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Doctrines and Fichte about society and state. Open Library - open library of educational information

The theory of morality developed by Fichte is based on his general philosophical concept. However, this was also characteristic of all his predecessors. But it is precisely about Ficht that we can say with all certainty that this concept for him is not an end in itself, but only a prerequisite and method for solving ethical problems. The question of man and ways of his improvement has always been at the center of Fichte’s creative searches. Everything else was subordinated to the realization of this goal. And if Kant already placed practical reason (the doctrine of morality) above the theoretical, then Fichte, using the concept of activity fundamental to his philosophy, developed this thesis and turned what Kant had only been a guess into the core of his entire philosophical system.

The activity of the Self in the process of cognition, as has already been shown, consists in overcoming opposition from the non-Self and achieving a relative identity of subject and object, which is then replaced by a new contradiction between the Self and the non-Self. This is the epistemological aspect of their interaction. However, in addition to it, there is another aspect of analysis, namely: man and society. In this case, the Self and the non-Self are taken beyond the boundaries of epistemology, and the problem turns to a practical plane: The antithesis of the Self in this case is the non-Self opposing it, i.e. everything that prevents the I from realizing itself and limits its initiative. Thus, Fichte places not cognition, but the practical activity of the subject at the forefront of his teaching on morality.

In this context, it becomes obvious why Fichte considers inactivity, laziness, and apathy not only immoral, but also the worst of evils, giving rise to opportunism and hypocrisy. Inaction leaves a person at the level of a thing, activity raises him to the level of personality.

Fichte considers freedom to be a prerequisite and condition for morality. No one has the right to limit the will and free choice of a person. As a private individual, the individual is subject only to his free choice, or, as Fichte writes, to his own legislation. By choosing one path or another, an individual chooses his own destiny, and also creates himself. But this does not mean at all that any freely chosen act is moral. The activity of an individual can be recognized as moral only when it complies with the moral law. Fichte considers this the requirement to act not under compulsion, but always only according to conviction and free will, but at the same time in such a way that your will and free actions based on it do not limit the freedom of others. But even in this case, we can only talk about the voluntary acceptance of a moral imperative and awareness of duty as an internal motivating reason for its fulfillment. In the field of morality, Fichte thus rejects all violence and coercion. And proclaims the right to freedom as an inalienable right of the individual. “My I,” wrote Fichte, “must be a genuine I - an independent being, a personality, I must always want to fulfill my duty... and I have the right to be a person and the right to want to fulfill my duty.” Fichte associates moral progress with the increase in the number of individuals who are not forced by external circumstances, but who want to follow the moral imperative.

So, we see that Fichte connects morality with free will, limited only by a freely accepted obligation, or, what is the same thing, by the duty to act in such a way as not to limit the freedom of others. This formulation of the question is very close to Kant’s. However, unlike Kant, Fichte does not oppose freedom and necessity, but combines them. Kant believed that necessity is inherent only in nature. As for man, as a conscious being, he is not subject to necessity. In relation to the subject, Kant resolves the contradiction: “freedom - necessity”, in favor of freedom by excluding necessity. Fichte the dialectician unites thesis and antithesis in a general synthesis. It was he who came up with the definition, which he would later repeat: “Freedom is a perceived necessity.” An individual acting “at random”, without taking into account necessity, is not free in his actions. He is likened to a blind kitten, who, in search of a way out of the room, crawls “freely” into different directions and runs into obstacles everywhere. The knowledge of necessity provides a guideline that allows a person to freely choose from the fan of possible solutions in a given situation the only correct one. Thus, Fichte denies absolute freedom, limiting it not only by duty, but also by necessity.

Way to moral improvement Fichte sees it not in enlightenment, although he does not deny it, but in active activity. At the same time, he understood that a society entirely consisting of moral people is only an ideal to which humanity can only approach in the course of its history. Fichte saw the meaning of history in the realization of personal freedom, however, in this case, he warned that such an ideal can only be approached, but it is impossible to translate it into reality, since this contradicts the principle of endless self-development of the absolute and individual Self.

Based on this, Fichte, like Kant, concluded that there is a need for law and state power that would regulate relations between members of society in such a way that the freedom of one citizen does not infringe on the freedom of another, who has an equal right to freedom. However, this is the extent of the similarities between the legal theories of the two prominent philosophers.

Unlike Kant, Fichte considers the first human right to be the right to life. Before thinking about freedom, Fichte argued, one must think about living. Fichte saw the decisive guarantee of this right in the right to work. Such a right must be enshrined in law. But Fichte goes further: since the ability to live is conditioned by labor, he concludes, “everyone should be able to live by their labor.” The primary duty of the state is to create conditions in which every citizen would have real opportunity earn one's living through labor.

