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The number of Russian troops at the Battle of Kulikovo. Mama's army

(Mamaevo or Don Massacre) - the battle of the troops of the Russian principalities with the Horde on September 8, 1380 (summer 6888 from the creation of the world) on the territory of the Kulikovo field between the rivers Don, Nepryadva and Krasivaya Mecha on the territory currently belonging to the Kimovsky and Kurkinsky districts of the Tula region, on an area of ​​​​about 10 km².

Background

In the 60s of the 14th century, the strengthening of the Moscow principality in Rus' and Mamai’s temnik in the Golden Horde proceeded almost simultaneously, and the unification of the Horde under the rule of Mamai was greatly facilitated by the Russian princes with their victories over Tagai on the river. Void in 1365, above Bulat-Temir on the river. Drunk in 1367 and marching on the middle Volga in 1370.

When in 1371 Mamai gave the label for the great reign of Vladimir to Mikhail Alexandrovich Tverskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich told Ambassador Achikhozha “ I’m not going to the label, I won’t let Prince Mikhail reign in the land of Vladimir, but for you, ambassador, the path is clear“, which was a turning point in relations between Moscow and the Horde. In 1372, Dmitry achieved the termination of Lithuanian assistance to the Tver principality (Lyubutsky Treaty), and in 1375 he obtained recognition from Tver of the condition “ and the Tatars will come against us or against you, you and I will go against them; If we go against the Tatars, then you, together with us, will go against them", after which, in the spring of 1376, the Russian army led by D. M. Bobrok-Volynsky invaded the middle Volga, took a ransom of 5,000 rubles from Mamaev’s proteges and planted Russian customs officers there.

In 1376, Khan of the Blue Horde Arapsha, who came to serve Mamai from the left bank of the Volga, ravaged the Novosilsk principality, avoiding a battle with the Moscow army that had crossed the Oka River; in 1377 on the river. Pyana defeated the Moscow-Suzdal army, which did not have time to prepare for battle, and ruined the Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan principalities. In 1378, Mamai finally decided on a direct clash with Dmitry, but Begich’s army suffered a crushing defeat on the river. Vozha. The Ryazan principality was immediately devastated by Mamai again, but in 1378−1380 Mamai lost his position on the lower Volga in favor of Tokhtamysh.

Correlation and deployment of forces

Russian army

The gathering of Russian troops was scheduled in Kolomna on August 15. The core of the Russian army set out from Moscow to Kolomna in three parts along three roads. Separately there was the court of Dmitry himself, separately the regiments of his cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky and separately the regiments of the assistants of the Belozersk, Yaroslavl and Rostov princes.

Representatives of almost all lands of North-Eastern Rus' took part in the all-Russian gathering. In addition to the henchmen of the princes, troops arrived from the Suzdal, Tver and Smolensk great principalities. Already in Kolomna, the primary battle order was formed: Dmitry led a large regiment; Vladimir Andreevich - right-hand regiment; Gleb Bryansky was appointed commander of the left-hand regiment; The leading regiment was made up of Kolomna residents.

The episode with the blessing of the army by Sergius, which gained great fame thanks to the life of Sergius of Radonezh, is not mentioned in early sources about the Battle of Kulikovo. There is also a version (V.A. Kuchkin) according to which the story of the Life of Sergius of Radonezh’s blessing of Dmitry Donskoy to fight against Mamai refers not to the Battle of Kulikovo, but to the battle on the Vozha River (1378) and is related in “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamai "and other later texts with the Battle of Kulikovo later, as with a larger event.

The immediate formal reason for the upcoming clash was Dmitry’s refusal to Mamai’s demand to increase the tribute paid to the amount in which it was paid under Dzhanibek. Mamai counted on joining forces with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jagiello and Oleg Ryazansky against Moscow, while he counted on the fact that Dmitry would not risk withdrawing troops beyond the Oka, but would take a defensive position on its northern bank, as he had already done in 1373 and 1379 . The connection of allied forces on the southern bank of the Oka was planned for September 14.

However, Dmitry, realizing the danger of such a unification, on August 26 quickly withdrew his army to the mouth of Lopasnya and crossed the Oka River to the Ryazan borders. It should be noted that Dmitry led the army to the Don not along the shortest route, but along an arc to the west of the central regions of the Ryazan principality, ordered that not a single hair should fall from the head of a Ryazan citizen, “Zadonshchina” mentions 70 Ryazan boyars among those killed on the Kulikovo field, and in 1382, when Dmitry and Vladimir went north to gather troops against Tokhtamysh, Oleg Ryazansky would show him the fords on the Oka, and the Suzdal princes would generally take the side of the Horde. The decision to transfer Oka was unexpected not only for Mamai. In Russian cities that sent their regiments to the Kolomna gathering, the crossing of the Oka River with the leaving of a strategic reserve in Moscow was regarded as a movement towards certain death:

On the way to the Don, in the Berezuy tract, the Russian army was joined by the regiments of the Lithuanian princes Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich. Andrei was Dmitry's governor in Pskov, and Dmitry was in Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, however, according to some versions, they also brought troops from their former appanages, which were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - Polotsk, Starodub and Trubchevsk, respectively. At the last moment, the Novgorodians joined the Russian army (in Novgorod in 1379-1380 the Lithuanian prince Yuri Narimantovich was the governor). The right-hand regiment, formed in Kolomna, led by Vladimir Andreevich, then served in the battle as an ambush regiment, and Andrei Olgerdovich led the right-hand regiment in the battle. The historian of military art Razin E. A. points out that the Russian army in that era consisted of five regiments, however, he considers the regiment led by Dmitry Olgerdovich not part of the right-hand regiment, but the sixth regiment, a private reserve in the rear of a large regiment.

Russian chronicles provide the following data on the size of the Russian army: “The Chronicle of the Battle of Kulikovo” - 100 thousand soldiers of the Moscow Principality and 50-100 thousand soldiers of the allies, “The Tale of the Battle of Mamayev”, also written on the basis of a historical source - 260 thousand. or 303 thousand, Nikon Chronicle - 400 thousand (there are estimates of the number of individual units of the Russian army: 30 thousand Belozersts, 7 thousand or 30 thousand Novgorodians, 7 thousand or 70 thousand Lithuanians, 40-70 thousand in ambush shelf). However, it should be borne in mind that the figures given in medieval sources are usually extremely exaggerated. Later researchers (E.A. Razin and others), having calculated the total population of Russian lands, taking into account the principle of recruiting troops and the time of crossing of the Russian army (the number of bridges and the period of crossing over them), settled on the fact that under the banner of Dmitry gathered 50-60 thousand soldiers (this agrees with the data of the “first Russian historian” V.N. Tatishchev about 60 thousand), of which only 20-25 thousand are troops of the Moscow principality itself. Significant forces came from territories controlled by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but in the period 1374-1380 became allies of Moscow (Bryansk, Smolensk, Drutsk, Dorogobuzh, Novosil, Tarusa, Obolensk, presumably Polotsk, Starodub, Trubchevsk).

Army of Mamai

Critical situation, in which Mamai found himself after the battle on the Vozha River and Tokhtamysh’s advance from across the Volga to the mouth of the Don, forced Mamai to use all opportunities to gather maximum forces. There is interesting news that Mamai’s advisers told him: “ Your horde has become impoverished, your strength has failed; but you have a lot of wealth, let's go hire the Genoese, Circassians, Yasses and other peoples" Muslims and Burtases are also named among the mercenaries. According to one version, the entire center of the Horde’s battle formation on the Kulikovo field was mercenary Genoese infantry, with cavalry standing on the flanks. There is information about the number of Genoese at 4 thousand people and that Mamai paid them with a section of the Crimean coast from Sudak to Balaklava for their participation in the campaign.

According to the Moscow Chronicle of the late 15th century, Mamai walked.

In the 14th century, the number of Horde troops was found to be 3 tumens (Battle of Blue Waters in 1362, Mamai watched from a hill the progress of the Kulikovo battle with three dark princes), 4 tumens (the campaign of Uzbek troops in Galicia in 1340), 5 tumens (the defeat of Tver in 1328, the battle of Vozha in 1378). Mamai dominated only in the western half of the Horde, in the battle of Vozha and in the Battle of Kulikovo he lost almost all of his army, and in 1385, for a campaign against Tabriz, Tokhtamysh gathered an army of 90 thousand people from the entire territory of the Golden Horde. “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev” names the figure as 800 thousand people.

Battle

Battle site

From chronicle sources it is known that the battle took place “on the Don at the mouth of Nepryadva.” The Kulikovo field was located between the Don and Nepryadva, that is, between the right bank of the Don and the left bank of the Nepryadva. Using paleogeographic methods, scientists established that “at that time there was a continuous forest on the left bank of the Nepryadva River.” Taking into account that cavalry is mentioned in the descriptions of the battle, scientists have identified a treeless area near the confluence of rivers on the right bank of the Nepryadva (?), which is bounded on one side by the Don, Nepryadva and Smolka rivers, and on the other by ravines and ravines that probably existed already in those days. The expedition estimated the size of the fighting area at "two kilometers with a maximum width of eight hundred meters." In accordance with the size of the localized area, it was necessary to adjust the hypothetical number of troops participating in the battle. A concept was proposed for the participation in the battle of equestrian formations of 5-10 thousand horsemen on each side (such a number, while maintaining the ability to maneuver, could be placed in the specified area). Thus, one of the turning points in Russian history came down to a local skirmish between two cavalry detachments.

For a long time, one of the mysteries was the lack of burials of those who fell on the battlefield. In the spring of 2006, an archaeological expedition used a new design of ground penetrating radar, which identified “six objects located from west to east with an interval of 100-120 m.” According to scientists, these are the burial places of the dead. Scientists explained the absence of bone remains by the fact that “after the battle, the bodies of the dead were buried at a shallow depth,” and “chernozem has increased chemical activity and, under the influence of precipitation, almost completely destructs the bodies of the dead, including bones.” At the same time, the possibility of arrowheads and spears getting stuck in the bones of fallen people, as well as the presence of crosses on the buried bodies, which, despite the “aggressiveness” of the soil, could not disappear completely without a trace. Forensic identification personnel involved in the examination confirmed the presence of ashes, but “were unable to determine whether the ashes in the samples were human or animal remains.” Since the mentioned objects are several absolutely straight shallow trenches, parallel to each other and up to 600 meters long, they are just as likely to be traces of some agricultural activity, for example, adding bone meal to the soil. Examples of historical battles with known burials show the construction of mass graves in the form of one or several compact pits.

Historians explain the lack of significant finds of military equipment on the battlefield by the fact that in the Middle Ages “these things were incredibly expensive,” so after the battle all the items were carefully collected. A similar explanation appeared in popular science publications in the mid-1980s, when for several field seasons, starting with the anniversary year of 1980, no finds were made at the canonical site, even indirectly related to great battle, and a plausible explanation was urgently needed for this.

In the early 2000s, the diagram of the Battle of Kulikovo, first compiled and published by Afremov in the middle of the 19th century, and after that wandering for 150 years from textbook to textbook without any scientific criticism, was already radically redrawn. Instead of a picture of epic proportions with a formation front length of 7-10 versts, a relatively small forest clearing was localized, sandwiched between the openings of ravines. Its length was about 2 kilometers and its width was several hundred meters. The use of modern electronic metal detectors for a complete survey of this area made it possible to collect representative collections of hundreds and thousands of shapeless metal fragments and fragments during each field season. During Soviet times, agricultural work was carried out on this field; ammonium nitrate, which destroys metal, was used as fertilizer. Nevertheless, archaeological expeditions manage to make finds of historical interest: a sleeve, the base of a spear, a chain mail ring, a fragment of an axe, parts of a sleeve hem or a chain mail hem made of brass; armor plates (1 piece, has no analogues), which were attached to a leather strap base.

