fireworks took place in Moscow. It was in honor of:
A) the liberation of Kharkov;
B) breaking the blockade of Leningrad;
C) the liberation of Orel and Belgrade
19. On March 26, 1944, Soviet troops for the first time reached the line of the State Border of the USSR. This happened in the area
A) the Soviet-Polish section of the border;
B) Soviet - Romanian border near the river. Rod;
C) The borders of the USSR and Norway.
20. January 12, 1945, a week before the appointed time, the Soviet troops launched a powerful offensive on almost the entire sector of the front from the Baltic to the Carpathians. Reason for this attack:
A) the desire to get ahead of the allies and be the first to enter the territory of Germany;
B) the request of Charles de Gaulle to help the anti-fascist uprising in Paris.
C) W. Churchill's request to save the Allied forces in the Ardennes from defeat.
21. At the Potsdam (Berlin) conference, the following decisions were made (several answers)
A) about reparations from Germany;
B) on the transfer of the USSR of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it;
C) about the management of post-war Germany.
D) on the appointment of Stalin as commander of the united allied forces.
E) on the arrest and trial of Nazi war criminals.
22. The meeting on the Elbe River of Soviet and American troops took place in 1945:
A) A.T. Tvardovsky
B) K.M. Simonov
C) S.V. Mikhalkov
A) A.A. Aleksandrov
B) N.V. Bogoslovsky
C) V.P. Solovyov-Sedoy
25. The breakthrough of the Siege of Leningrad occurred in:
A) January 1943
B) July 1943;
B) January 1944
26. Name the highest body of state power during the Great Patriotic War:
A) Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
B) State Defense Committee
B) Council of People's Commissars
27. When the Battle of Kursk began:
28. Give answers to the questions:
28.1 When hostilities were opened on the Second Front _________________________________________________________
28.2 Who led the delegations of the USSR, USA, Great Britain at the Tehran Conference in 1943 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The purpose of the lesson: to reveal the role of the rear as one of the factors in the victory of the Soviet people over Germany; to understand the causes and essence of changes in the policy of the Soviet state towards the church during the war years; to clarify the sources, the most important features and forms of people's war behind enemy lines.
Basic knowledge: the essence of the occupation regime; the moral and psychological state of Soviet society during the war years; the activities of the Orthodox Church during the war years; restructuring the economy on a war footing; the contribution of science and artistic culture to the defeat of the enemy; methods of combating the enemy of partisans and underground fighters.
Basic concepts: occupational regime; evacuation; partisan war.
Lesson equipment: workbook (issue 2, § 32); reader; tables; map "Rear of the country during the war."
The lesson begins with a discussion about homework. You can invite individual students to complete tasks 6, 7 (p. 67) in the workbook (issue 2), as well as conduct a test.
What was the significance of the battle for Moscow?
a) The strategic initiative passed into the hands of the Soviet command;
b) the blitzkrieg plan was thwarted;
c) a second front was opened in Europe.
What was the strategic plan of the Soviet command in the summer campaign of 1942?
a) Conducting active defensive battles with the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive in all decisive directions;
b) going on the defensive along the entire front line;
c) a tactical retreat to the Volga with the aim of drawing the enemy deep into Soviet territory.
What measures were provided for by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR issued on July 28, 1942 (multiple answers are possible)?
a) Creation of barrage detachments for the execution of unauthorized retreating soldiers of the Red Army;
b) the destruction of all settlements without exception during the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops;
c) mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for work at industrial enterprises and construction sites;
d) bringing to court-martial the commanders of the Red Army, who allowed unauthorized abandonment of their positions;
e) formation of penal battalions and companies.
Plan for learning new material
1. The moral and psychological state of Soviet society during the war.
2. Church during the Great Patriotic War.
3. Evacuation. Life and life of people in the rear.
4. Science and education during the war.
5. Artistic culture.
6. Guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.
1. It is advisable to start the first question by listening to a prepared report on the essence of the occupation regime established by the Nazis.
It is possible to reveal the problem of the moral and psychological state of Soviet society during the war years by combining the teacher’s story with completing task 1 (issue 2, pp. 51-52) in a workbook and working on the document “From the speech of I.V. Stalin on July 3, 1941 . placed at the end of the paragraph. After reading the document, the teacher asks: why did Stalin address the people in his speech on the radio with the words: “Brothers and sisters!”? What turning point in the relationship between government and society did this appeal reflect?
You can also organize a discussion of the problem task: what, in your opinion, did the Soviet people defend during the war years: the Motherland, socialist gains, Stalin? How would you explain the widespread use of the slogan “For the Motherland! For Stalin!"?
2. Beginning the explanation of the second question, the teacher should emphasize that during the war years the authorities also changed their attitude towards the church. Next, the teacher combines his story with the completion of task 2 (issue 2, p. 53) in the workbook.
3. Having revealed the essence of the concept of "evacuation", the teacher organizes a collective discussion of task 3 (issue 2, p. 55) in a workbook. Then you can create a problematic situation: what do you think, what factors allowed the Soviet Union to rebuild the economy on a war footing in a short time? In conclusion, you can listen to reports prepared at home about the life of people in the rear. In addition to the material of the textbook, the teacher can use the data given in the work of M. S. Zimich “Everyday life of military hard times. 1941-1945 "(M., 1994. - Issues 1 and 2).