What exactly are these conditions? The project proposed by Fichte, written under the obvious influence of Rousseau’s ideas, allows us to speak of him as an ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie with its equalizing ideals. In order for the right to work not to be limited to the area of ​​theoretical research, it is necessary, firstly, to make all citizens owners. “Every adult and reasonable person should have property,” writes Fichte in “The System of Morals.” Secondly, this property must be sufficient to provide for the life of its owner and his family, and not sufficient to use it to exploit the labor of others. Thirdly, the state is obliged to ensure that property is used for the purposes for which it is intended, namely as a condition for free labor. Fourthly, those who do not work are subject to punishment. Fifthly, the state provides everything necessary to those who, for health reasons or age, cannot participate in the labor process.

If all these conditions are met, forced labor will disappear, and work will bring joy and satisfaction. “Man must work, but not like a beast of burden, which falls asleep under its load and, after a meager restoration of its exhausted strength, is again forced to carry the same burden. He must work fearlessly, willingly and joyfully.”

From all that has been said, it is clear that Fichte is making an attempt to connect the problem of human rights not only with legislation, but also with economics. In itself, such an idea is undoubtedly fruitful. However, its specification results in purely utopian proposals, which are not only not feasible, but also contradict the natural and historical development of society.

Fichte's thoughts about the future fate of the state were no less utopian. Based on the fact that gradually all citizens would become owners, thanks to which their labor would turn from forced to voluntary, Fichte concluded that they would all be bound by a common interest. In this case, the state will lose its necessity and disappear over time. True, Fichte stipulated that this is only theoretical model, not a real prospect. But this model is useful as a guide. A reasonable state must follow this guideline, thereby creating the conditions for its own withering away.

A large place in Fichte's works is occupied by a complex of problems related to revolution. It must be said that Fichte’s attitude towards the revolutionary movement was far from academic. He warmly welcomed the French Revolution, including its Jacobin stage, and, as one of his friends recalls, he said that of all the titles for him, the most honorable would be the title of “Frenchman”. The title of one of his articles is also characteristic: “Towards correcting the public’s judgment of the French Revolution.”

When starting to analyze the revolution, Fichte first of all uses the theory of the social contract. Unlike Hobbes and his many followers, Fichte considers the social contract not a historical fact, but only a theoretical assumption that makes it possible to discover the cause and essence of the revolution, as well as give it a correct assessment. Fichte admits that any revolution is not a constitutional act. Its reason is the violation of the contract by one of its parties, namely the authorities and the upper classes of society that support it. In this case, the people have the right to revolution. Recognition of this right by the people makes Fichte related to his spiritual father, Rousseau.

However, the practice of the French Revolution presented Fichte with another very difficult problem: how to combine revolutionary violence with the inalienable human right to freedom? Fichte transfers this problem from the abstract theoretical field to the legal one. If the people have the right to break the contract, then they also have the right to refuse the laws that were in force in society before the revolution. A revolution results in the adoption of new laws developed by representatives of the people, expressing their interests and protecting their rights. Of these, as we have already found out, Fichte considered the main ones the right to life and work. Guaranteeing these rights requires the redistribution of property in order to make every citizen an owner. The royal family, the aristocracy, and the church are given the right to voluntarily renounce their property, first of all, huge lands. Refusal and resistance put all of them in the position of enemies of the nation, violators of the new legislation approved by the revolutionary people. As for the extremes of the Jacobin terror, Fichte explained them by the peculiarities of the historical development of France.

Subsequently, Fichte abandoned such enthusiastic assessments of the revolution and was increasingly inclined to recognize reforms as the most painless way to resolve social contradictions. In this regard, he pointed to the Germans, who, having gone through the Reformation, turned out, from his point of view, to be more mature than the French, who carried out their revolution without the Reformation preceding it. In general, it should be noted that Fichte did not ambiguously assert that only the German nation can, if not achieve, then at least approach the goal set by history, to create a society of labor, freedom and equality.

In Fichte's socio-political works one can find quite a few interesting thoughts and fruitful ideas. At the same time, they contain the author’s historical limitations, his illusions about the future of humanity, and his far from progressive ideas about economic equality. Fichte was also far from studying the specific class structure of society. Instead, he used the abstract concept of “people.” It would be incorrect to attribute all these shortcomings to Fichte’s personal limitations as a thinker. He was a son of his time, and, perhaps, none of the classics German philosophy did not express as clearly as Fichte did, the features of the turbulent era of wars and revolutions, the revision of established traditions and values, great hopes and great disappointments. His philosophy became a theoretical understanding of the historical process of this era. was right in considering Fichte's philosophy as the theorization of a certain historical consciousness.