Preparing for battle

On the evening of September 7, Russian troops were lined up in battle formations. A large regiment and the entire court of the Moscow prince stood in the center. They were commanded by the Moscow okolnichy Timofey Velyaminov. On the flanks were a regiment of the right hand under the command of the Lithuanian prince Andrei Olgerdovich and a regiment of the left hand of princes Vasily Yaroslavsky and Theodore of Molozhsky. Ahead in front of the large regiment was the guard regiment of princes Simeon Obolensky and John of Tarusa. An ambush regiment led by Vladimir Andreevich and Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky was placed in an oak grove up the Don. It is believed that the ambush regiment stood in the oak grove next to the regiment of the left hand, however, in “Zadonshchina” it is said that the ambush regiment struck from the right hand. The division into regiments according to military branches is unknown.

In the evening and night of September 7, Dmitry Ivanovich toured the troops, inspecting them. Then, in the evening, the Tatar advanced units, pushing back the Russian scouts of Semyon Malik, saw Russian troops lined up. On the night of September 8, Dmitry and Bobrok went out on reconnaissance and inspected the Tatar and their own positions from afar.

Russian banner

“The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev” testifies that Russian troops went into battle under a black banner depicting the image of Jesus Christ. There is also an opinion that since the original text of the legend has not been preserved, but has survived to this day in copies, an error could have occurred during the rewriting, and the color of the banner was red. That is, in the original text of the legend there could be the following words:

  • black - crimson, dark red, cloudy red ( The waters are as black as blood)
  • red/red - red, scarlet, bright red
  • scarlet - crimson, crimson, bright crimson

Progress of the battle

The morning of September 8 was foggy. Until 11 o'clock, until the fog cleared, the troops stood ready for battle, maintaining communication (“calling to each other”) with the sounds of trumpets. The prince again traveled around the regiments, often changing horses.

At 12 o'clock the Mongols appeared on the Kulikovo field. The battle began with several small skirmishes of the advanced detachments, after which the famous duel between the Tatar Chelubey (or Telebey) and the monk Alexander Peresvet took place. Both fighters fell dead, but victory remained with Peresvet, whose horse was able to carry him to the Russian troops, while Chelubey was knocked out of the saddle (perhaps this episode, described only in “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamaev,” is a legend). This was followed by a battle between the guard regiment and the Tatar vanguard, led by the military leader Telyak (in some sources - Tulyak). Dmitry Donskoy was first in a guard regiment, and then joined the ranks of a large regiment, exchanging clothes and horses with the Moscow boyar Mikhail Andreevich Brenok, who then fought and died under the banner of the Grand Duke.

“The strength of the Tatar greyhound from Sholomyani is great, coming and then again, not moving, stasha, for there is no place where they can make way; and so stasha, a copy of the pawn, wall against wall, each of them has on the shoulders of his predecessors, the ones in front are more beautiful, and the ones in the back are longer. And the great prince also with his great Russian strength went against another Sholomian.” The battle in the center was protracted and long. Chroniclers indicated that the horses could no longer avoid stepping on the corpses, since there was no clean place. “The Russian great army is on foot, like trees are broken and like hay is cut, they lie down, and they can’t see it terribly…”. In the center and on the left flank, the Russians were on the verge of breaking through their battle formations, but a private counterattack helped when “Gleb Bryansky with the Vladimir and Suzdal regiments walked through the corpses of the dead.” “In the right country, Prince Andrei Olgerdovich attacked not a single Tatar and beat many, but did not dare to chase into the distance, seeing a large regiment motionless and as if all the Tatar strength had fallen in the middle and lay there, wanting to tear it apart.” The Tatars directed the main attack on the Russian left-hand regiment, he could not resist, broke away from the large regiment and ran to Nepryadva, the Tatars pursued him, a threat arose to the rear of the Russian large regiment, the Russian army was pushed back to the river, the Russian battle formations were completely mixed up. Only on the right flank the Mongol attacks were unsuccessful, because there the Mongol warriors had to climb a steep hill.

Vladimir Andreevich, who commanded the ambush regiment, proposed to strike earlier, but Voivode Bobrok held him back, and when the Tatars broke through to the river and exposed the rear to the ambush regiment, he ordered to engage in battle. The cavalry attack from an ambush from the rear on the main forces of the Mongols became decisive. The Mongol cavalry was driven into the river and killed there. At the same time, the regiments of Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich went on the offensive. The Tatars became confused and fled.

The tide of the battle turned. Mamai, who watched the progress of the battle from afar and saw the defeat, fled with small forces as soon as the Russian ambush regiment entered the battle. There was no one to regroup the Tatar forces, continue the battle, or at least cover the retreat. Therefore, the entire Tatar army fled.

The ambush regiment pursued the Tatars to the Beautiful Sword River for 50 versts, “beating up” “countless numbers” of them. Returning from the chase, Vladimir Andreevich began to gather an army. Myself Grand Duke was shell-shocked and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found after the battle under a felled birch tree in an unconscious state.

Losses

Chroniclers greatly exaggerate the number of Horde deaths, bringing them to 800 thousand (which corresponds to the estimate of Mamai’s entire army) and even 1.5 million people. “Zadonshchina” talks about the flight of Mamai himself-nine to the Crimea, that is, about the death of 8/9 of the entire army in the battle.

At the sight of the strike of the ambush regiment, the Horde is attributed the phrase “the young fought with us, but the good ones (the best, the elders) survived.” Immediately after the battle, the task was set to count “how many governors we don’t have and how many young (service) people.” Moscow boyar Mikhail Alexandrovich made a sad report on the death of about 500 boyars (40 Moscow, 40-50 Serpukhov, 20 Kolomna, 20 Pereyaslavl, 25 Kostroma, 35 Vladimir, 50 Suzdal, 50 Nizhny Novgorod, 40 Murom, 30-34 Rostov, 20-23 Dmitrovsky, 60-70 Mozhaisk, 30-60 Zvenigorod, 15 Uglitsky, 20 Galician, 13-30 Novgorod, 30 Lithuanian, 70 Ryazan), “and there is no count for young people (younger combatants); but we only know that all 253 thousand of our squads died, and we have 50 (40) thousand squads left.” Several dozen princes also died. Mentioned among the dead are Semyon Mikhailovich and Dmitry Monastyrev, whose deaths are also known, respectively, in the battle on the river. Drunk in 1377 and the battle on the river. Vozhe in 1378.

After the battle

When the convoys, in which numerous wounded soldiers were taken home, fell behind the main army, the Lithuanians of Prince Jagiello finished off the defenseless wounded, and some Ryazan residents, in the absence of their prince, robbed the convoys returning to Moscow through the Ryazan land.

In 1381, Oleg Ryazansky recognized himself as a “younger brother” and concluded an anti-Horde treaty with Dmitry, similar to the Moscow-Tver Treaty of 1375, and promised to return the prisoners captured after the Battle of Kulikovo.

Consequences

As a result of the defeat of the main forces of the Horde, its military and political dominance was dealt a serious blow. Another foreign policy opponent of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, entered a period of protracted crisis. “The victory on the Kulikovo Field secured Moscow’s importance as the organizer and ideological center of the reunification of the East Slavic lands, showing that the path to their state-political unity was the only path to their liberation from foreign domination.”

For the Horde itself, the defeat of Mamaev’s army contributed to its consolidation “under the rule of a single ruler, Khan Tokhtamysh.” Mamai hastily gathered the rest of his forces in Crimea, intending to go into exile again to Rus', but was defeated by Tokhtamysh. After the Battle of Kulikovo, the Horde raided many times (the Crimean Horde burned Moscow under Ivan the Terrible in 1571), but did not dare to fight the Russians in the open field. In particular, Moscow was burned by the Horde two years after the battle and was forced to resume paying tribute.

Memory

From September 9 to 16, the dead were buried; a church was erected on the common grave, which had long since ceased to exist. The Church has legalized commemoration of the murdered in Dmitriev's parents' Saturday, “while Russia stands.”

The people rejoiced at the victory and nicknamed Dmitry Donskoy, and Vladimir Donskoy or Brave(according to another version, the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Ivanovich received the honorary name Donskoy only under Ivan the Terrible).

In 1850, on the site that was considered the Kulikovo Field, on the initiative of the first researcher of the great battle, Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod S. D. Nechaev, a monument-column was erected and inaugurated, manufactured at the factory of Ch. Berd according to the design of A. P. Bryullov. In 1880 it was solemnly celebrated on the field itself, near the village. Monasteries, the day of the 500th anniversary of the battle.

The Russian Orthodox Church celebrates the anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo on September 21, since September 21 according to the current civil Gregorian calendar corresponds to September 8 according to the Russian Orthodox Church Julian calendar.

In the 14th century Gregorian calendar has not yet been introduced (it appeared in 1584), so events before 1584 are not translated into a new style. However, Russian Orthodox Church celebrates the anniversary of the battle on September 21, because Christmas is celebrated on this day Holy Mother of God- according to the old style, September 8 (the day of the battle in the 14th century according to the Julian calendar).

In fiction

  • "Zadonshchina."
  • Mikhail Rapov. Dawns over Russia. Historical novel. - M.: AST, Astrel, 2002. - 608 p. - (Russian commanders). - 6000 copies. - ISBN 5-17-014780-5
  • Sergei Borodin."Dmitry Donskoy". Historical novel (1940).
  • Dmitry Balashov."Holy Rus'". volume 1: " Steppe Prologue».

In popular culture

  • On the occasion of the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo (1980), a hand-drawn cartoon “Swans of Nepryadva” was released in the USSR, telling about the events of that time.
  • The advertising video “Dmitry Donskoy” from the series is dedicated to the Battle of Kulikovo The World History, Bank Imperial.
  • The Russian courtyard song "Prince of Moscow" (probably from the 60s of the 20th century, contains elements of obscene vocabulary) is a crude caricature of the canonical ("school") description of the course of the Battle of Kulikovo.

Sources

Information about the Battle of Kulikovo is contained in four main ancient Russian written sources. These are “A short chronicle story about the Battle of Kulikovo”, “A lengthy chronicle story about the Battle of Kulikovo”, “Zadonshchina” and “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev”. The last two contain a significant number of literary details of dubious reliability. Information about the Battle of Kulikovo is also contained in other chronicles covering this period, as well as in Western European chronicles, adding additional interesting information about the course of the battle, not known from Russian sources.

In addition, a short story about the Battle of Kulikovo of secondary origin contains “A Tale of the Life and Repose of Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich,” and “The Life of Sergius of Radonezh” contains a story about the meeting before the battle of Dmitry Donskoy with Sergius of Radonezh and about sending Peresvet and Oslyaby to the battle .