About the card system. The Soviet state introduced a rationed sale of goods on cards with differentiated norms and conditions of sale for various groups of the population. On July 18, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution to introduce cards for bread, meat, fats, sugar and other essential products, as well as for essentials (fabrics, shoes, garments, etc.) in Moscow, Leningrad, and their suburbs. At the end of October, the card system for the sale of bread, sugar and confectionery was introduced in all cities and workers' settlements of the country. At the end of 1941, a rationed supply of food was organized throughout the country ...
Supply standards in the country were differentiated according to the social and production principle. Preferential rights were enjoyed by workers in sectors of the national economy who were supplied with bread on cards of the first category, which were of decisive importance in strengthening the defense power of the state. These included workers, employees and engineers of the military industry, coal and oil industries, hazardous shops in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, etc. The needs of such population groups as children, nursing mothers, war invalids were also taken into account. According to the supply standards, the entire population was divided into 4 groups: workers and persons equated to them; employees and persons equated to them; dependents; children up to 12 years of age...
The norms for supplying the population of the USSR established at the beginning of the war
The norms for the supply of meat and fish were also differentiated. The usual monthly norm according to the work card for these products was as follows: meat, fish - 1.8 kg, fats - 0.4 kg, cereals and pasta - 1.2 kg. Employees, dependents and children received less than these rates.
4. Students study the fourth question on their own, reading the text of the corresponding section of the textbook and filling out the table “Science during the Great Patriotic War”:
To consolidate the material studied, the teacher gives the task: name the best examples of Soviet weapons and military equipment and the names of their creators.
5. When covering the fifth question, it is advisable to use the computer version of the textbook. If this is not possible, the question is studied by combining the teacher's story with the completion of task 6 (issue 2, p. 57) in the workbook. The teacher can accompany his story with work with illustrations placed on the insert of the textbook, as well as use recordings of songs from the times of the Great Patriotic War.
6. The study of the sixth question can be organized as a mini-conference with listening to short speeches by students.
At the end of the lesson, it is advisable to discuss the question: what is the contribution of home front workers to the common cause of defeating the enemy?
Homework assignment. § 33 and questions to it. Tasks 4, 5 (p. 56), 7, 8 (p. 58), 9 (p. 60-61) in the workbook (issue 2).
After the defeat near Moscow and the failure of the "blitzkrieg" plan against the USSR, the position of fascist Germany worsened. But she still had huge forces and resources to continue the criminal war.
By the spring of 1942, the fascist German army had established itself on new frontiers. At the same time, the troops of its central grouping were 150 and in some places even 120 km from the Soviet capital. Having carried out emergency measures to mobilize forces and transferring a significant part of the reserves from the West to the Eastern Front, Hitler and the generals obedient to him were preparing a new offensive here. The absence of a second front in Europe favored this.
Fascist Germany not only made up for the losses suffered in the battles against the Red Army, but also increased its armed forces compared with the beginning of 1942 by more than 700 thousand people. By May 1942, the Nazis, together with their allies, had 6200 thousand people on the Soviet-German front, up to 43 thousand guns and mortars, about 3230 tanks and assault guns, almost 3400 combat aircraft. There were 76.6% of all divisions of the Wehrmacht.
The active Red Army at that time included 5.5 million people, 43 thousand guns and mortars, 1200 rocket artillery installations, 4 thousand tanks, more than 3 thousand combat aircraft.
Preparing for a new offensive, the enemy still retained confidence in the superiority of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army. But the Nazi leaders no longer considered it possible to carry out an offensive along the entire length of the Eastern Front. The idea of the German High Command for the summer campaign of 1942 was to take control of the Caucasus and the Lower Volga region. True, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder, was in favor of launching an offensive in the Moscow direction. He, like a number of other German generals, expected that the capture of Moscow and the defeat of the central grouping of Soviet troops would not only ensure the success of the summer campaign of 1942, but also decide the fate of the entire war in favor of Germany. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, also put forward his plan. He proposed first of all to carry out the capture of Leningrad.
In the end, however, the enemy decided to concentrate his main efforts in the south of the Soviet-German front. As a result, the main task assigned to the Nazi troops for the summer campaign of 1942 was to capture the southern regions of the USSR, rich in strategic raw materials. These operations were considered decisive. The capture of Leningrad also depended on their course. In the Moscow direction, only restrictive actions were envisaged and the improvement of the operational position of the German troops through private operations. Expecting to recapture the strategic initiative, the enemy believed that he would achieve victory over the Soviet Union.
This plan for the continuation of aggression was adventurous in its essence, since, like the previous plans of the enemy, it was based on an underestimation of the strength of the Soviet Union. But the promotion of military-economic goals in the first place in the strategic plan of the campaign was not accidental. It was dictated by the very definite aspirations of the Hitlerite command. Subsequently, Field Marshal Paulus described them as follows: “The main military operation of 1942 was to be carried out in the area of operations of Army Group South. The strategic goal of the operation is to capture the oil-rich regions of the North Caucasus. The capture of Caucasian oil was considered vital for the further conduct of the war by the armed forces of Germany and its allies.
The conquest of the Caucasus, according to the calculations of the German command, was to bring a number of other significant benefits: to involve Turkey in the war against the USSR, deprive our country of communication with the outside world through Iran, lead the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to death, and, finally, open the way for Nazi Germany to the Middle East.
In accordance with its plan, by the end of June 1942, the enemy had concentrated about 900,000 soldiers and officers, 1,260 tanks, over 17,000 guns and mortars, and 1,640 combat aircraft in the zone from Kursk to Taganrog. There were up to 35% of all his infantry and over 50% of tank and motorized formations located on the Soviet-German front.