Plan

  1. Political and legal teachings of I. Kant
  2. The doctrine of state and law by I. G. Fichte
  3. G. W. F. Hegel and his doctrine of state and law

Relatively late - from the middle of the 18th century. Germany entered the path of Enlightenment, where at that time a galaxy of brilliant thinkers emerged: Wieland, Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller and others, who influenced big influence on the worldview of Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, Feuerbach and others. It was I. Kant - the largest representative of German philosophy - in his work “Answer to the question: what is Enlightenment?” (1784), summarizing the main ideas of the Enlightenment, gives it a definition: “Enlightenment is a person’s way out of their incompetence, for which he himself is to blame. Incompetence is the inability to use your mind without someone else’s guidance... Be brave and use your mind” .

The classics of German philosophy traditionally include I. Kant, J. G. Fichte and G. W. F. Hegel.

1. Political and legal teachings of I. Kant

Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804). Born in Konigsberg into the family of a craftsman. At the age of 16, Kant entered the university and at the same time worked as a home teacher for wealthy families, which provided financial means for studying philosophy. In 1755 he completed his studies at the university, defended his dissertation and received the title of private assistant professor. For the next 15 years, while waiting for a professorship, he served in the Königsberg Palace Library as an assistant librarian. In 1770 he occupied the chair of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. In 1786 and 1788 was elected rector of the university. There were no significant external events in his life. He focused entirely on science. During his teaching career, he lectured on a wide range of subjects, from mathematics to philosophy. Kant served as a professor until 1796, when he was forced to stop lecturing due to poor health, and in 1801 he left the university.

Main works: " Towards Eternal Peace”, “Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Law”, “Metaphysics of Morals”, “Critique of Pure Reason”, “Critique of Practical Reason”, etc.

State.

Origin of the state. Kant, like Rousseau, believed that before the formation of the state, people were in a state of nature and could be happier than in a state. However, legal insecurity and the threat of violence lead people to the idea of ​​establishing a state through a social contract. The state is the result of an agreement whereby everyone gives up natural freedom in order to enjoy freedom as members of the state . Accepting the idea of ​​a social contract as a whole, Kant calls it the original contract. This agreement, in his opinion, is not historical fact, and nothing more than an explanation, one of the versions of events about which we cannot have reliable information.

Constitutional state. I. Kant considered the state as “an association of many people subject to legal laws,” but this is not a definition of a specific state, but of its idea, i.e. what it should be. The good of the state, according to Kant, consists in highest degree consistency of the state structure with legal principles, and reason obliges us to strive for such consistency through the categorical imperative. Legal categorical imperative (Kant called it the law of moral freedom) is based on a sense of duty and can be formulated as follows: an act will be moral only if it is performed solely out of respect for the moral law.

It was Kant who developed a number of fundamental principles of legal statehood: freedom and independence of each member of society as a person and citizen; limiting pervasive government interference in private life; the connection between the state and society by law and law; the rule of law in the life of the people, society, and state.

Power sharing: legislative (belongs to the sovereign “collective will of the people”), executive (concentrated in the hands of the legal ruler) and judicial. Unlike C. Montesquieu, Kant wrote about the division of power not as a system of checks and balances, but as a clear subordination of all its branches: the supreme is the legislative power, the executive is subordinate to it, which in turn forms the judicial. It is the subordination and consent of all branches of government, according to Kant, that can prevent despotism and guarantee the prosperity of the state.

Form of government. In accordance with the number of bearers of supreme power, Kant distinguished autocracy , aristocracy and democracy. However, according to the criterion of separation of powers, he distinguished two forms of government: republican, where there is a division of power, and despotic, in which they merge. He believed that a republic is a social system in which power means the rule of laws, and the latter correspond to the interests of citizens, for “what the people cannot decide about themselves, the legislator cannot decide about the people.” Kant himself was a supporter of a constitutional monarchy, believing that an autocracy can also be a republic if it clearly separates the legislative and executive branches of government.

I. Kant condemns the right of the people to revolt, because all political changes must be carried out smoothly, through reforms from above.

Right. Law according to Kant is the realization of the freedom of a member of society, limited only by the freedom of its other members, i.e. law is a set of conditions under which the arbitrariness of one person is compatible with the arbitrariness of another from the point of view of all common law freedom. Such conditions include: the presence of universal compulsory laws, equality of citizens before such laws, legal guarantee of personal rights of citizens, resolution of conflicts through the courts. That is, the rules of law, as it were, outline the boundaries within which a person can act freely.