Brief mentions of the Battle of Kulikovo were also preserved by the Order chroniclers, contemporaries of the event: Johann Posilge, his successor Johann Lindenblat and Dietmar of Lubeck, author of the Toruń Annals. Here are excerpts from their works:

Johann Poschilge, an official from Pomesania who lived in Riesenburg, also wrote his chronicle in Latin from the 60s-70s of the 14th century until 1406. Then his successor until 1419, Johann Lindenblatt, translated it into High German:

Dietmar of Lübeck, a Franciscan monk of the Torun monastery, brought his chronicle in Latin to 1395. Then his successor translated it into Low German until 1400:

Their information about the Battle of Kulikovo apparently goes back to a message brought from Rus' by Hanseatic merchants to a congress in Lübeck in 1381. It was preserved in a highly distorted form in the work of the German historian of the late 15th century, the dean of the spiritual chapter of the city of Hamburg, Albert Kranz, “Vandalia”:

“At this time, the greatest battle in human memory took place between the Russians and the Tatars, in an area called Flavasser. According to the custom of both peoples, they fought not by standing against each other in a large army, but by running out to throw spears at each other and kill, and then returning again to their ranks. They say that two hundred thousand people died in this battle. The Russian victors captured considerable booty in the form of herds of cattle, since the Tatars owned almost nothing else. But the Russians did not rejoice at this victory for long, because the Tatars, having called the Lithuanians as allies, rushed after the Russians, who were already returning back, and took away the booty that they had lost and, having defeated and killed many of the Russians. This was in 1381 AD. At this time in Lubeck there was a congress of all the cities of the union called the Hansa.

Information about the Battle of Kulikovo is well preserved in two Bulgar sources: the collection of Volga-Bulgar chronicles of Bakhshi Iman “Djagfar Tarihi” (“History of Jagfar”, 1681-1683) and the collection of Karachay-Balkar chronicles of Daish Karachay al-Bulgari and Yusuf al-Bulgari Bulgari “Nariman Tarihi” (“History of Nariman”, 1391-1787). In the “Djagfar Tarihi” the battle on the Kulikovo field in 1380 is called “Mamai sugesh” (can be translated both as “Mama’s Battle” and as “Mama’s War”), and in the “Nariman Tarikhi” codex it is also called “Sasnak sugesh” (“Sasnak battle"). "Sasnak" in Bulgarian means "swamp sandpiper", which is the same as the Russian "Battle of Kulikovo".

According to the historian F.G.-H. Nurutdinov, Russian chroniclers mistakenly identify the Kulikovo field as the site of the battle near the modern Nepryadva River. Meanwhile, according to the Nariman Tarikha, the main part of the Kulikovo field was located between the rivers Sasnak (“Kulik”) - the modern Pine River, and Kyzyl Micha (“Beautiful Dubnyak, or Oak”) - the modern rivers Beautiful Mecha or Nizhny Dubyak. And only the outskirts of the “Sasnak kyry” (that is, the Kulikovo field) went a little beyond these rivers. Thus, the “Nariman Tarihi” says:

The most detailed account of the battle, which coincides with the texts of Russian sources, is found in the chronicle of Mohamedyar Bu-Yurgan “Bu-Yurgan Kitaby” (“Book of Bu-Yurgan”, 1551), included in the chronicle of Bakhshi Iman “Jagfar Tarikh” (1680- 1683).

History of the study

The main sources of information about the battle are three works: “The Chronicle of the Massacre on the Don”, “Zadonshchina” and “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev”. The last two contain a significant number of literary details of dubious reliability. Information about the Battle of Kulikovo is also contained in other chronicles covering this period, as well as in Western European chronicles, which add additional interesting information about the course of the battle that is not known from Russian sources.

The most complete chronicle document telling about the events of September 1380 is “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamaev,” known from more than a hundred surviving copies. This is the only document that talks about the size of Mamai’s army (albeit implausibly large).

The first explorer of the Kulikovo field was Stepan Dmitrievich Nechaev (1792-1860). The collection of finds he made formed the basis of the Museum of the Battle of Kulikovo.

Historical assessment

The historical assessment of the significance of the Battle of Kulikovo is ambiguous. In general, the following main points of view can be distinguished:

  • From a traditional point of view, the Battle of Kulikovo is the first step towards the liberation of Russian lands from Horde dependence.
  • Supporters of the Orthodox approach, following the main sources on the history of the Battle of Kulikovo, see the battle as a confrontation between Christian Rus' and the steppe infidels.
  • Russian historian S. M. Solovyov believed that the Battle of Kulikovo, which stopped another invasion from Asia, had the same significance for Eastern Europe that the battle on the Catalaunian fields of 451 and the Battle of Poitiers in 732 had for Western Europe.
  • Supporters of the critical approach believe that the real significance of the Battle of Kulikovo is greatly exaggerated by the later Moscow scribes and view the battle as an internal conflict in the Horde (a skirmish between a vassal and an illegal usurper), not directly related to the struggle for independence.
  • The Eurasian approach of the followers of L. N. Gumilyov sees in Mamaia (in whose army the Crimean Genoese fought) a representative of the trade and political interests of hostile Europe; Moscow troops objectively came out to defend the legitimate ruler of the Golden Horde, Tokhtamysh.

Battle of Kulikovo, which occurred on September 8, 1380 between the Russian army of Prince Dmitry Ivanovich and the Tatar hordes of Mamai, became a turning point in Russian history. And although Muscovite Rus', as a result of the battle, was freed from the Horde yoke for only two years, the Battle of Kulikovo led to the mental unification of Rus' and marked the beginning of the formation of the Great Russian nation - if Kulikovo field They walked, being Muscovites, Vladimir, Mozhaisians, Serpukhovites and Novgorodians, then returned from there as Russians.

Background to the Battle of Kulikovo

Popular uprisings against The Tatar yoke began to break out immediately after its establishment. So, in 1259, the residents of Novgorod dealt with the insolent Horde Baskaks. and in 1262 the inhabitants of Rostov the Great, Vladimir, Suzdal and many other Russian cities rose up against the oppressors. However, the Horde invariably drowned these actions in blood, since the Russian princes were on their side.

Many are now trying to claim that the Tatar yoke is over There was no Rus'. The Tatars, they say, did not keep garrisons in Russian cities, but only limited themselves to punitive expeditions against the rebel cities. Yes, indeed, they did not keep garrisons in the cities - the obedience of the Russian people to the Tatar power was ensured by the Russian princes themselves, and therefore the Tatar yoke was doubly burdensome - it was necessary to support not only the khan in the Sarai, but also the prince in the Kremlin.

The princes themselves repeatedly brought Tatar detachments to Rus', using them both to restore order in their inheritance and to attack neighboring principalities. In addition, the Tatars themselves often used some Russian princes in the fight against others. So, in 1333, the Tatars went with the Muscovites to the Novgorod land, which refused to pay an increased tribute. In 1334, together with Dmitry Bryansky, the Tatars went against the Smolensk prince Ivan Alexandrovich.
But on November 13, 1359, after the death of Ivan the Red, nine-year-old Dmitry Ivanovich became the Grand Duke of Vladimir and Moscow. In the early years, Moscow was ruled on his behalf by Metropolitan Alexy, who was a supporter of an alliance with the Horde against Lithuania. Objectively, this policy was correct: the Tatars looked at Rus' only as a cash cow, and Lithuania as an object of genocide. Subjectively, this policy of the Metropolitan was caused by the fact that it was Berdibek, and not some Jagiello, who issued Alexy a label confirming the liberation of the Russian Church from tributes and extortions.

However, in the same year 1359, the twelfth khan of the Golden Horde, Berdybek, was killed. The impostor Kulpa, who took his place, stayed in Sarai for five months and was killed by Nauryzbek, who four months later was killed by Khan Khyzyr. But Khyzyr, after the same four months, became a victim of a conspiracy by his own eldest son Timur-Hadji. The latter ruled for five weeks, having only managed to mint a coin with his name. In total, over the next 10 years, 25 khans changed in Sarai.
Temnik Mamai, who served as governor of Crimea under Berdybek, took advantage of this situation. This representative of the Kyyat tribe did not have any rights to the Horde throne, but was married to the daughter of Berdybek - the last representative of the legitimate dynasty, descending from Batu. In addition, an eight-year-old representative of the Baty family, Muhammad-Bulak, was on vacation in Crimea at that moment.
Having proclaimed this boy khan, Mamai declared himself regent of the entire Golden Horde. However, he could not control the entire Horde - Sarai and the entire eastern part of the Horde were under the control of other khans, and from 1377 Timur’s protege Genghisid Tokhtamysh began to take control of it.

Taking advantage of the situation in the Horde, called the Great Zamyatnya by the chroniclers, Prince Dmitry decided not to send tribute to Sarai anymore.
But Lithuania also decided to take advantage of the situation in the Horde: the Lithuanian prince Olgerd Gedeminvich, married to the daughter of the Tver prince Alexander Mikhailovich Ulyana, who was killed in the Horde, declared himself the liberator of Russian lands from the Tatar yoke. Halo of a liberator and similar to Russians appearance, as well as his Russian wife and Orthodox religion, allowed him to take possession of Bryansk, Kiev, Smolensk and all of Volyn in a short time. It seemed that he was about to take over the entire former Kievan Rus, but Moscow unexpectedly stood in the way of his plans.
In alliance with the Tver princes, Olgerd began a war against Dmitry. Three times the Lithuanian prince went to Moscow, but he was unable to take it. At the height of the confrontation, on May 24, 1377, 80-year-old Olgerd died. His 15-year-old heir Jagiello was unable not only to expand, but also to maintain most of his father’s conquests - one principality fell away from Lithuania after another. And then Jagiello decided to offer the Tatars, Lithuania’s recent enemies, an alliance against Dmitry. The condition of this union was the support of Mamai in his claims to the Horde throne and the division of Rus' between Lithuania and the Horde.

For Mama, this alliance could not have come at a better time: from the very beginning of his reign, he sought to make North-Eastern Rus' not just a dependent territory, but also to completely occupy and annex it. In this desire, he was indulged by Crimean Jews (not to be confused with the Karaites) and Genoese merchants, mostly of the same nationality, sometimes covered with a Catholic cross. Both of them intended to open trading posts in Rus' to exchange furs for Italian glass. Hoping for future dividends, they generously loaned money to Mamai, who managed to gather quite significant military forces. They were also interested in the ruin of Moscow for the reason that in the spring of 1376, the Russian army led by Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky made a campaign against the middle Volga, defeated Volga Bulgaria and, instead of Mamaev’s henchmen, put Russian customs officers there. thus, the influx of furs to Crimean merchants decreased.

It completely dried up after the next winter, Prince Boris Konstantinovich Gorodetsky, together with his nephew Semyon Dmitrievich and the Moscow governor Sviblo, carried out a campaign in the Mordovian land. All Bulgarian and Mordovian furs now went to Rus' and were sold through Novgorod to the Hanseatic cities.

To resume the supply of furs to Crimea, Mamai sent an army to Rus' under the command of Murza Begich, but this army was completely defeated on August 11, 1378 Battle of the Vozhe River. Begich himself also died.

Preparation for the Battle of Kulikovo

For the next two years, the opponents prepared for the decisive battle. Finally, on July 23, 1380, a messenger Andrei Semenovich Popov galloped to Moscow with the news that an army led by Mamai himself had crossed the Voronezh River.

Letters were immediately sent to all the capitals of the Russian principalities, cities and lands: “let them be ready.” Kolomna, a fortress near the mouth of the Moscow River, was designated as the location for the concentration of the main forces of the Russian army.

Soon, Russian intelligence officers Rodion Rzhevsky, Andrei Volosatov and Vasily Tupik managed to obtain a tongue, according to whose testimony it became clear that Jagiello and Oleg Ryazansky.