Attaching great importance to keeping secret their strategic plans for the summer campaign of 1942, the enemy made great efforts to misinform the Soviet command. A special role in this regard was given to the operation "Kremlin", developed and implemented by the headquarters of the Army Group "Center" at the direction of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH). It included a whole series of disinformation measures aimed at creating a false impression among the Soviet command that the fascist German army would deliver its main blow in the summer of 1942 in the Moscow area.
Meanwhile, the complex tasks facing the Soviet Supreme High Command required it to correctly assess both the balance of forces between the USSR and Nazi Germany as a result of the first year of the war, and the immediate prospects for the struggle on the Soviet-German front.
When analyzing the situation, it was taken into account that, having thwarted the enemy's plan of a "blitzkrieg" war, the Soviet country successfully mobilized forces and means to continue the fight against the aggressor. More and more tanks, aircraft, artillery, jet weapons, and ammunition came into service with the troops. There were over 5.5 million people in the active army. The troops gained combat experience and had a high moral and political spirit.
At the same time, the Headquarters and the General Staff saw that the winter offensive of the Red Army remained unfinished, and the enemy was preparing to resume active operations. It was also obvious that he still had superiority in the number of troops and their technical equipment. The Red Army still did not have enough trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations, although it proceeded at an increasing pace, was still limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. The Soviet troops, which had suffered heavy losses during the winter campaign, needed to recuperate, and this task had not yet been completed by the spring of 1942.
Under the circumstances, the most expedient use of forces and means was of particular importance. And the Headquarters, based on a correct understanding of the general situation, came to the conclusion that only by exhausting the enemy forces in defensive battles on fortified lines, by combining defense with delivering strong counterattacks, the Red Army could go on a decisive offensive. In this regard, it was considered necessary by the beginning of the summer of 1942 to basically prepare the Soviet troops for a temporary strategic defense.
However, this idea was ultimately not fully implemented by the Stavka. Along with the transition to the defensive, it was decided to conduct a number of private offensive operations - near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Palgovsk-Kursk and Smolensk directions, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass, Crimea. Such a decision - to defend and attack at the same time - was, as the subsequent course of events showed, erroneous, especially considering the scale of the planned offensive.
As for the assessment of the enemy's strategic plans for the summer campaign, the Headquarters and the General Staff, contrary to Soviet intelligence data, believed that the Moscow direction would again be the main one, while in the south the enemy would deliver an auxiliary strike. At the same time, it was taken into account that by the spring of 1942, the largest grouping of Nazi troops, consisting of 70 divisions, was located on the central sector of the Soviet-German front.
Of particular concern were the Oryol-Tula and Kursk-Voronezh directions, from where the Nazis could strike at the capital, bypassing it from the southwest. In accordance with this assessment of the situation, the Headquarters reinforced the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts to the detriment of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts.
These miscalculations in assessing the plans of the Nazis had a negative impact on the course of hostilities in the summer of 1942.
Today our country celebrates the anniversary date of the epic battle that changed the course of World War II - the 75th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Stalingrad. "Uranus" is the code name for the defensive (July 17 - November 18, 1942) and offensive (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) operations of the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts in the Great Patriotic War with the aim of encircling and defeating the German fascist group near Stalingrad.
Fury of the Fuhrer and a new plan of attack
Having suffered a defeat near Moscow, Hitler was furious. His illusions about the imminent and inevitable capture of the Soviet capital were dispelled, plans to seize Caucasian oil turned out to be unfulfilled, and the order to block the flow of military supplies to Moscow along the Volga from the southern regions turned out to be unfulfilled. For the first time in the years of the war, German troops suffered a crushing defeat and for the first time were forced to retreat.
In the first quarter of 1942, the General Staff of the Red Army tried to determine where the German command could deliver the main blow. Opinions differed, but one thing prevailed: the main goal of the German troops was still Moscow.
However, Hitler had bigger plans. His plan for a summer offensive on the Eastern Front was formalized as a plan for a new campaign. On March 28, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces arrived at Hitler's headquarters and reported to him a draft plan for a new operation under the code name "Blau". Hitler carefully studied it for several days, subjected the proposal of the General Staff of the Ground Forces to clarifications and adjustments. On April 5, the plan was finally approved as Directive No. 41.
Directive No. 41 ("Blau") contained the strategic plan of the German command for the conduct of the war on the Eastern Front in 1942 and determined the main directions of the main attack of the German troops. The purpose of the summer offensive of 1942 of the German troops on the Eastern Front was to "recapture the initiative and impose their will on the enemy." The main blow was planned in the southern direction with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don River and subsequently capturing the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasian ridge.
In the course of operations in this strategic direction, it was planned to capture Stalingrad, which Hitler especially insisted on. In order to create the prerequisites for the successful implementation of the Blau plan, it was supposed to initially capture Sevastopol, the Kerch Peninsula, cut off the ledge of the Soviet front in the Barvenkovo area, and also conduct operations in some other sectors of the Eastern Front.
Considerable attention was paid to the Stalingrad direction. The directive says the following about this: "Try to reach Stalingrad, or at least subject it to heavy influence so that it loses its importance as a center of the military industry and a communications hub."
Giving such an order, Hitler hoped that by capturing the Caucasus, he would also be able to destroy the city that bore the name of Stalin. The order to destroy Stalingrad with the help of "heavy weapons" is considered by many historians as a clear desire of Hitler to slap Stalin in the face and thereby have a psychological impact on him. In fact, Hitler's intention was much more serious. After the capture of Stalingrad, Hitler planned to turn the main striking forces of the German troops to the north, cut off Moscow from the rear, and then carry out a general offensive against the Soviet capital from the east and west.