The general structure of law according to Kant’s views is as follows:

The exercise of a right requires that it be generally binding. The universal obligatory nature of law is achieved through coercive force. Only the state can give coercive force to law.

International law. Part of Kant's philosophy is the idea of ​​eternal peace. He associated the future development of humanity with the formation of a world confederation of sovereign republics, where the international legal order is based on the principles of equality of peoples and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. This is a kind of social contract at the state level.

1. The doctrine of state and law by I. G. Fichte

In the doctrine of state and law by I. G. Fichte specific features German idealism received a unique expression.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte(1762-1814) was born in Rammenau. From 1774 to 1780 he studied in Pfort. Fichte then attended theology lectures at the Universities of Jena and Leipzig. Since 1788 he has been a home teacher in Zurich. In Berlin, where he went in 1799, he began to give public lectures that attracted large audiences. In 1809, the University of Berlin was founded, where Fichte took the chair of philosophy. He died on January 29, 1814 in Berlin from fever.

Main works: " On the purpose of the scientist", "On the purpose of man", "A message clear as the sun to the general public about the true essence modern philosophy", "Main features of the modern era", "Fundamentals of general scientific teaching", "Fundamentals of natural law according to the principles of scientific teaching", "First introduction to scientific teaching", "Second introduction to scientific teaching for readers who already have a philosophical system", "System of the teaching of morality according to the principles of scientific teaching."

Right. His teaching until 1806 was built on provisions inherent in the doctrine of natural law, under which he tried to lay a philosophical foundation. The concept of law in I. G. Fichte follows from the interaction of free beings among themselves, who enter into legal relations with mutual restrictions on freedom.

Thus, I. G. Fichte believed that law is based on reason. Therefore, if common or written law contradicts reason, then it cannot be recognized as law.

The philosopher argues even more insistently that we can talk about law when people's intentions are expressed in actions. What does not appear outwardly and remains in the depths of the soul does not fall within the scope of law. Therefore, there is no point in talking about the right to freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, since, according to the thinker, this relates to the sphere of internal, subjective life and supposedly is not expressed in actions.

From this it is clear that J. G. Fichte breaks the connection between law and morality even more decisively than I. Kant. J. G. Fichte sees the essence of law only in coercive force.

Law requires coercion to exist. But coercion cannot act mechanically, since mechanical influence is generally inapplicable to free will, otherwise the freedom of rational beings is eliminated. Compulsion must appeal to the will itself and induce it to act in accordance with its own dictates.

State. Based on this understanding of law, I. G. Fichte builds his doctrine of the state. Trying to portray the state as an organization designed to ensure the private interests of owners, he argues that people, in the desire to ensure the boundaries of their freedom, strive to subordinate the common cause to their private goals, and the task is to find a synthesis of private and general will. This synthesis is carried out only in a state, the formation of which is possible only through an agreement. The purpose of the treaty is to define the limits of the freedom of each individual and to establish coercive power. This contract aims to ensure the property of each, the security of the individual and the security of the whole.

To enforce the order created by the action of the general will requires a superpower greater than that of any individual. With the help of this superpower, the state carries out coercion. But the exercise of this coercion must be lawful: the authorities must act only in accordance with civil criminal laws.

J. G. Fichte places special hopes on the exploitative state, thinking that it is able to ensure everyone’s life through their own labor and the use of property. Therefore, he proposes to transfer the management of production and distribution to the state. The state must distribute professions among citizens. Any freedom in choosing professions is excluded. The state is vested with broad powers to regulate production and protect domestic industry from foreign competition. He believes that in the economic field the state should become closed, and proclaims the idea of ​​economic autarky. Everything that is bought and sold in a country must be sold and consumed in it. Labor is carefully regulated and even private life citizens.

Criminal law . In the field of criminal law, I. G. Fichte expresses views that differ in many respects from Kant’s concepts.

In his opinion, a crime is a violation of the social contract through which the state is formed. Whoever violates this agreement places himself outside the law and is subject to exclusion from society. But this exception can be replaced by atonement. The criminal has the right to demand this, and the state is obliged to satisfy this demand. Atonement is expressed in punishment, which must be applied according to the principle of talion.

Since the absolute goal of the state is to ensure public safety, it is necessary to establish a body whose direct task is to detect and prevent crimes. Such a body is the police, which, unlike the court, does not punish crimes, but prevents their implementation.

International law. In area international law I. G. Fichte proceeds from the fact that since the creation of a single world state is impossible, it is necessary to establish certain legal relations between states, that is, the existence of international law.