IN Lately a theory has emerged suggesting that Battle of Kulikovo happened not on the Don at all, but right under the walls of Moscow in the area of ​​​​what is now Moscow Solyanka Street. From the point of view of formal logic, everything in this theory looks perfect: why chase Mamai in an open field, risking that he will go around from the rear and ruin defenseless Moscow? Isn't it better to meet him under the walls of the city if he is going to Moscow anyway?

However, this theory does not take into account the fact that in this case not only Mamai, but also Jagiello and Oleg Ryazansky would come to Moscow. Dmitry wanted to break up the opponents piece by piece, forestalling their connection.

On the morning of August 20, the Russian army set out from Moscow along three roads. To defend the capital, Voivode Fyodor Andreevich Koshka, a distant ancestor of the future Romanov family, was left with the army.

Rus' fielded 24 thousand warriors of heavily armed infantry from city regiments, replenished with volunteer peasants, and about 12 thousand mounted knights against Mamai.

Russian horse warrior

The knights and their war horses were covered from head to toe in iron armor. Long-range crossbows were attached to the saddles of the knights, firing iron arrows at 800-1000 m, while the Horde bow, according to my information, hit only at a distance of 150-200 m. Each Russian knight was fluent in the techniques of throwing and hand-to-hand combat, and habitually felt himself in heavy armor, since he was taught military affairs from the age of three.

The infantry men-at-arms were armed with crossbows, swords, axes and spears, and according to some information there were also a small number of arquebuses that fired not only bullets, but also arrows. The infantrymen were protected by armor and chain mail with bracers, metal gloves, leg guards, knee pads and leggings, plate boots, helmets with steel faces, and scarlet almond-shaped shields.

The Russian army included regiments under the command of twenty-three princes and governors, including the Tver regiment. There was no various reasons regiments of Smolensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod and, of course, Ryazan. But on the other hand, two Orthodox Lithuanian princes, his half-brothers who were in opposition to Jogaila, sent their squads. These were Andrei, who reigned in Pskov, and Dmitry, to whose inheritance Olgerd at one time allocated Bryansk and the Trubetskoy principality. This same Dmitry Olgerdovich became the founder of the Trubetskoy princes. It was to meet with these detachments that Dmitry Ivanovich, leaving Kolomna with his army on the 24th, did not move directly towards Mamai, but first headed west along the Oka to the mouth of Lopasnya. In addition, already knowing about Oleg Ryazansky’s betrayal, he did not dare to move through the center of the Ryazan principality, although the battle itself took place on Ryazan territory.

After crossing the Oka River near Lopasnya, Dmitry and his military leaders had to decide which enemy should be met first. The Grand Duke took into account that Jagiello and Oleg were advancing in a narrow zone, mainly along roads, and therefore their army did not cause much damage to the local population. Mamai is a different matter. Nomads, greedy for prey, promised great troubles to Russian villages, towns and villages. Therefore, having decided to beat the enemies separately, Dmitry wanted first of all to knock the Horde out of the coalition.

Dmitry Ivanovich hastened to cross the Don at an unusual time according to the then rules of war - at night. And in this risky enterprise there was a deep calculation: realizing that Mamai could know quite a lot about the Moscow army from the spies, Dmitry hoped that the night crossing would eliminate the possibility of a surprise attack on his rear by one of the opponents, and the next day the warriors would have time to prepare for battle.

Kulikovo field

Progress of the Battle of Kulikovo

Pavesiere

Tatar horseman

In the morning September 8, 1380 Two troops lined up on the Kulikovo field: 36 thousand Russian soldiers were opposed by 120 thousand Horde soldiers. The location of the Russian troops was covered by Semyon Melik's Watch Regiment, which numbered up to a thousand mounted knights in damask armor. Behind him were the Advanced and Great Regiments, in the ranks of which there were 24 thousand foot warriors. Their flanks were covered by the regiments of the Right and Left Hands, which included 3-4 thousand each of heavily armed forged troops, seated in thick armor on armored horses. In the rear of the Big Regiment, Dmitry prudently deployed 3,600 reserve warriors, not far from which fluttered the grand ducal banner, defended by three hundred warriors. On the left, in the oak grove, the Ambush Regiment, consisting of 4 thousand knights Dmitry Bobrok and Vladimir Serpukhovsky, was waiting in the wings.

Mamai’s army was also not purely cavalry - it also included Genoese infantrymen . They were recruited not only in the Crimean Cafe, but also in Genoa itself. Some of them were pikemen, and the rest were crossbowmen. pavesiere ami - while loading the crossbow, they covered themselves with a standing shield stuck into the ground, called paveza. Each of them had two crossbows, plate armor and a gorget, iron bracers and bascinet, a sword and a dagger. For every 25 people there was a commander who received 10 florins per month. An ordinary crossbowman received five florins.

Using the main light weapon to hit a moving target. At a trot, the rider is able to reach speeds of up to 12-15 km/h. in this case, the nomads usually began shooting from five hundred steps, rapidly approaching the enemy.

The battle began at about 11 o'clock in the morning with a duel between the Horde giant Chelubey and the Russian knight Peresvet. Both our knight and the Tatar warrior died, killing each other, after which Mamai moved his advanced detachment of 4,4 thousand light cavalry towards the Sentinel Regiment. Behind him, 14-15 thousand dismounted heavily armed horsemen were preparing for an attack.

Semyon's guard regiment sowed and mostly destroyed the light cavalry of the Horde advanced detachment, but then the main enemy forces entered the battle. The Tatars, at full gallop, crashed into the thick chains of Muscovites who had put out their spears. Tatar horses jumped over spears, and Tatar horsemen cut right and left with crooked sabers. individual daredevils stood with their backs to each other, put out spears, formed hedgehog formations, and successfully fought back. Then the Tatars, without coming close, began to shoot them with bows. Thus, having greatly thinned out, the Advanced Regiment withdrew, joining the regiments of the Right and Left Hands.

On the right flank, the Russian knights successfully repelled the attacks of the Mamaev horsemen with iron arrows. In the center, the Big and Advanced regiments also rained down a hail of arrows on the approaching Horde soldiers. Every eight seconds, volleys of 4-6 thousand crossbows tore into the air, and yet the enemy cavalry was in their zone of action for at least 10 minutes, and the clumsy 50-ranked infantry from the Genoese mercenaries for at least 25 minutes. And those who managed to break through to the Advance Detachment were met by the steel bristles of spears.

On the left flank, the right wing of the Horde, reinforced by a reserve, attacked our Left Hand regiment, trying to go to the rear of the Big Regiment. Here, Prince Dmitry Ivanovich fought in the front row. Mamai threw the weight of reserves into battle. The Tatars, regardless of the enormous losses, went ahead.
In the center of the fighting, fierce slaughter continued, the Horde partly crashed into the ranks of the Advanced and Big regiments. At the same time, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the thinned regiment of the Left Hand retreated back, and the Grand Duke's warriors of the Moscow banner entered the battle.

Mamai, seeing that the hour was not far when the main forces of the Russians would be captured and surrounded, celebrated the victory. However, in front of the enemy who had broken through, foot soldiers of the reserve suddenly appeared, blocking his path with a wall of shields bristling with spears. Iron arrows fired from crossbows mowed down hundreds of Horde soldiers.

And at that moment, an Ambush attack fell on the Horde from behind. Now the enemy, who had already lost many soldiers, found himself between a rock and a hard place - he was destroyed from three sides by Russian warriors and knights. The Horde couldn’t bear this and started to run away. At the same time, the heavily armed regiment of the Right Arm went on the offensive, scattering the light enemy horsemen. Now the Russians surrounded the main forces of Mamai, defeated them and went into pursuit, destroying those fleeing for almost 50 miles to the Red Sword River, covering the entire path with Tatar corpses. And on the Beautiful Sword the same thing happened that Mamaev’s warriors had already experienced on Vozha: heavy weapons pulled to the bottom those who wanted to cross the river. Dmitry Donskoy was shell-shocked and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found unconscious after the battle under a felled birch tree.

The Russians also got the entire huge convoy, on which Mamai kept everything that was necessary for the army, and, in addition, hoped to take out Moscow booty on it.

Having learned about the defeat of Mamai, Jagiello, who did not have time to get to the battle site, turned back and returned to Lithuania as quickly as if he were being followed on his heels.

For a long time it was believed that the Russians lost almost their entire army on the Kulikovo Field. However, according to the calculations of military historian Dmitry Zenin, Russian losses amounted to 6% of personnel. that is, a little more than two thousand people. Mamai lost more than a hundred thousand soldiers, and the Genoese infantry - both pikemen and pavesiers - were almost completely exterminated - most of them were trampled by the horses of the fleeing Tatars.

The carts from the captured Tatar convoy were useful for loading the wounded, but on the way back, Oleg of Ryazan’s army of five thousand attacked this convoy and, having cut off the wounded, took for themselves all the trophies obtained by the Russians on the Kulikovo field.

The defeated Mamai fled to Crimea, managed to gather a new army there and again went to Rus', but on the way on the Kalka River, where in 1223 the the first clash of Rus' with the Tatar-Mongols , he met with the army of Tokhtamysh, to whom legal power passed after the death of Muhammad-Bulak. There was essentially no battle: Tokhtamysh’s archers shot arrows across the river with leaflets that promised a reward for going over to his side and punishment for those who remained on Mamai’s side. In the end, Mamai, abandoned by the army, again fled to Crimea, where the Jews who had given him loans demanded repayment of his debts. There was nothing to pay Mamai, and they sold him to Tokhtamysh for a third of the debt. Mamai initially managed to escape, but then their own nukers decided to sell him. They could not take him alive, and they had to kill him and offer Tokhtamysh his already dead body. Tokhtamysh generously paid the traitors, methodically stuffing coins into their anus. By order of Tokhtamysh, Mamai was buried with due honors.

Dmitry Donskoy sent Tokhtamysh a greeting message on the occasion of his accession to the throne and sent him generous gifts, but did not ask him for a label to reign. Therefore, Tokhtamysh made a campaign against Moscow in 1382, after a long siege, he took it by deception and burned it to the ground. The Horde yoke in Rus' was restored and lasted for another century.

Battle of Kulikovo

Battle of Kulikovo

Main conflict: Mongol-Tatar yoke

date

Place

Kulikovo field (Tula region)

Bottom line

Russian victory

Opponents

Commanders

Strengths of the parties

90 - 150 thousand

Losses

up to 20 thousand

8/9 of the total army

Battle of Kulikovo Mamaevo or Don Massacre) - a battle between the Russian army led by the Moscow prince Dmitry Donskoy army of the Golden Horde Mamaia, which took place on September 8, 1380 on the territory of the Kulikovo field - a historical area between the rivers Don, Nepryadva and Krasivaya Mecha, currently belonging to the Kimovsky and Kurkinsky districts of the Tula region, on an area of ​​​​about 10 km².

September 21 (September 8 according to the Julian calendar) is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the victory of Russian regiments led by Grand Duke Dmitry Donskoy over the Mongol-Tatar troops in the Battle of Kulikovo.

Background

In the 60s of the 14th century, the strengthening of the Moscow Principality in North-Eastern Russia and Temnik Mama in the Golden Ordeshlo almost simultaneously, and the unification of the Horde under the rule of Mamai was facilitated by the Russian princes with their victories over Tagaemu of the Shishevsky forest in 1365, over Bulat-Temir on the Pyan river in 1367 and a campaign against the middle Volga in 1370.