INTELLIGENCE PROVISION OF THE DEFENSE OPERATION
During the greatest battle of Stalingrad, all the military-diplomatic missions abroad worked selflessly. What information was obtained in 1942 by military diplomats operating far from the Eastern Front?
As stated above, Hitler approved Directive No. 41 on 5 April. However, thanks to the work of Soviet military diplomats, its main provisions became known in Moscow much earlier. This fact was noted by Army General Sergei Shtemenko as follows: “In the summer of 1942, the enemy’s plan to capture the Caucasus ... was revealed quite quickly. But even this time, the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive actions to defeat the advancing enemy grouping in a short time.
It is difficult to say exactly when the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces began to develop the said directive, but the first report on Hitler's plans for the spring offensive on the Eastern Front arrived in Moscow from the military attaché office (BAT) at the USSR Embassy in London on March 3, 1942. It reported that Germany “plans in the spring of 1942 to launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. For these purposes, Berlin achieved agreements on sending 16 new Romanian, 12 Italian, 10 Bulgarian, 2 Slovak and several Hungarian divisions to the Eastern Front ... "
Vladimir Lota in his work "The Secret Front of the General Staff" indicates that on the same day a new message arrived:
“The Bulgarian military attache in Turkey reported the following from Ankara to Sofia:
b) the offensive of the German troops will not have the character of a blitzkrieg. The Germans intend to act slowly but successfully ... "
On March 15, one of the sources of an employee of the apparatus of the Soviet military attache in London, Captain I.M. Kozlova Dolly gave the contents of the conversations of the Japanese ambassador in Berlin with the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, which took place on February 18, 22 and 23. In these conversations, Ribbentrop declared that the Eastern Front had been stabilized. When asked by the Japanese ambassador when the spring offensive on the Eastern Front should be expected, the German minister replied that “the plan for the summer campaign is being developed by the General Staff. So far, he cannot give an exact date for the start of the offensive, but in general terms the plan is the same that Hitler spoke about to the Japanese ambassador in a personal conversation. In Germany's operations against the USSR in 1942, the southern sector of the Eastern Front will be of paramount importance. It is there that the offensive will begin, and the battle will unfold to the north.
Further, the agent reported that, according to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, the Germans planned to cut off the USSR from foreign aid, to expand the offensive in the south, including the entire Donbass and the Caucasus. If it is not possible, as Ribbentrop declared, to completely break the Soviet regime, then after the summer offensive the USSR will lose all significance and strength.
By the way, since January 1942, this source has been transmitting to I. Kozlov copies of German radio messages deciphered by the British as a result of the famous Enigma cipher machine falling into their hands. Dolly did not understand why Winston Churchill did not pass on this information to the Soviet leadership, which needed it to repel the onslaught of the German armies on the Eastern Front. During 1942 he transmitted between 20 and 38 transcribed German, Japanese and Turkish radiograms every month. By that time, the British decryption service was able to crack the diplomatic and military ciphers not only of Germany, but also of Japan and Turkey.
Information from Dolly came in such quantity that they forced the Soviet military attache in London to apply to the Center with such an unusual request: “I ask you to evaluate Dolly's messages. Allow me to send them by regular mail so as not to load radio communications. Your information plans do not include these materials. I ask you to give instructions on Dolly's tasks.
A day later, he received the following reply: “Dolly's data is very valuable. They must be sent in full. May Dolly provide more of this material. Increase security and secrecy when meeting with Dolly.
Director"
Why did the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) treat Dolly's materials in this way? Firstly, because this agent transmitted the content of all important negotiations conducted by Ribbentrop with the ambassadors of the Axis countries. Thus, the political plans of the German leadership became the property of Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov and were taken into account when carrying out foreign policy actions of the USSR. Secondly, Dolly conveyed the content of many orders that the Hitlerite command sent to their generals who were operating near Stalingrad and in the Caucasian direction.
Here are some of the information that Dolly transmitted in November 1942.
November 16: "Messages intercepted by the British from Berlin indicate that perhaps Manstein's 11th Army will not be used in the central sector of the Eastern Front, where it is currently located, but in its southern sector."
November 18: "... the German Air Force is experiencing a significant shortage of fuel in units operating on the southern front from Stalingrad to the Caucasus."
November 19: “German artillery lacks high-explosive and shrapnel shells for field 105-mm guns. This explains its weak intensity near Stalingrad.
November 22: "Göring ordered the 4th Air Force to pay special attention to the concentration of Russians in the Beketovka area."
On November 22, "Dolly" transmitted a transcript of radio interceptions of orders from the 6th Army on November 20. From these data it followed that the Germans intended "to stop the attacks on Stalingrad, the forces would be withdrawn from the city and used to strengthen the defense behind the western wing of the Paulus army."
November 30: "All available Air Force forces in the Stalingrad region will be thrown into the area of the Don river arc to bombard the concentration of Soviet troops near Pavlovsk, especially in the area of the junction of the 8th Hungarian and 9th Italian armies." The same report stated that “Field Marshal Manstein took command of Army Group Don on November 27th.
These and other similar reports by Dolly, which revealed the position of the German troops encircled near Stalingrad, were reported to I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
A strictly limited circle of officials knew about the existence of this valuable source in Moscow. Even today, the real name of this man continues to remain unknown.