States must enter into agreements among themselves, which must be secured by recognition of the sovereignty of the states that entered into them.

Each state cares about its security. Violation of contracts should entail the use of coercion against violators. This right of coercion is exercised in war. Since the purpose of war is the security of the state waging war, it is quite acceptable to destroy the independence of the defeated state, since the latter represents a source of danger.

I. G. Fichte considers it necessary to create an international organization and an international court to resolve international disputes. In his opinion, in order to establish lasting peace it is necessary international organization, which can, if necessary, resort to force, that is, wage war against a state that has violated its obligations. But he argues that war should not be waged against weak states.

2. G. W. F. Hegel and his doctrine of state and law

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel(1770-1831) was born in Stuttgart into the family of an official. From 1788 to 1793 he studied at the Theological Institute, where he studied philosophy and law. Then he worked as a home teacher for several years. In 1801-1806. taught at the University of Jena. For some time he was the director of a gymnasium in Nuremberg. He taught philosophy and the basics of law. Having achieved some material wealth, Hegel got married. A quiet life gave him the opportunity to work actively, and he became widely known. As a result, three universities simultaneously offer him a professorship. From 1816 he was a professor at universities in Heidelberg (1816-1818) and Berlin (from 1818), where he served until the end of his days, becoming rector of the university shortly before his death.

Main job: " Philosophy of Law".

In The Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. Hegel argues that only philosophical doctrine about law is a genuine science, and develops it as part of philosophy, and not as a legal discipline. Hegel's philosophical system is divided into three parts: logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit. Problems of the theory of state and law are the subject of philosophy of spirit. But since philosophy deals with ideas, the subject of legal philosophy is the idea of ​​law itself. In the Hegelian interpretation, the concept of law includes the concept of state, i.e. The philosophy of law is also the philosophy of the state.

Right. Hegel denied the opposition between natural and positive law. From his point of view, natural law relates to the positive, just as theory relates to actually functioning norms. By natural law he understood the very idea of ​​law, and the idea of ​​law, in turn, considered universal freedom, which requires that a person’s aspirations be subordinated to moral duty, and human rights are subordinated to duties to the state, while individual freedom must be consistent with necessity.

The idea of ​​law goes through three stages of development:

  • abstract law(every person has the right to own things, enter into agreements with others, etc., i.e. this right gives subjects legal capacity, giving them complete freedom of action in everything related to determining the size of property, its purpose, etc. );
  • morality(concretization of abstract law in the actions of the subject, legal and illegal);
  • moral(the highest level of human understanding of law, at this stage the contradictions between abstract law and morality are overcome, a person gains moral freedom in communicating with other people when he consciously subordinates his actions to common goals).

Hegel distinguished between right and law, but did not oppose them. “Right in itself” is transformed into law through lawmaking, which gives law the form of universality and true certainty.

Legal science- the science of positive law, which deals not with the meaning of law, but with historically changing legislation, with what is established in a given place and at a given time.

International law. Hegel, criticizing Kant's idea of ​​“eternal peace,” believed that it was necessary to respect international treaties, but at the same time justified the possibility of resolving disputes through war. He insisted only that wars be fought in accordance with certain rules.

State.

Origin of the state. Hegel rejects the contractual theory of the origin of the state. But he does not explain how the state arose, believing that in this case there was a manifestation of the divine will.

The state, according to Hegel, is the idea of ​​law embodied in reality, its real manifestation, concretization, no matter how flawed this real manifestation may be. The main task of the state is to realize the “good of the whole”, perhaps to the detriment of the good of the individual citizen, i.e. the state does not think about the welfare of the individual citizen.

Distinguishes between the objective and subjective sides of the state. From the objective side, the state is an organization of public power. From a subjective point of view - a spiritual community (organism), all members of which are imbued with the spirit of patriotism and awareness of national unity.

Form of state. Best form considered a constitutional monarchy (it was not by chance that Hegel became the official philosopher of the Prussian monarchy in 1818) and criticized democracy. In a “well-ordered” monarchy, according to the philosopher, the law rules, and the monarch can only add to it the subjective “I want.” The establishment of a constitutional system is possible only through gradual reforms from above.

Power sharing. A reasonably structured state, according to Hegel, has three branches of power: legislative, governmental and princely.

The legislative (lower) power is a bicameral parliament, where the upper house is hereditary, the lower house is elected.

Government (middle) power consists of officials. The court belonged to the government branch of government.

Princely (supreme) power is the power of the sovereign.

All these branches represent an inextricable unity, united by princely power into an integral state mechanism.