When in 1371 Mamai announced the great reign of Vladimir to Mikhail Alexandrovich Tverskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich told Ambassador Achikhozha “I’m not going to the label, I won’t let Prince Mikhail reign in the land of Vladimir, but for you, ambassador, the path is clear,” which was a turning point in relations between Moscow and the Horde. In 1372, Dmitry achieved the cessation of Lithuanian assistance to the Principality of Tver (Lyubutsky Peace), in 1375 he obtained recognition from Tver of the condition “if the Tatars come against us or against you, you and I will go against them; “If we go against the Tatars, then you, together with us, will go against them,” after which, in the spring of 1376, the Russian army led by the SD. M. Bobrok-Volynsky invaded the middle Volga, took a ransom of 5,000 rubles from Mamaev’s proteges and put Russian customs officers there.

In 1376, Khan of the Blue Horde, Arapshar, who came into the service of Mamai from the left bank of the Volga, devastated the Novosilsk principality, avoiding battle with the Okumoskovsky army, in 1377 on the river. Pyana defeated the Moscow-Suzdal army, which did not have time to prepare for battle, and ruined the Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan principalities.

In 1378, Mamai finally decided on a direct clash with Dmitry, but the army he sent under the command of Murza Begich suffered a crushing defeat on the river. Vozha. The Ryazan principality was immediately devastated by Mamai again, but in 1378-1380 Mamai lost his position on the lower Volga in favor of Tokhtamysh.

Correlation and deployment of forces

Russian army

Novoskoltsev A. N. “Reverend Sergius blesses Dmitry for the fight against Mamai”

The gathering of Russian troops was scheduled in Kolomna on August 15. The core of the Russian army set out from Moscow to Kolomna in three parts along three roads. Separately, there was the court of Dmitry himself, separately the regiments of his cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky, and separately the regiments of the assistants of the Belozersk, Yaroslavl and Rostov princes.

Troops also arrived from the Suzdal and Smolensk grand duchies. According to some sources (the later Nikon Chronicle and Solovyov S.M., who accepted its version), the Tver regiment, brought by Mikhail Alexandrovich’s nephew Ivan Vsevolodovich, as well as the Novgorodians who joined immediately before the battle, also participated in the gathering, but historians question the reliability of this information.

Already in Kolomna, the primary battle order was formed: Dmitry led a large regiment; Vladimir Andreevich with the Yaroslavl people - the regiment of the right hand; Gleb Bryansky was appointed commander of the left-hand regiment; the Kolomna residents formed the leading regiment.

Having gained great fame thanks to the life of Sergius of Radonezh, the episode with the blessing of the army by Sergius is not mentioned in early sources about the Battle of Kulikovo. There is also a version (V.A. Kuchkin) according to which the story of the life of Sergius of Radonezh’s blessing of Dmitry Donskoy to fight against Mamai refers not to the Battle of Kulikovo, but to the battle on the Vozha River (1378) and is related in “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamai” and other later texts with the Battle of Kulikovo later, as with a larger event.

The immediate formal reason for the upcoming clash was Dmitry’s refusal to Mamai’s demand to increase the tribute paid to the amount in which it was paid under Dzhanibek. Mamai counted on joining forces with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jagiello and Oleg of Ryazan against Moscow, while he counted on the fact that Dmitry would not risk withdrawing troops beyond the Oka, but would take a defensive position on its northern bank, as he had already done in 1373 and 1379. The connection of allied forces on the southern bank of the Oka was planned for September 14.

However, Dmitry, realizing the danger of such a unification, on August 26 quickly withdrew his army to the mouth of Lopasnya and crossed the Oka River to the Ryazan borders. It should be noted that Dmitry led the army to the Don not along the shortest route, but in an arc to the west of the central regions of the Ryazan principality, and ordered that not a single hair fall from the head of a Ryazan citizen. “Zadonshchina” also mentions 70 Ryazan boyars among those killed on the Kulikovo Field. The decision to transfer Oka was unexpected not only for Mamai. In Russian cities that sent their regiments to the Kolomna gathering, the crossing of the Oka River with the leaving of a strategic reserve in Moscow was regarded as a movement towards certain death:

On the way to the Don, in the Berezuy tract, the Russian army was joined by the regiments of the Lithuanian princes Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich. Andrei was Dmitry's governor in Pskov, and Dmitry was in Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, however, according to some versions, they also brought troops from their former appanages, which were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - respectively Polotsk, Starodubai and Trubchevsk. The right-hand regiment, formed in Kolomna, led by Vladimir Andreevich, then served in the battle as an ambush regiment, with the exception of the Yaroslavl residents who stood on the left flank, Andrei Olgerdovich led the right-hand regiment in the battle, having also received Rostovites under his command, about possible reshuffles in the front line and large shelves are unknown. The historian of military art Razin E. A. points out that the Russian army in that era consisted of five regiments, however, he considers the regiment led by Dmitry Olgerdovich not part of the right-hand regiment, but the sixth regiment, a private reserve in the rear of a large regiment.

Russian chronicles provide the following data on the number of Russian troops: “The Chronicle of the Battle of Kulikovo” - 100 thousand soldiers of the Moscow Principality and 50-100 thousand soldiers of the allies, “The Tale of the Battle of Mamayev”, also written on the basis of a historical source - 260 thousand. or 303 thousand, Nikon Chronicle - 400 thousand (there are estimates of the number of individual units of the Russian army: 30 thousand Belozersts, 7 or 30 thousand Novgorodians, 7 or 70 thousand Lithuanians, 40-70 thousand in an ambush regiment). However, it should be borne in mind that the figures given in medieval sources are usually extremely exaggerated. Later researchers (E.A. Razin and others), having calculated the total population of Russian lands, taking into account the principle of recruiting troops and the time of crossing of the Russian army (the number of bridges and the period of crossing over them), settled on the fact that under the banner of Dmitry gathered 50-60 thousand soldiers (this agrees with the data of V.N. Tatishcheva about 60 thousand), of which only 20-25 thousand are troops directly from the Moscow Principality. Significant forces came from territories controlled by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but in the period 1374-1380, which became allies of Moscow (Bryansk, Smolensk, Drutsk, Dorogobuzh, Novosil, Tarusa, Obolensk, presumably Polotsk, Starodub, Trubchevsk).S. B. Veselovsky believed in his early works that there were about 200-400 thousand people on the Kulikovo field, but over time he came to the conclusion that in the battle the Russian army could only number 5-6 thousand people. According to A. Bulychev, the Russian army (like the Mongol-Tatar) could be about 6-10 thousand people with 6-9 thousand horses (that is, it was mainly a cavalry battle of professional horsemen). The leaders of archaeological expeditions on the Kulikovo field also agree with his point of view: O. V. Dvurechensky and M. I. Gonyany. In their opinion, the Battle of Kulikovo was a horse battle, in which about 5-10 thousand people took part on both sides, and it was a short-term battle: about 20-30 minutes instead of the chronicle 3 hours. In the Moscow army there were both princely courts and Gorod regiments of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir and Moscow.

Army of Mamai

The critical situation in which Mamai found himself after the battle on the Vozha River and Tokhtamysh’s advance from across the Volga to the mouth of the Don forced Mamai to use every opportunity to gather maximum forces. There is news that Mamai’s advisers told him: “Your horde has become impoverished, your strength is exhausted; but you have a lot of wealth, let’s go hire the Genoese, Circassians, Yasses and other peoples.” Muslims and Burtases are also named among the mercenaries. According to one version, the entire center of the Horde’s battle formation on the Kulikovo field was mercenary Genoese infantry, with cavalry standing on the flanks.

According to the Moscow Chronicle of the late 15th century, Mamai walked

with all the princes of Orda and with all the power of the Tatar and Polovtsian. Moreover, he hired an army, Besermeny and Armeny, Fryazy and Cherkasy and Burtasy, and with him, in one mind, the great Prince of Lithuania and Yagailo Olgerdovich with all the power of Lithuania and Lyatsk, with them in unity and Prince Oleg Ivanovich Ryazansky.

PSRL, t. 25, M. -L, 1949, p. 201

In the 14th century, the number of Horde troops was 3 tumens (Battle of Blue Waters in 1362, Mamai watched from the hill the progress of the Battle of Kulikovo with the Three Dark Princes), 4 tumens (the campaign of Uzbek troops in Galicia in 1340), 5 tumens (the defeat of Tver in 1328, the Battle of Vozha in 1378 ). Mamai dominated only in the western half of the Horde, in the battle of Vozha and in the Battle of Kulikovo he lost almost all of his army, and in 1385, to march on Tabriz, Tokhtamysh gathered an army of 90 thousand people from the entire territory of the Golden Horde. “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev” names the number 800 thousand people.

Modern scientists have given their estimate of the size of the Mongol-Tatar army: B.U. Urlanis believed that Mamai had 60 thousand people. M. N. Tikhomirov, L. V. CherepniniV. I. Buganov believed that the Russians were opposed by 100-150 thousand Mongol-Tatars. Yu. V. Seleznev made an assumption about the Mongol-Tatar army of 90 thousand people (since it is presumably known [source not specified 503 days] that Mamai led 9 tumens with him). Military historian and weapons expert M.V. Gorelik suggested that the real number of Mamaev’s army did not exceed 30-40 thousand people. [source not specified 689 days]

Modern research

Using paleogeographic methods, it was established that the size of the forest-free part of the Kulikovo field was about 2 km². Up to 1 km wide, up to 2 km long. For comparison, the area of ​​the Battle of Grunwald field was about 4 km² and a 66 thousand-strong army was stationed on it: 27 thousand of the Teutonic Order - in two lines with a front of 2.5 km and 39 thousand of the united Polish-Lithuanian-Russian - in three lines with a front of 2-2 .5 km.

Taking into account the conclusions of the historian Anatoly Kirpichnikov, according to the then existing norms of saturation of the battlefield with troops and taking into account the length of the front of 1 km, the total number of troops in the Battle of Kulikovo could not exceed 10-12 thousand soldiers on each side.

Battle site

From chronicle sources it is known that the battle took place “on Donuust-Nepryadvy”. Using paleogeographic methods, scientists established that “at that time there was a continuous forest on the left bank of the Nepryadva.” Taking into account that cavalry is mentioned in the descriptions of the battle, scientists have identified a treeless area near the confluence of rivers on the right bank of the Nepryadva, which is bounded on one side by the Don, Nepryadva and Smolka rivers, and on the other by ravines and gullies that probably existed already in those days. The expedition estimated the size of the fighting area at "two kilometers with a maximum width of eight hundred meters." In accordance with the size of the localized area, it was necessary to adjust the hypothetical number of troops participating in the battle. A concept was proposed for the participation in the battle of equestrian formations of 5-10 thousand horsemen on each side (such a number, while maintaining the ability to maneuver, could be accommodated in the specified area). In the Moscow army these were mainly princes, servicemen and city regiments.