Actively worked in 1942 and other military-diplomatic missions. The information received from them allowed the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army to prepare a special message to the General Staff in March 1942:
“Preparation for the spring offensive is confirmed by the transfer of German troops and materials. During the period from January 1 to March 10, 1942, up to 35 divisions were transferred, and the active army is constantly being replenished. Intensive work is underway to restore the railway network in the occupied territory of the USSR, there is an intensified importation of military and transport vehicles ... The center of gravity of the spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow.
For the spring offensive, Germany, together with the allies, will put up 65 new divisions ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.
At the end of March, military diplomats continued to report: “The most likely direction of the main German attack on the Eastern Front will be the Rostov direction. The purpose of the military offensive is to seize the oil base of the USSR and, in the subsequent attack on Stalingrad, reach the river. Volga.
At the end of March, in April and May, clarifying information about the plans of the Germans continued to come from foreign attaches. For example, on March 31, Gano, a source in the office of the military attaché to the governments of Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in London, reported to Moscow:
“According to a reliable source from Berlin, the plan of the German offensive on the Eastern Front provides for two directions:
1. Attack on Leningrad to reinforce Finland and break ties and supplies to the USSR through the White Sea.
2. An attack on the Caucasus, where the main effort is foreseen in the direction of Stalingrad and a secondary one - to Rostov and, in addition, after the capture of the Crimea - to Maykop. The main goal of the offensive is to capture the Volga along its entire length. On the western bank, the Germans intend to put up strong fortifications.
Regarding actions on the central sector of the front, there were disagreements in the German headquarters. Some prefer to inflict a frontal strike, others prefer to liquidate Moscow by bypassing.
At the end of the report, the agent named the approximate date for the start of the German offensive, which could unfold after April 15th.
Having thus revealed the essence of the strategic plans of the German command for the first half of 1942, Soviet military diplomacy continued to obtain information about the further intentions and plans of the German command to conduct military operations on the southern sector of the Eastern Front and about the transfer of German army reserves to the area of the future battle of Stalingrad.
DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE ALLIES
During the covert preparation of German troops for an offensive in the Caucasus, Major General Ivan Sklyarov, the military attache at the USSR Embassy in Great Britain, tried to start cooperation in the field of information exchange with the American military attache in London. Sklyarov thought rationally - the allies should selflessly help each other in the fight against a common enemy. However, the very first experience of such cooperation with the Americans brought disappointment to Sklyarov.
On June 7, 1942, Sklyarov received from the American military attache information about the deployment and grouping of units and formations of the German army and transferred them to the Center. He also sent information to Moscow about the grouping of German troops on the Eastern Front. However, after some time, a far from flattering assessment of the transferred materials came from Moscow. The head of military intelligence reported: “The quantity and quality of materials on the state and armament of the German army and the armies of the Axis countries, as well as the plans and intentions of the enemy command, are still completely insufficient. Information on these matters is limited mainly to the materials you receive officially from the British and Americans. You get from them far from everything that they can give us.”
What representatives of the allied intelligence did not pass on to Sklyarov, the GRU received from other sources. Taking into account the fair remarks of the chief of military intelligence and realizing that the General Staff constantly needs a large amount of various information about the enemy, Major General Sklyarov stepped up work with Agent Dolly.
Dolly's materials were often very important. The information transmitted by this source was taken into account when organizing the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. About the value of the information transmitted by Dolly to Captain I.M. Kozlov, can be judged from the report of Major General I.A. Sklyarov prepared in 1942. So, on October 3, Sklyarov reported to the Center: “Dolly reported that at a regular meeting in the British military department, intelligence chief Major General Davidson made a report on the state of affairs on the Eastern Front. In his estimation, the Russians are winning the war for the British. The Russians are doing much better than we expected.”
On the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, more precisely on November 5, 1942, Dolly handed over to the Soviet military diplomat a summary of the assessment of the USSR and the Red Army, prepared jointly by specialists from the general staffs of Germany and Hungary:
“The Soviets cannot count on any effective help from the Allies and are forced to rely only on their own resources.
The uncertainty of the situation in the Far East continues to worry Moscow, which fears Japan's entry into the war against the USSR.
The fighting efficiency of the Red Army is generally lower due to the lack of aircraft, tanks, guns and the poor quality of training of the highest military command.
The Red Army cannot be completely defeated in 1942, but it is incapable of any major offensive in the winter and will not be a threat to the Axis in the future.
According to the estimates and forecasts of the analysts of the German and Hungarian General Staffs, the goals of the USSR until the end of 1942 remained: "the defense of the Caucasus, the defense (liberation) of Stalingrad, the liberation of Leningrad." At the end of the report, the conclusion was made: "The offensive of the Red Army troops on a large scale in 1942 is impossible."
Such an assessment of the situation at the front suited the General Staff of the Red Army most of all. The enemy was deeply mistaken. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) already had other plans.
PREPARATION FOR THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION
Thanks to the efforts of Soviet military diplomats, before the start of the offensive operation of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, almost the entire grouping of enemy troops of the first line was opened up to the battalion, the forces and the defense system of many enemy formations in front of the front of our troops. Accurate information was obtained about the deployment of the main strike units of the Nazi troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies, the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian armies, about the tasks and strength of the 4th air fleet of the German Air Force.
Already during the Battle of Stalingrad, Gano's source mentioned above continued to report important information. So, on October 6, he gave the military attache to the governments of Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in London, Alexander Sizov, complete information about the number and deployment of the reserve units of the German army on the Eastern Front. The center asked to obtain information about the deployment of all Romanian units and their combat strength. Gano completed this and many other tasks of the Soviet military intelligence.