Civil society. Many scientists have contributed to the development of this fundamental theoretical category, but the main credit for this rightfully belongs to G. W. F. Hegel. Based on the works of his predecessors, he was the first to point out that between the individual and the state there is a certain social environment (society), which is important for both the individual and the state.

Civil society, as Hegel believed, is an indirect system of needs that rests on two components - property relations and the formal equality of people. However, Hegel emphasized that civil society exists “only in modern world", i.e., essentially, we're talking about about contemporary bourgeois society.

The legal foundations of civil society are: the equality of people as subjects of law, their legal freedom, private property, the inviolability of contracts, the protection of rights from violations, as well as orderly legislation and an authoritative court, including jury trials. Hegel recognized that the state has priority over civil society. The state, in his opinion, acts as a guarantor of the real freedom of civil society.

Educational and methodological literature

  1. Anthology of world political thought. - M., 1997. T. 1-5.
  2. Anthology of world legal thought. - M., 1999. T. 1-5.
  3. History of state- legal doctrines. Textbook. Rep. ed. V. V. Lazarev. - M., 2006.
  4. History of political and legal doctrines. Ed. V. S. Nersesyants. - M., 2003 (any edition).
  5. History of political and legal doctrines. Ed. O. V. Martyshina. - M., 2004 (any edition).
  6. History of political and legal doctrines. Ed. O. E. Leista. - M., 1999 (any edition).
  7. History of political and legal doctrines. Ed. V. P. Malakhova, N. V. Mikhailova. - M., 2007.
  8. Chicherin B. N. Story political doctrines. - M. 1887-1889. T. 1-5.
  9. History of political and legal doctrines: Reader. - M., 1996.
  10. Rassolov M. M. History of political and legal doctrines. - M., 2010.
  1. Baskin Yu. Ya. Kant. - M., 1984.
  2. Galanza P. N. Kant's doctrine of state and law. - M., 1960.
  3. Gaidenko P. P. Paradoxes of freedom in the teachings of Fichte. - M., 1990.
  4. Hegel G. V.F. Philosophy of law. - M., 1990.
  5. Hegel G. W. F. Political works. - M., 1978.
  6. Kant I. Metaphysics of morals. Metaphysical principles of the doctrine of law. - M., 1965. T.4.
  7. Kuznetsov V. N. German classical philosophy of the second half of the 18th and early 19th centuries. M. 1989.
  8. Nersesyants V. S. Hegelian philosophy of law: history and modernity. - M., 1984.
  9. Nersesyants V. S.. Hegel. - M., 1979.
  10. Piontkovsky A. A. Hegel's doctrine of law and state and his criminal law theory. - M., 1963.
  11. Soloviev E. Yu. I. Kant: complementarity of morality and law. - M., 1992.
  12. Kant's philosophy and modernity. - M., 1974.

Questions for self-control and preparation for testing:

  1. How did I. Kant define law?
  2. I. Kant on the rule of law.
  3. Compare the idea of ​​“eternal peace” by I. Kant and G. W. F. Hegel.
  4. What is the relationship between natural and positive law in the interpretation of G.V. F. Hegel?
  5. What, according to Hegel, is civil society?

From Lat. a priori - from the previous - a philosophical concept denoting knowledge that precedes experience and is independent of it. I. Kant believed that the form of organization of knowledge is a priori, which is filled with experimental content, ensuring the universality and necessity of scientific knowledge.

The socio-political lag of Germany from other European states, paradoxically, stimulated the rapid development of philosophical thought, including in the field of philosophy of law. The era of stagnation gave birth to a whole galaxy of outstanding philosophers. It was headed by Immanuel Kant (1724 -1804). He devoted his works to the philosophy of law: “Critique of Practical Reason”, “Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Law”, “Dispute of Faculties”, “Metaphysics of Morals”, “Towards Eternal Peace”.

It was not by chance that Kant turned to philosophical and legal topics. His two of the four famous questions that outline the subject field of philosophy are directly related to the philosophy of law: “what should I do” and “what can I hope for?”

Answering the first question, I. Kant calls for you to act in such a way that the maxim of your behavior can become a universal rule for everyone “to be free in your actions, but to measure your freedom with the freedom of others. Otherwise, arbitrariness and anarchy arise. This is precisely what was natural state, Kant believed, because then people constantly violated each other’s rights. Therefore, each member of society must obey the legal order, which expresses the right of each by a common law for all. Hence, I. Kant defined law as a set of conditions that limit the arbitrariness of one person in relation to another through. general law of freedom.

According to Kant, law is divided into private (relationships between private individuals) and public (relationships between an individual and society or between social groups). The main object of private law is property, public law is the legal attributes of a person: freedom, equality and independence.