For a long time, one of the mysteries was the lack of burials of those who fell on the battlefield. In the spring of 2006, an archaeological expedition used a georadar design, which identified “six objects located from west to east with an interval of 100-120 m.” According to scientists, these are the burial places of the dead. Scientists explained the absence of bone remains by the fact that “after the battle, the bodies of the dead were buried at a shallow depth,” and “black soil has increased chemical activity and, under the influence of precipitation, almost completely destructs the bodies of the dead, including bones.” At the same time, the possibility of arrowheads and spears getting stuck in the bones of fallen people, as well as the presence of crosses on the buried bodies, which, despite the “aggressiveness” of the soil, could not disappear completely without a trace, is completely ignored. Forensic identification personnel involved in the examination confirmed the presence of ashes, but “were unable to determine whether the ashes in the samples were human or animal remains.” Since the mentioned objects are several absolutely straight shallow trenches, parallel to each other and up to 600 meters long, they are just as likely to be traces of some kind of agricultural activity, for example, adding bone meal to the soil. Examples of historical battles with known burials show the construction of mass graves in the form of one or several compact pits.

Historians explain the lack of significant finds of combat equipment on the battlefield by the fact that in the Middle Ages “these things were incredibly expensive,” so after the battle all the items were carefully collected. A similar explanation appeared in popular science publications in the mid-1980s, when for several field seasons, starting with the anniversary of 1980, no finds were made at the canonical site, even indirectly related to the great battle, and a plausible explanation was urgently needed for this .

In the early 2000s, the diagram of the Battle of Kulikovo, first compiled and published by Ivan Fedorovich Afremov in the middle of the 19th century, and after that wandering for 150 years from textbook to textbook without any scientific criticism, was already radically redrawn. Instead of a picture of epic proportions with a formation front length of 7-10 versts, a relatively small forest clearing was localized, sandwiched between the openings of ravines. Its length was about 2 kilometers and its width was several hundred meters. The use of modern electronic metal detectors for a complete survey of this area made it possible to collect representative collections of hundreds and thousands of shapeless metal fragments and fragments during each field season. During Soviet times, agricultural work was carried out on this field; ammonium nitrate, which destroys metal, was used as fertilizer. Nevertheless, archaeological expeditions manage to make finds of historical interest: a sleeve, the base of a spear, a chain mail ring, a fragment of an axe, parts of a sleeve trim or the hem of a chain mail made of brass; armor plates (1 piece, has no analogues), which were attached to a leather strap base.

One of the problems in interpreting archaeological finds from the Kulikovo Field is the fairly broad dating of weapons and military equipment. Most of them could remain in use for quite a long time, until the 17th century, and be lost during the clash with the Crimean Tatars, noted in the chronicles on the Kulikovo Field in 1542. At the same time, most of the objects confidently dating back to the time of the Battle of Kulikovo were found in the surrounding area, but not at the battle site itself.

Preparing for battle

In order to impose a decisive battle on the enemy in the field even before the approach of the Lithuanians or Ryazans allied with Mamai, and also to use the water line to protect their own rear in the event of their approach, Russian troops crossed to the southern bank of the Don and destroyed the bridges behind them.

On the evening of September 7, Russian troops were lined up in battle formations. A large regiment and the entire court of the Moscow prince stood in the center. They were commanded by the Moscow okolnichy Timofey Velyaminov. On the flanks stood a regiment of the right hand under the command of the Lithuanian prince Andrei Olgerdovich and a regiment of the left hand of princes Vasily Yaroslavsky and Theodore of Molozhsky. Ahead in front of the large regiment was the guard regiment of princes Simeon Obolensky and John of Tarusa. An ambush regiment led by Vladimir Andreevich and Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky was placed in an oak grove up the Don. It is believed that the ambush regiment stood in the oak grove next to the regiment of the left hand, however, in “Zadonshchina” it is said that the ambush regiment struck from the right hand. The division of troops into regiments is unknown.

In the evening and night of September 7, Dmitry Ivanovich toured the troops, inspecting them. Then, in the evening, the Tatar advanced units, pushing back the Russian scouts of Semyon Melik, saw Russian troops lined up. On the night of September 8, Dmitry and Bobrok went out on reconnaissance and inspected the Tatar and their own positions from afar.

Before the start of the battle, Dmitry Donskoy joined the ranks of the military men, exchanging clothes with his favorite Mikhail Brenok (or Bryanok). This trick probably drew the attention of the Tatars to Brenok, who tried in every possible way to destroy him, while the prince himself received more freedom and opportunity to conduct battle. After the general battle, Brenok was found killed, and near him lay many Russian princes and boyars who defended the “prince.”

Russian banner

“The Legend of the Massacre of Mamaev” reports that Russian troops went into battle under a black, that is, dark red or crimson, banner with the image of a golden image of Jesus Christ. Miniatures from the 17th century depict a red banner with an Orthodox cross as a banner.

Progress of the battle

The morning of September 8 was foggy. Until 11 o'clock, until the fog cleared, the troops stood ready for battle, maintaining communication (“calling to each other”) with the sounds of trumpets. The prince again traveled around the regiments, often changing horses. At 12 o'clock the Tatars also appeared on the Kulikovo field. The battle began with several small skirmishes of the advanced detachments, after which the famous duel between the Tatar Chelubey (or Temir Bey) and the monk Alexander Peresvet took place. Both fighters fell dead (perhaps this episode, described only in “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev,” is a legend). This was followed by a battle between the guard regiment and the Tatar vanguard, led by the military leader Telyak (in some sources - Tulyak). Dmitry Donskoy was first in the guard regiment, and then joined the ranks of a large regiment, exchanging clothes and horses with the Moscow boyar Mikhail Andreevich Brenk, who then fought and accepted death under the banner of the Grand Duke.

“The strength of the Tatar greyhound from Sholomyani is great, coming and then again, not moving, stasha, for there is no place where they can make way; and so stasha, a copy of the pawn, wall against wall, each of them has on the shoulders of his predecessors, the ones in front are more beautiful, and the ones in the back are longer. And the great prince also with his great Russian strength went against another Sholomian.” The battle in the center was protracted and long. Chroniclers indicated that the horses could no longer avoid stepping on the corpses, since there was no clean place. “The Russian great army is on foot, like trees are broken and like hay is cut, they lie down, and they can’t see it terribly…”. In the center and on the left flank, the Russians were on the verge of breaking through their battle formations, but a private counterattack helped when “Gleb Bryansky with the Vladimir and Suzdal regiments walked through the corpses of the dead. “In the right country, Prince Andrei Olgerdovich attacked not a single Tatar and beat many, but did not dare to chase into the distance, seeing a large regiment motionless and as if all the Tatar strength had fallen in the middle and lay there, wanting to tear it apart.” The Tatars directed the main attack on the Russian left-hand regiment, he could not resist, broke away from the large regiment and ran to Nepryadva, the Tatars pursued him, and a threat arose to the rear of the Russian large regiment.

Vladimir Serpukhovskoy, who commanded the ambush regiment, proposed striking earlier, but Voivode Bobrok held him back, and when the Tatars broke through to the river and exposed the rear to the ambush regiment, he ordered the battle. The cavalry attack from an ambush from the rear on the main forces of the Horde became decisive. The Tatar cavalry was driven into the river and killed there. At the same time, the regiments of Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich went on the offensive. The Tatars became confused and fled.

The tide of the battle turned. Mamai, who watched the progress of the battle from afar, fled with small forces as soon as the Russian ambush regiment entered the battle. The Tatars did not have reserves to try to influence the outcome of the battle or at least cover the retreat, so the entire Tatar army fled from the battlefield.

The ambush regiment pursued the Tatars to the Beautiful Sword River for 50 versts, “beating up” “countless numbers” of them. Returning from the chase, Vladimir Andreevich began to gather an army. The Grand Duke himself was shell-shocked and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found unconscious after the battle under a felled birch tree.

Loss estimates

Chroniclers greatly exaggerate the number of dead Horde soldiers, bringing it to 800 thousand (which corresponds to the estimate of Mamai’s entire army) and even 1.5 million people. “Zadonshchina” talks about the flight of Mamai himself-nine to the Crimea, that is, about the death of 8/9 of the entire army in the battle.

At the sight of the strike of the ambush regiment, the Horde people are attributed the phrase “the young fought with us, but the nobles (the best, the elders) survived.” Immediately after the battle, the task was set to count “how many governors we don’t have and how many young [service] people.” Moscow boyar Mikhail Alexandrovich made a sad report on the death of more than 500 boyars (40 Moscow, 40-50 Serpukhov, 20 Kolomna, 20 Pereyaslav, 25 Kostroma, 35 Vladimir, 50 Suzdal, 50 Nizhny Novgorod, 40 Murom, 30-34 Rostov, 20-23 Dmitrov, 60-70 Mozhaisk, 30-60 Zvenigorod, 15 Uglitsky, 20 Galician, 13-30 Novgorod, 30 Lithuanian, 70 Ryazan), “and there is no count for the young people [younger warriors]; but we only know that all 253 thousand of our squads died, and we have 50 (40) thousand squads left.” Also killed were 6 Belozersk, two Tarusa and Molozhsk princes (out of four dozen participating princes known by name). Mentioned among the dead are Semyon Mikhailovich and Dmitry Monastyrev, whose deaths are also known, respectively, in the battle on the river. Drunk in 1377 and the battle on the river. Vozhe in 1378. E. A. Razin believed that in the Battle of Kulikovo the Russian army lost approx. 25-30 thousand people, which is half of his estimate of the total number of troops.A. N. Kirpichnikov made a cautious assumption that about 800 boyars and 5-8 thousand people could have died in the battle. A. Bulychev, based on a study of similar battles in medieval Europe, made the assumption that the Russian army could have lost about a third of all soldiers.

After the battle

The presence of Surozhans in the Russian army as guides gives reason to assume that the command of the Russian army intended to carry out a campaign deep into the steppes in which the Tatars roamed. But the victory on the Kulikovo field could not be consolidated with the complete defeat of the Golden Horde. There was not yet sufficient strength for this.

Taking into account the heavy losses of the Russian army and the danger of going deep into the steppes with small forces, the command decided to return to Moscow

When the convoys, in which numerous wounded soldiers were taken home, fell behind the main army, the Lithuanians of Prince Jagiello finished off the defenseless wounded. The main forces of Yagaila on the day of the battle were only 35-40 km west of the Kulikovo field. The time of Jagiel's campaign is associated with the loss of his former inheritance by Dmitry Olgerdovich (the inheritance was transferred by Jagiel to his younger brother Dmitry-Koribut).

Let's continue the topic... The Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 is traditionally considered one of the of the late Middle Ages both in meaning and scope. Without touching on the first, let us dwell in more detail on its second aspect - its scope, trying to assess the number of troops deployed by Dmitry Ivanovich and his vassals on the Kulikovo Field.

In conditions where no precise instructions have been preserved regarding the mobilization potential of the north-eastern Russian principalities, no military registers, much less the list of Russian “regiments” in the battle, any considerations regarding the size of the troops of Dmitry Ivanovich and his allies will be of an evaluative nature. However, a discussion of this problem will make it possible to determine some framework restrictions within which the number of coalition troops can be considered more or less reasonable, not fantastic, and will be close to real.

In the domestic historiography of the Battle of Kulikovo, the range of estimates of the number of Russian troops is very large - from 100-150 thousand to 30-50 or even less than 1 thousand fighters.

So how much was it really?

Pre-revolutionary historical science adhered to the first meaning. Thus, V. Tatishchev cites in his “Russian History” a figure of 400 thousand, M. Shcherbatov – 200 thousand, N. Karamzin believed that Dmitry Ivanovich’s army consisted of “more than 150 thousand horsemen and foot soldiers. S. Soloviev gives the same amount, who compares the battle with “the massacre of Catalonia, where the Roman commander saved Western Europe from the Huns.” In “too 100 thousand” the number of Dmitry Ivanovich’s army was determined by D. Ilovaisky. Russian military historians, for example, P. Geisman and the authors of a collective work on Russian military history"Russian military force".