During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military attaché Colonel Nikolai Nikitushev successfully worked in Sweden. He had several valuable sources of information that transmitted important information about Nazi Germany and its armed forces. So, in the period of preparation for the battle for Stalingrad, information was received from him revealing the plans of the German command. On August 31, Nikitushev said: “The Swedish General Staff believes that the main German offensive has begun in Ukraine. The plan of the Germans is to break through the Kursk-Kharkov line with the development of an offensive through the Don to Stalingrad on the Volga. Then - the establishment of a barrier in the northeast and the continuation of the offensive with fresh forces to the south through Rostov to the Caucasus.
Below is the content of individual reports of Soviet military diplomats, which were used in the preparation of the offensive operation of the Battle of Stalingrad.
"BAT report from London
Top secret
Baron said:
1. The situation on the Eastern Front by the German high command is assessed as generally satisfactory ...
4. A well-informed source reported: German aviation losses from the beginning of the war with us to March 1, 1942 are estimated at 8,500 aircraft, of which 30 percent are bombers. Average losses per month - 1,000 aircraft. In addition, they lost about the same number of aircraft on other fronts throughout the war.
"BAT report from the USA
Top secret
The Germans are planning the main attack in the south on Stalingrad to secure the flanks, with a subsequent attack on Rostov.
New bombs and heavy shells of the Germans destroy every living thing within a radius of 150-200 meters by the force of air pressure.
According to the French General Staff, the Germans lost 1 million killed, 1.5 million seriously wounded and 2.5 million lightly wounded.
"BAT report from London
Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army
radio lightning
Top secret
The source relayed information he received personally from the Japanese military attache in Stockholm after his trip to Berlin to talk with Ambassador Oshima and the German General Staff.
1. Germany demands that Japan either attack the USSR or increase the threat of attack.
2. Germany has declared to Japan that it is making every effort to achieve the following:
a) capture the Caucasus and reach the Persian Gulf;
b) capture Egypt and reach the Red Sea before autumn.
3. Oshima expects that if the Germans do one or the other, they will try to force Turkey to join the "axis".
4. Oshima stated that before 07/06/42 Japan had not yet made a promise to fulfill the German requirements and in general Japan finds it difficult to fully engage in the operational plans of the "axis" ...
5. From conversations with the German General Staff, the military attache concluded that the Germans did not consider it possible to open a second front in 1942, so they considered it possible to transfer all troops from west to east, leaving 30 divisions in France, Belgium and Holland, and these divisions consist from units battered on the Eastern Front, and from new formations from old people ...
At the turn of 1942-1943, BAT apparatuses obtained information about the enemy, mainly responding to numerous requests from the Center. Naturally, these tasks were developed at the General Staff, which was interested in obtaining accurate data on the rear defensive lines of the Germans southwest of Stalingrad, on the reserves of the German command, on the plans of the Germans in connection with the offensive of the Red Army, etc.
Here, for example, is the content of one of these reports.
"BAT report from London
Top secret
1. The Germans are preparing a counteroffensive in the Don region. To this end, numerous reserves are transferred from Kharkov to the Kamensk region. A grouping of troops is planned along the Donbass-Stalingrad railroad. To ensure this counteroffensive, Millerovo will be held at all costs.
2. In Sevastopol, the Germans establish a large supply base for the armies of the Caucasus in case the land communications and supply bases located west of the Don are cut off.
3. In Romanian ports, the German military authorities have already begun to confiscate ships with a displacement of over 200 tons. Most of the ships with supplies will be sent from Sevastopol to the port of Novorossiysk.
4. In mid-December, the 75th and 299th Infantry Divisions, which were being transferred from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, received an order to return to our front. (The source is well-informed.) ”(CA Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Op. 24183.D.3.L.105. Distribution indicated: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Antonov).
The long-awaited victory in the Second World War, which was not equal in the world
AT in accordance with the military-political goals set by the Communist Party and the government for the Soviet people at a new stage of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a strategic plan for the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the winter campaign of 1942/43. conclusion about the need for a consistent defeat of the enemy. Therefore, the concept was based on the idea of conducting a system of successive offensive operations on a huge front from Lake Ladoga to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. Its implementation was supposed to lead to the defeat of the most powerful enemy groupings, the seizure of the strategic initiative and the achievement of a decisive turning point in the armed struggle on the main front of the Second World War.
The Soviet troops were to first defeat the enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and the Don, and then strike in the North Caucasus, the Upper Don and near Leningrad. In order to pin down the enemy and deprive him of the ability to maneuver forces, it was also envisaged to carry out offensive operations in the regions of Velikie Luki, Rzhev and Vyazma. In the event of a successful solution of these tasks, it was supposed to develop a strategic offensive in the Kursk, Kharkov directions and in the Donbass.
The main efforts in the winter campaign of 1942/43 were concentrated on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. It was here that the largest and most active enemy groupings were located, the defeat of which ensured the capture of the strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for launching an offensive in other important areas.
The situation that developed on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front facilitated the carrying out of large-scale offensive operations here with decisive goals. The enemy strike groups operating near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus had not yet managed to create a strong defense and were scattered along a huge front - from Voronezh to Elista and from Mozdok to Novorossiysk. As a result of the extremely stubborn and active defense of the Soviet troops in the summer and autumn of 1942, they suffered heavy losses. The strategic and operational reserves of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front were largely depleted, while the Soviet command was completing the accumulation of large reserves, fully equipped with all means of armed struggle.