It is noteworthy that it is law, according to I. Kant, that should dominate in society, and the country should be governed not by people, but by laws.

Answering the question “what can I hope for?”, the philosopher emphasizes that, in addition to himself, a person places his hopes on society and its institutions and, above all, on legal laws. However, legal law does not take into account the motives of an action and, therefore, does not ensure justice as a type of law. It only regulates people’s behavior, their actions, and not all of them, but only those stipulated by law.

From here Kant makes a brilliant conclusion, which became the legal foundation of humanism: the state, the will of the legislator, does not have the right to patronize a person, prescribe to him what to believe, whom to love, etc. And most importantly, under no circumstances should a person be used as a means, but only as an end, for there is no higher goal than Man; human rights must be considered sacred, no matter what sacrifices it may cost the ruling power.

Philosophical and legal views of another representative of the German classical philosophy Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) are in tune with the ideas of I. Kant.

In the system of philosophical knowledge, he especially emphasized practical philosophy as a doctrine of morality, law and state.

At the heart of this teaching is the idea of ​​freedom. Man, J. Fichte argued, must obey the laws, but not blindly, but under duress, but on the basis of knowledge of necessity.

However, to guarantee freedom, the force of law is necessary, i.e. coercion. Fichte considered the state, understood as the “collective will” of citizens, to be the means of such legal coercion, and therefore the guarantor of freedom. At the same time, the state, represented by rulers and officials, is responsible to the people, and the people have the right to change rulers if they do not ensure freedom for their subjects. Moreover, this “change” can also be carried out by force, i.e. revolutionary way.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL VIEWS OF I.G. FICHT.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte(1762-1814) - the son of a weaver, he himself was forced to start working early. Fichte's views were formed under the influence of ideas and communication with Kant. However, unlike the latter, Fichte reacted more to topical problems. General theoretical views on the state and law are developing in line with the natural law doctrine. The methodological and philosophical basis of these views is unique. Fichte is a convinced subjective idealist, for whom the material world in all its countless aspects exists only as a sphere of manifestation of the freedom of the human spirit; non-objective reality outside human consciousness and human activity.

According to Fichte, law is derived from the “pure forms of reason.” External factors have nothing to do with the nature of law. The need for it is dictated by self-consciousness, for only the presence of law creates the conditions for self-consciousness to reveal itself. However, law is not based on individual will. It is constituted on the basis of mutual recognition by individuals of the personal freedom of each of them. In order to guarantee the freedom of an individual and combine with it the freedom of all, a legal community of people is needed. The core of such a legal community should be a legal law arising from the relationships of rationally free beings, and not from a moral law. Law functions independently of morality, regulating exclusively the scope of human actions and actions.

Fichte believed that legal relations, and, consequently, the freedom of individuals, are not immune from violations. The rule of law does not come automatically. Legal relations and freedom must be protected by coercion. There are no other means. The need to ensure the personal rights of people determines the need for a state. Individual will cannot be a coercive force in a state. It can only be a single collective will, for the formation of which the consent of everyone is necessary, an appropriate agreement is necessary. And people enter into such a civil-state agreement. Thanks to him, statehood is established. The general will of the people forms the core of legislation and determines the boundaries of the influence of the state. Thus, the democrat Fichte sought to stop the arbitrariness of absolutist police power over his subjects and, relying on the natural law doctrine, to establish political rights and individual freedoms.

Fichte saw in the state not an end in itself, but only a tool for achieving an ideal system in which people, armed with science and making maximum use of machinery, solve practical, earthly problems without a lot of time and effort and still have enough leisure to think about their spirit and the super-earthly.

In the views of an outstanding philosopher and public figure Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) showed the duality and contradictoriness of the political tendencies of the German burghers much more clearly, brightly, more strikingly than in Kant.

Fichte's general theoretical views on the state and law develop in line with the natural law doctrine. The methodological and philosophical basis of these views is unique. Fichte is a convinced subjective idealist, for whom the material world in all its countless aspects exists only as a sphere of manifestation of the freedom of the human spirit; There is no objective reality outside of human consciousness and human activity.

Fichte believed that legal relations, and therefore the freedom of individuals, are not immune from violations. The rule of law does not come automatically. Legal relations and freedom must be protected by coercion.

Without hiding his sympathy for the republic, Fichte noted that distinctive feature Any reasonable, consistent with the requirements of the law of the state (regardless of its form) should be the responsibility of those carrying out management to society. If there is no such responsibility, the state system degenerates into despotism.