For a long time, Soviet historiography was dominated by the old estimate of the size of the Russian army at 100-150 thousand fighters. This was the opinion, for example, of the authors of the collective “Essays on the History of the USSR,” who referred to chronicle evidence, and L. Cherepnin. The same figure was adhered to much later in the essay “Military Art” in the collective work “Essays on Russian Culture of the XIII-XV Centuries” by B. Rybakov.

Meanwhile, E. Razin, in his classic “History of Military Art,” came to the conclusion that “the total number of the Russian army probably did not exceed 50-60 thousand people.” This assessment was revised downward by one of the most authoritative experts on the history of Russian military affairs of the Middle Ages, A. Kirpichnikov. He believed that at most 36 thousand warriors gathered on the Kulikovo field from Dmitry Ivanovich’s side, since an army of a larger size (100 or more thousand) would have been “an uncontrollable crowd of people who only interfered with each other.” The opinion of S. Veselovsky stands apart, who noted that on the Kulikovo field there were 5-6 thousand people on the Russian side. "at the front." Today, attempts have been made to even more radically review the size of the Russian army. For example, A. Bulychev believed that the Russian army could have about 1-1.5 thousand horsemen, and the entire army, together with servants and transporters, amounted to 6-10 thousand people.

This range of estimates is not surprising, given the unsatisfactory state of the sources on the history of the 1380 campaign. At first glance, quite a lot of them have been preserved - these are both chronicle evidence and literary works. But their value is by no means equal. Regarding the first group of sources, chronicles, it should be noted here that the first, brief, version of the chronicle legend about the battle, originally placed on the pages of the Trinity Chronicle, written in Moscow - “About the Great Massacre on the Don”, appears at the beginning of the 15th century, that is, very soon after the battle itself. This story came to us in the Rogozh chronicler and in the Simeonovskaya chronicle. Around the same time, a story was compiled and placed on the pages of the Novgorod First Chronicle, junior edition. But, alas, all these chronicles provide virtually no specific information about the purely military aspects of the battle. The lengthy chronicle story, contained, for example, in the Resurrection Chronicle, was created much later and bears the imprint of the influence of the literary tradition of covering the Battle of Kulikovo that had formed by that time and has a pronounced journalistic character.

More interesting, at first glance, are the literary monuments - primarily “Zadonshchina” and the famous “The Tale of the Massacre of Mamayev.” The first monument was created, as many researchers believe, at the end of the 1380s or at the very beginning of the 1390s, i.e. directly immediately after the battle. However, alas, it has not reached us in its original form and, due to the peculiarities of the genre, neither “Zadonshchina”, nor even more so the later “Tale”, created, apparently, at the end of the 15th or at the very beginning of the 16th century, do not inspire confidence. While outlining the general picture of events quite fully, they give clearly inflated figures about the number of fighters on both sides. Thus, “Zadonshchina” (according to the Synodal list) gives us a figure of 300 thousand “forged army,” and “The Legend” (in the Cyprian edition) gives us a total of 400 thousand “horse and foot troops.”

And since the sources at our disposal do not allow us to draw any definite conclusions about the number of Russian troops on the Kulikovo field, it remains to resort to calculations based on indirect evidence as modern sources containing more or less exact information about the peculiarities of military affairs of that time, as well as data from archeology and paleogeography.

In order to get an idea of ​​the approximate framework values ​​for the size of Dmitry Ivanovich’s army, you can look at the number of military contingents that the princes and individual “lands” had at the end of the 14th – 1st half of the 15th centuries.

In relation to the 1st half of the 15th century, such data exists, and they seem quite plausible. So, on July 3, 1410, 150 Russian soldiers under the command of the governor of the Nizhny Novgorod prince Danila Borisovich Semyon Karamyshev and the same number of Tatars Tsarevich Talych took Vladimir and plundered it to the ground. The rival of Vasily the Dark, Dmitry Shemyaka, had about 500 nobles in 1436.

In 1418, the Lithuanian prince Ostrozhsky freed the Lithuanian prince Svidrigailo from imprisonment with 500 “nobles”. Another Lithuanian prince, Alexander Czartoryski, not wanting to swear allegiance to Vasily II, left Pskov in 1461 and took with him “... the court of his forged army, 300 fighting people, including the Koshovs...”.

The Pskovites in 1426, during the conflict with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas, sent 50 people to the aid of the besieged Opochka “tackle army”, and the main Pskov army, led by posadniks Selivester Leontyevich and Fyodor Shibalkin, entered into battle with Vytautas’s troops, having at their disposal 400 fighters. Prince Vasily Yuryevich took Vologda in 1435, having a “squad” of 300 people.

10 years later, in the winter of 1444-45, the Litvins came to the western borders of the Moscow state in retaliation for the Russian campaign against Kaluga. The nobles of the appanage princes of Mozhaisk - 100 people, Vereisky - another 100 people and Borovsky - 60 people - followed them. According to other sources, there were only 300 of them. Lithuanian chronicles speak of 500 Muscovites.

Finally, sadly famous battle near Suzdal in the summer of 1445, in which Vasily II was defeated by the Tatars and captured, his “regiment”, together with the “regiments” of his vassals, princes Ivan Mozhaisky, Mikhail Vereisky and Vasily Serpukhovsky, numbered less than 1 thousand horsemen, and the Vladimir “ The regiment of governor Alexei Ignatievich consisted of 500 soldiers. According to the chronicler, the Tatars who opposed them were 3.5 thousand.

Thus, the number of “regiments” in the 1st half of the 15th century, i.e. in fact, immediately after the Battle of Kulikovo it is measured in hundreds, in best case scenario a little more than 1 thousand fighters. The princely “courts” number several hundred horsemen, usually from 300 to 500, but no more, the Vladimir “city” “regiment” (and Vladimir is not one of the last cities in these places) - also 500, and separate detachments of small patrimonial detainees from appanages do not exceed hundreds.

Knowing the approximate order of numbers (tens and hundreds, but not thousands of soldiers), let us now turn to the composition of the Russian army. The latest and most reasonable attempt to analyze it was made by A. Gorsky. Having compared the information contained in chronicles and stories about the composition of Dmitry Ivanovich’s army and comparing it with data from the campaigns of 1375 and 1386/1387, the researcher came to the conclusion that Dmitry’s army included detachments from Moscow, Kolomna, Zvenigorod, Mozhaisk, Volok, Serpukhov, Borovsk, Dmitrov, Pereyaslavl, Vladimir, Yuryev, Kostroma, Uglich, Galich, Bezhetsky Verkh, Vologda, Torzhok, as well as military contingents deployed by the principalities of Belozersky, Yaroslavl, Rostov, Starodubsky, Molozhsky, Kashinsky, Vyazemsky-Dorogobuzhsky, Tarussko-Obolensky and Novosilsky. To them it is also necessary to add the “courts” of the rogue princes Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich and Roman Mikhailovich Bryansky, and, possibly, a detachment of Novgorodians.

A. Gorsky also did not exclude the participation in the battle (in the regiment of Vladimir Andreevich) of detachments from the Yeletsk and Murom principalities, as well as from Meshchera. Analysis of information from the earliest sources gives slightly different, smaller values ​​- 9 princely “courts” and 12 “land” “regiments” and, possibly, Ryazanians (Pronchans -?) and Novgorodians.

Taking into account these data and information about the number of “yards” and “land” “regiments” (very roughly counting the princely “courts” as 500 horsemen each, and the “land” “regiments” made up of small patrimonial landowners as 100), we can assume that the total number of warriors fielded by Dmitry Ivanovich was between 6 and 15 thousand people.

The spread is very large. The knowledge we have today regarding the nature of the battle site allows us to narrow this scope.

Both armies were most likely mounted. Real infantry, foot soldiers, were hardly present on the Kulikovo Field. The unprofessional “Zemstvo” militia, assembled from time to time and without appropriate training, was unable to withstand 30-kilometer marches for several days (unless they were mounted on carts for greater march speed - such a practice, judging by later times, existed. But in this case it will inevitably be small). It is possible that some of the Russian horsemen could dismount. This is unlikely, although this option cannot be completely ruled out. In any case, among the finds of weapons on the Kulikovo field, the tip of one spear was found, which was the weapon of Russian foot soldiers.

May with high degree It is confident to say that for 15-16 thousand troops the Kulikovo field was too small - with a field size of 1.5 by 1 km, at best, approximately 5-6 thousand horsemen could operate more or less freely on it (i.e. we see a figure named by S. Veselovsky as an assumption). We consider this figure to be the most consistent with both the conditions of the battle and the tactics of that time, and, therefore, the most probable. And if we assume those named in “Zadonshchina” and in the so-called. “Synodike of the Assumption Cathedral”, which was published by N.I. Novikov, lists of Russian losses (11 governors and approximately 400-500 “boyars”, i.e. small fiefdoms who appeared under the princely banners “on horse, in people and in arms”, at the head of a small, 3-5 person retinue) corresponding in general reality, then the loss in battle of at least 10% of experienced, professional warriors, whose training lasted for decades, should have been regarded as very difficult.

Battle of Kulikovo (Mamaevo Massacre), a battle between the united Russian army led by the Moscow Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich and the army of the temnik of the Golden Horde Mamai, which took place on September 8, 1380 on the Kulikovo field (a historical area between the Don, Nepryadva and Krasivaya Mecha rivers in the south- east of the Tula region.

Strengthening the Moscow Principality in the 60s of the 14th century. and the unification around him of the remaining lands of North-Eastern Rus' occurred almost simultaneously with the strengthening of the power of the temnik Mamai in the Golden Horde. Married to the daughter of the Golden Horde Khan Berdibek, he received the title of emir and became the arbiter of the destinies of that part of the Horde, which was located west of the Volga to the Dnieper and in the steppe expanses of the Crimea and Ciscaucasia.


Militia of Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich in 1380 Lubok, 17th century.


In 1374, Moscow Prince Dmitry Ivanovich, who also had a label for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, refused to pay tribute to the Golden Horde. Then the khan in 1375 transferred the label to the great reign of Tver. But virtually the entire North-Eastern Rus' opposed Mikhail Tverskoy. The Moscow prince organized a military campaign against the Tver principality, which was joined by Yaroslavl, Rostov, Suzdal and regiments of other principalities. Novgorod the Great also supported Dmitry. Tver capitulated. According to the concluded agreement, the Vladimir table was recognized as the “fatherland” of the Moscow princes, and Mikhail Tverskoy became Dmitry’s vassal.

However, the ambitious Mamai continued to consider the defeat of the Moscow principality, which had escaped subordination, as the main factor in strengthening his own positions in the Horde. In 1376, the Khan of the Blue Horde, Arab Shah Muzzaffar (Arapsha of Russian chronicles), who went over to the service of Mamai, ravaged the Novosilsk principality, but returned back, avoiding a battle with the Moscow army that had gone beyond the Oka border. In 1377 he was on the river. It was not the Moscow-Suzdal army that defeated Pian. The governors sent against the Horde showed carelessness, for which they paid: “And their princes, and boyars, and nobles, and governors, consoling and having fun, drinking and fishing, imagining the existence of the house,” and then ruined the Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan principalities.