According to the general plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, at the first stage of the campaign, it was planned to concentrate large forces in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction and, having moved them to a decisive counteroffensive, encircle and destroy the main enemy grouping (about 40 divisions as of November 1, 1942) in the Stalingrad area. Subsequently, with the introduction of additional reserves into the battle, it was meant to expand the front of the strategic counteroffensive, defeat the enemy troops in the Middle Don and strike in the general direction on Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov-on-Don, cut off the escape routes to the Donbass of a large enemy group located in the North Caucasus 1. Thus, it was supposed to create the prerequisites for completing the defeat of the entire southern wing of the German eastern front.
Taking into account the experience of the previous period of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command refused to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in all strategic directions of the Soviet-German front. Initially, she concentrated her main efforts on the main operation of the campaign in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. Therefore, the action plan of the fronts, which were to advance in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction, was developed in most detail.
Based on the plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command, the most important strategic operation of the campaign was to be the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. It was planned to start a powerful winter offensive from it.
The principal decision on the counter-offensive at Stalingrad was made on September 13, 1942, after the Supreme Commander-in-Chief heard the reports of Generals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. “Having gone through all the possible options,” recalled the former Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, “we decided to propose to I.V. Stalin the following plan of action: first, continue to wear down the enemy with active defense; the second is to start preparing a counteroffensive in order to inflict such a blow on the enemy in the Stalingrad region that would dramatically change the strategic situation in the south of the country in our favor "2. At the same time, it was taken into account that the decisive defeat of the enemy in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction would put the army group in a difficult situation "A", which operated in the North Caucasus, and will force it to either hastily retreat, or fight, in essence, in the conditions of encirclement. The date for the start of the counteroffensive was not set, however, from the report of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it followed that it could not have been undertaken before the last decade of October 19423.
In developing preliminary considerations for the plan of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, the General Staff took into account the comprehensive analysis of the situation on the Soviet-German front, and in particular on its southern wing. Based on this analysis, it was supposed to use the advantageous position of the Soviet troops, covering the 6th and 4th tank armies of the German armies, and deliver powerful concentric strikes on their flanks in order to encircle and defeat all the main forces of the enemy group operating in the interfluve of the Volga and Don.
2 N. Voronov. In the service of the military. M., 1963, p. 287.
3 G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. T. 2. Ed. 2. M., 1974, p. 86.:; T. 1, p.
The operation was proposed to be carried out in two stages. At the first stage, break through the defenses and surround the main forces of the 6th field and 4th tank armies, as well as create a solid outer front of the encirclement. The content of the second stage was to be the reflection of attempts to deblockade the encircled troops and their destruction.
The views of the Stavka representatives were approved in principle. After that, the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff left for the Stalingrad region in order to study on the spot all issues related to the counteroffensive and submit concrete proposals to the General Headquarters on the plan of this decisive operation. Particular attention was paid to the strict observance of secrecy in the preparation of the counteroffensive.
The results of the work of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were discussed at the end of September at a meeting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Then the operational plan of the counteroffensive was basically approved, the directions of the main attacks of the fronts involved in the operation, the forces and means necessary for them, the areas for the deployment of reserves advanced to the front and the approximate dates for their concentration were determined. At the same time, decisions were made on the organization of command and control in the forthcoming operation. In particular, the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts, which were previously led by the commander of the South-Eastern Front, were renamed the Don and Stalingrad, respectively, with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In the zone of the middle reaches of the Don, a new, South-Western Front was created, which was assigned the main task in the operation - to deliver a powerful blow to the flank of the Stalingrad enemy grouping, go to its rear and play a decisive role in its encirclement. Experienced military leaders were placed at the head of the fronts that were to launch a counteroffensive in the south: the commander of the Don Front was General K. K. Rokossovsky, who had previously been commander of the Bryansk Front; commander of the Southwestern Front - General N. F. Vatutin, who in the summer and autumn of 1942 was the commander of the Voronezh Front; General A.I. Eremenko remained commander of the Stalingrad Front.
After an additional thorough study on the spot of the real possibilities for conducting a counteroffensive, the plan of operation was finally approved. The operation received the code name "Uranus". The transition of troops to the counteroffensive was determined for the Southwestern and Don Fronts on November 9, and for the Stalingrad Front on November 10. The difference in the timing of the transition of the fronts to the offensive was due to the different depth of tasks and the need to ensure the simultaneous exit of shock groups to the Kalach-on-Don, Sovetsky region, where their meeting was envisaged.
Taking into account the fact that the success of the strike against the enemy that was being prepared near Stalingrad was to have a decisive influence on the entire course of the winter campaign and therefore acquired not only military, but also important political significance, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command recognized it necessary to “consider the upcoming operation in the Stalingrad area as the main event until the end of 1942 on the entire Soviet-German front, concentrating on it the main attention and efforts of the party, government and the entire Soviet people.
1 Cited. Quoted from: The Stalingrad epic. M., 1968, p. 83.
The commands of the fronts of the Stalingrad direction were involved in practical work on the counteroffensive plan in the first days of October. These days, representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command briefed the leading staff of the fronts in general terms with the idea and plan of the Stalingrad operation to encircle the enemy. The fronts were instructed to develop concrete proposals on the most expedient use of forces and means in the operation. On October 9, the front commanders presented their initial considerations to the Headquarters.