In his work “The Closed Commercial State” (1800), written under the influence of the theories of the French utopian socialists, Fichte paints a picture ideal state, which is based on reason and true freedom and which guarantees the well-being of each individual.

Fichte saw in the state not an end in itself, but only a tool for achieving an ideal system in which people, armed with science and making maximum use of machine technology, solve practical, earthly problems without a lot of time and effort and still have enough leisure to think about their spirit and the supermundane. .

It is characteristic of Fichte that he closely connects the national revival of his country with its social renewal: with the creation of a single centralized German state, which should finally become a “national state”, with the implementation of serious internal reforms on a bourgeois-democratic basis.

Hegel's doctrine of state and law

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is a brilliant thinker whose creative achievements represent a significant milestone in the entire history of philosophical and political-legal thought.

Problems of state and law were the focus of Hegel's attention at all stages of the creative evolution of his views. This topic is covered in detail in many of his works, including such as: “The German Constitution”, “On scientific methods studies of natural law, its place in practical philosophy and its relation to the science of positive law", "Phenomenology of the Spirit", "Report of the Estates Assembly of the Kingdom of Württemberg", "Philosophy of the Spirit", "Philosophy of Law", "Philosophy of History", "English Bill about the reform of 1831" and etc.

In the most complete and systematic form, Hegel’s doctrine of state and law is presented in “Philosophy of Law” (1820) - one of the most significant works in the history of political and legal teachings.

The concept of “law” is used in Hegel’s philosophy of law in the following basic meanings: I) law as freedom (“idea of ​​law”), II) law as a certain level and form of freedom (“special right”), III) law as law (“positive right").

I. At the stage of objective spirit, where all development is determined by the idea of ​​freedom, “freedom” and “right” express a single meaning; in this respect, Hegel's philosophy of law could be called the philosophy of freedom. The relationship between “freedom” and “right” is mediated through the dialectic of free will.

II. The system of law as the realm of realized freedom represents a hierarchy of “special rights” (from its abstract forms to concrete ones). Each stage of self-deepening of the idea of ​​freedom (and, consequently, the concretization of the concept of law) is a certain existing existence of freedom (free will), and therefore a “special right”. A similar characteristic applies to abstract law, morality, family, society and the state.

III. Right as law (positive law) is one of the “special rights”. Hegel writes: “What is right in itself is posited in its objective existence, that is, determined for consciousness by thought, and determined as what is right and is considered right, which is known as law; Law is generally, thanks to this definition, positive law.”

Distinguishing right and law, Hegel at the same time strives in his construction to exclude their opposition. He regards as a major misunderstanding “the transformation of the difference between natural or philosophical law and positive law into the opposite and contradiction between them.”

Law has the meaning that, in general, the basis of law is the freedom of an individual (person, personality). Personality, according to Hegel, generally implies legal capacity.

Personal freedom finds its realization, first of all, according to Hegel, in the right of private property. Hegel justifies the formal, legal equality of people: people are equal precisely as free individuals, equal in their equal right to private property, but not in the amount of ownership of property.

Hegel distinguishes between civil society and the political state. By civil society we essentially mean bourgeois society. Civil society, according to Hegel, is the sphere of realization of special, private goals and interests of an individual.

In the structure of civil society, Hegel distinguishes three estates: 1) substantial (landowners - nobles and peasants); 2) industrial (manufacturers, traders, artisans); 3) general (officials).

The development of civil society already presupposes, according to Hegel, the presence of a state as its foundation.

Various interpretations of the state in Hegel’s philosophy of law: the state as the idea of ​​freedom, as a specific and supreme right, as legal education as a single organism, as a constitutional monarchy, as a “political state”, etc. - are interconnected aspects of a single idea of ​​the state.

In Hegel's philosophy of law, the ancient thought about polis government (about the polis-state as the highest and perfect form of communication) is synthesized with the doctrine of the “dominance of law”; the result of this synthesis is the Hegelian concept of the rule of law.

The three different powers into which the political state is divided, according to Hegel, are: legislative power, governmental power and the power of the sovereign.

The shortcomings of Hegel's teaching are clearly manifested in the elevation of the state over the individual and society, in the denial of the independent value of individual rights and freedoms, etc. At the same time, Hegel praises the state as the idea (i.e. reality) of law, as a rule of law state, as such an organization freedom, in which the mechanism of violence and the apparatus of political domination are mediated and curbed by law,

Hegel's philosophical and legal teaching had a significant influence on the subsequent history of political and legal thought. This was clearly demonstrated in the subsequent history of Hegelianism and interpretations of Hegel’s teachings from various ideological and theoretical positions.