In the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the headquarters of the combat arms and services of the Armed Forces, the fundamental issues of using aviation, artillery, armored forces and the logistics of the operation in the counteroffensive were developed. This work was headed by General N. N. Voronov, commander of artillery of the Soviet Army, General A. A. Novikov, commander of the Air Force, General G. A. Vorozheykin, his deputy, General G. A. Vorozheikin, commander of long-range aviation, General A. E. Golovanov, head of the Main Armored Directorate, General Ya. N. Fedorenko. The head of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General A.V. Khrulev, and the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, General N.D. Yakovlev, took part in direct work on planning the logistics of the counteroffensive.
Thus, the creative work of a large team of military leaders, commanders and staffs was invested in the development of the concept and plan of the Stalingrad offensive operation. The main role in planning and supporting this operation belonged to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, its representatives and the General Staff.
Simultaneously with the deployment of preparations for a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad direction, the Headquarters ordered the command of a number of other fronts to prepare troops for active offensive operations.
Until further notice, the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were ordered not to carry out any private operations, but to prepare troops to break the blockade of Leningrad 2.
The North-Western, Kalinin and Western fronts were supposed to conduct a joint offensive operation in the Moscow direction in October - November 1942 with the aim of defeating the enemy in the Rzhev and Novo-Sokolnikov regions. The operation was provisionally called "Mars". The initial deadline for its readiness was determined on October 21, and the start of operations - on October 23 3.
The Transcaucasian Front was ordered to firmly defend the occupied lines, and the troops of the Northern Group 4 were to be ready for an offensive in order to defeat the enemy's Mozdok grouping. The deadline for the readiness of the Northern Group of Forces for the operation was determined on November 3, and the start of operations - by special order of the Headquarters.
The successful creation of reserve formations allowed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-November to begin preparing a new operation, which received the code name "Saturn". The idea of this operation, which was an integral part of the strategic counter-offensive, provided for two or three weeks after the start of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, to deliver a deep cutting blow from the Don line (in its middle reaches) through Millerovo to Rostov by the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh and the right wing of the South-Western Fronts. According to the plan for conducting operations "Uranus" and "Saturn", up to 60 enemy divisions fell under the blow of Soviet troops. When
1 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 48a, op. 1640, d. 27, ll. 240, 247.
2 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 48a, op. 1640, d. 180, ll. 295, 302.
3 Ibid., l. 275.
4 The Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front included the 9th, 37th, 44th, 58th, 4th Air Armies, separate units and formations.
the success of Saturn, Army Group A, operating in the North Caucasus, could also be surrounded. Specific planning of operations in other directions, provided for by the general plan of the winter campaign, was carried out in the course of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of this method of planning strategic offensive operations.
Skillfully organized interaction between groups of fronts operating in different directions was supposed to create favorable conditions for the implementation of the Stavka's plan. The foundations for the interaction of groups of fronts were laid in the very idea of conducting a strategic offensive.
In planning and organizing the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, the Stavka provided for the fettering of enemy forces by active operations of troops in the western, northwestern directions and in the North Caucasus. She took into account that as soon as the enemy gets into a difficult situation near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht high command will try to transfer part of the troops from other regions, in particular from the Rzhev and Vyazma regions, to help the southern group. It was then that the offensive operation "Mars" was to begin. Its goal was not only to pin down the enemy forces and defeat him in the area of the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge, but also to attract additional enemy reserves to this direction. The same role in the course of the Stalingrad offensive operation was assigned to the counterattacks of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front in the area of Mozdok.
In preparing for winter offensive operations, much attention was paid to the use of aviation. She had to continue the struggle to gain strategic air supremacy, as well as support the shock groups of the fronts until they completed their tasks. In one of the telegrams sent by the Supreme Commander II. V. Stalin told General G.K. Zhukov, who was in the Stalingrad area, that based on the experience of the war with Germany, “an operation against the Germans can only be won if we have air superiority.” For success in the operation, three tasks had to be completed: “First, to concentrate the actions of our aviation in the area of the offensive of our strike units, suppress the German aircraft and firmly cover our troops. The second is to break the way for our advancing units by systematic bombing of the German troops standing against them. The third is to pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely upset them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines. postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aviation. These directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were directly related not only to Stalingrad, but also to all subsequent operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The navy was supposed to assist the troops of the fronts in offensive operations in coastal areas, continue to disrupt enemy communications and reliably protect their maritime communications. Particular importance was attached to the protection of northern communications, through which more than 40 percent of the supplies provided for by the agreements arrived from the United States and England to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Great importance was attached to ensuring communications in the Caspian Sea.
1 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 32, l. 193.
The main tasks of the Air Defense Forces of the country, as before, were to reliably cover large economic, political centers and communications from enemy air strikes. They also had to solve new tasks: to defend objects in the liberated territory and to strengthen the cover of front lines of communication.
The Headquarters attached great importance to the intensification of the nationwide struggle behind enemy lines. Back in September 1942, she demanded to intensify attacks on the enemy in the occupied Soviet territory. Somewhat later, during the period of direct preparation of the offensive campaign, many partisan formations were given the task of carrying out raids from the Bryansk forests to the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine in order to launch sabotage activities there on enemy communications, disable important railway junctions, and conduct reconnaissance.
Thus, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command most carefully developed the initial operation - the strategic counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In his interests, it was planned to carry out offensive operations with the aim of actively pinning down the enemy in the western direction and in the North Caucasus. All subsequent operations were to be planned in detail already in the course of the counter-offensive that had already begun, when tendencies towards a decisive change in the general situation on the Soviet-German front should have been clearly manifested.
The high military skill of the Soviet Supreme High Command was clearly manifested in the strategic concept and methods of developing a counteroffensive plan.