In 1378, Mamai, trying to force him to pay tribute again, sent an army led by Murza Begich to Rus'. The Russian regiments that came out to meet were led by Dmitry Ivanovich himself. The battle took place on August 11, 1378 in Ryazan land, on a tributary of the Oka river. Vozhe. The Horde were completely defeated and fled. The Battle of Vozha showed the increased power of the Russian state emerging around Moscow.

Mamai attracted armed detachments from the conquered peoples of the Volga region and North Caucasus, his army also included heavily armed infantrymen from the Genoese colonies in Crimea. The Horde's allies were the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jagiello and the Ryazan Prince Oleg Ivanovich. However, these allies were on their own: Jagiello did not want to strengthen either the Horde or the Russian side, and as a result, his troops never appeared on the battlefield; Oleg Ryazansky entered into an alliance with Mamai, fearing for the fate of his border principality, but he was the first to inform Dmitry about the advance of the Horde troops and did not participate in the battle.

In the summer of 1380 Mamai began his campaign. Not far from the place where the Voronezh River flows into the Don, the Horde set up their camps and, wandering, awaited news from Jagiello and Oleg.

In the terrible hour of danger hanging over the Russian land, Prince Dmitry showed exceptional energy in organizing resistance to the Golden Horde. At his call, military detachments and militias of peasants and townspeople began to gather. All of Rus' rose up to fight the enemy. The gathering of Russian troops was appointed in Kolomna, where the core of the Russian army set out from Moscow. The court of Dmitry himself, the regiments of his cousin Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky and the regiments of the Belozersk, Yaroslavl and Rostov princes walked separately along different roads. The regiments of the Olgerdovich brothers (Andrei Polotsky and Dmitry Bryansky, the Jagiello brothers) also moved to join the troops of Dmitry Ivanovich. The brothers' army included Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians; citizens of Polotsk, Drutsk, Bryansk and Pskov.

After the troops arrived in Kolomna, a review was held. The assembled army on the Maiden Field was striking in its numbers. The gathering of troops in Kolomna had not only military, but also political significance. The Ryazan prince Oleg finally got rid of his hesitations and abandoned the idea of ​​​​joining the troops of Mamai and Jagiello. A marching battle formation was formed in Kolomna: Prince Dmitry led the Big Regiment; Serpukhov Prince Vladimir Andreevich with the Yaroslavl people - the regiment of the Right Hand; Gleb Bryansky was appointed commander of the Left Hand regiment; The leading regiment was made up of Kolomna residents.



Saint Sergius of Radonezh blesses Saint Prince Demetrius Donskoy.
Artist S.B. Simakov. 1988


On August 20, the Russian army set out from Kolomna on a campaign: it was important to block the path of Mamai’s hordes as soon as possible. On the eve of the campaign, Dmitry Ivanovich visited Sergius of Radonezh at the Trinity Monastery. After the conversation, the prince and the abbot went out to the people. Having made the sign of the cross over the prince, Sergius exclaimed: “Go, sir, against the filthy Polovtsians, calling on God, and the Lord God will be your helper and intercessor.” Blessing the prince, Sergius predicted victory for him, albeit at a high price, and sent two of his monks, Peresvet and Oslyabya, on the campaign.

The entire campaign of the Russian army to the Oka was carried out in a relatively short time. The distance from Moscow to Kolomna is about 100 km; the troops covered it in 4 days. They arrived at the mouth of Lopasnya on August 26. Ahead there was a guard guard, which had the task of protecting the main forces from a surprise attack by the enemy.

On August 30, Russian troops began crossing the Oka River near the village of Priluki. Okolnichy Timofey Velyaminov and his detachment monitored the crossing, awaiting the approach of the foot army. On September 4, 30 km from the Don River in the Berezuy tract, the allied regiments of Andrei and Dmitry Olgerdovich joined the Russian army. Once again, the location of the Horde army was clarified, which, awaiting the approach of the allies, was wandering around the Kuzmina Gati.

The movement of the Russian army from the mouth of Lopasnya to the west was intended to prevent the Lithuanian army of Jagiello from uniting with the forces of Mamai. In turn, Jagiello, having learned about the route and number of Russian troops, was in no hurry to unite with the Mongol-Tatars, hovering around Odoev. The Russian command, having received this information, decisively sent troops to the Don, trying to forestall the formation of enemy units and strike at the Mongol-Tatar horde. On September 5, the Russian cavalry reached the mouth of the Nepryadva, which Mamai learned about only the next day.

To develop a plan for further action, on September 6, Prince Dmitry Ivanovich convened a military council. The votes of the council members were divided. Some suggested going beyond the Don and fighting the enemy on the southern bank of the river. Others advised staying on the northern bank of the Don and waiting for the enemy to attack. The final decision depended on the Grand Duke. Dmitry Ivanovich uttered the following significant words: “Brothers! An honest death is better than an evil life. It was better not to go out against the enemy than to come and do nothing and return back. Today we will all cross the Don and there we will lay our heads for the Orthodox faith and our brothers.” The Grand Duke of Vladimir preferred offensive actions that made it possible to maintain the initiative, which was important not only in strategy (hitting the enemy in parts), but also in tactics (choosing the location of the battle and the surprise of a strike on the enemy’s army). After the council in the evening, Prince Dmitry and voivode Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky moved beyond the Don and examined the area.

The area chosen by Prince Dmitry for the battle was called Kulikovo Field. On three sides - west, north and east, it was limited by the Don and Nepryadva rivers, cut by ravines and small rivers. The right wing of the Russian army forming into battle formation was covered by the rivers flowing into the Nepryadva (Upper, Middle and Lower Dubiki); on the left is the rather shallow Smolka River, which flows into the Don, and dried-up stream beds (beams with gentle slopes). But this lack of terrain was compensated for - behind Smolka there was a forest in which a general reserve could be placed to guard the fords across the Don and strengthen the wing’s battle formation. Along the front, the Russian position had a length of over eight kilometers (some authors significantly reduce it and then question the number of troops). However, the terrain convenient for enemy cavalry action was limited to four kilometers and was located in the center of the position - near the converging upper reaches of Nizhny Dubik and Smolka. Mamai's army, having an advantage in deployment along a front of more than 12 kilometers, could attack the Russian battle formations with cavalry only in this limited area, which excluded maneuver by cavalry masses.

On the night of September 7, 1380, the crossing of the main forces began. Foot troops and convoys crossed the Don along built bridges, and cavalry forded. The crossing was carried out under the cover of strong guard detachments.



Morning on the Kulikovo field. Artist A.P. Bubnov. 1943–1947.


According to the message of the guard Semyon Melik and Pyotr Gorsky, who had a battle with enemy reconnaissance on September 7, it became known that the main forces of Mamai were at a distance of one march and by the morning next day they should be expected at Don's. Therefore, so that Mamai would not forestall the Russian army, already on the morning of September 8, the army of Rus', under the cover of the Sentinel Regiment, took up battle formation. On the right flank, adjacent to the steep banks of Nizhny Dubik, stood the Right Hand regiment, which included Andrei Olgerdovich’s squad. The squads of the Big Regiment were located in the center. They were commanded by the Moscow okolnichy Timofey Velyaminov. On the left flank, covered from the east by the Smolka River, the Left Hand regiment of Prince Vasily Yaroslavsky formed. Ahead of the Big Regiment was the Advanced Regiment. Behind the left flank of the Big Regiment, a reserve detachment was secretly located, commanded by Dmitry Olgerdovich. Behind the Left Hand regiment in the Green Dubrava forest, Dmitry Ivanovich placed a selected cavalry detachment of 10–16 thousand people - the Ambush Regiment, led by Prince Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovsky and the experienced governor Dmitry Mikhailovich Bobrok-Volynsky.



Battle of Kulikovo. Artist A. Yvon. 1850


This formation was chosen taking into account the terrain and the method of fighting used by the Golden Horde. Their favorite technique was to envelop one or both flanks of the enemy with cavalry detachments and then move to his rear. The Russian army took up a position reliably covered on the flanks by natural obstacles. Due to the terrain conditions, the enemy could attack the Russians only from the front, which deprived him of the opportunity to use his numerical superiority and use the usual tactics. The number of Russian troops, formed in battle formation, reached 50–60 thousand people.

Mamai’s army, which arrived on the morning of September 8 and stopped 7-8 kilometers from the Russians, numbered about 90-100 thousand people. It consisted of a vanguard (light cavalry), the main forces (mercenary Genoese infantry were in the center, and heavy cavalry deployed in two lines on the flanks) and a reserve. Light reconnaissance and security detachments scattered in front of the Horde camp. The enemy's plan was to cover the Russian. army from both flanks, and then surround it and destroy it. The main role in solving this problem was assigned to powerful cavalry groups concentrated on the flanks of the Horde army. However, Mamai was in no hurry to join the battle, still hoping for Jagiello’s approach.

But Dmitry Ivanovich decided to draw Mamai’s army into the battle and ordered his regiments to march. The Grand Duke took off his armor, handed it over to boyar Mikhail Brenk, and he himself put on simple armor, but not inferior in its protective properties to the prince’s. The Grand Duke's dark red (black) banner was raised in the Big Regiment - a symbol of honor and glory of the united Russian army. It was handed to Brenk.



Duel between Peresvet and Chelubey. Artist. V.M. Vasnetsov. 1914


The battle began around 12 o'clock. When the main forces of the parties converged, a duel between the Russian warrior monk Alexander Peresvet and the Mongolian hero Chelubey (Temir-Murza) took place. As folk legend says, Peresvet rode out without protective armor, with only one spear. Chelubey was fully armed. The warriors dispersed their horses and struck their spears. A powerful simultaneous blow - Chelubey fell dead with his head towards the Horde army, which was a bad omen. Pere-light stayed in the saddle for several moments and also fell to the ground, but with his head towards the enemy. This is how the folk legend predetermined the outcome of the battle for a just cause. After the fight, a fierce battle broke out. As the chronicle writes: “The strength of the Tatar greyhound from Sholomyani is great, coming and then again, not moving, stasha, for there is no place for them to make way; and so stasha, a copy of the pawn, wall against wall, each of them has on the shoulders of his predecessors, the ones in front are more beautiful, and the ones in the back are longer. And the great prince also with his great Russian strength went against another Sholomian.”

For three hours, Mamai’s army unsuccessfully tried to break through the center and right wing of the Russian army. Here the onslaught of the Horde troops was repulsed. Andrei Olgerdovich’s detachment was active. He repeatedly launched a counterattack, helping the center regiments hold back the enemy onslaught.

Then Mamai concentrated his main efforts against the Left Hand regiment. In a fierce battle with a superior enemy, the regiment suffered heavy losses and began to retreat. Dmitry Olgerdovich's reserve detachment was brought into the battle. The warriors took the place of the fallen, trying to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, and only their death allowed the Mongol cavalry to move forward. The soldiers of the Ambush Regiment, seeing the difficult situation of their military brothers-in-arms, were eager to fight. Vladimir Andreevich Serpukhovskoy, who commanded the regiment, decided to join the battle, but his adviser, the experienced governor Bobrok, held the prince back. Mamaev's cavalry, pressing the left wing and breaking through the battle formation of the Russian army, began to go to the rear of the Big Regiment. The Horde, reinforced by fresh forces from the Mamaia reserve, bypassing Green Dubrava, attacked the soldiers of the Big Regiment.

Arrived decisive moment battles. The Ambush Regiment, the existence of which Mamai did not know, rushed into the flank and rear of the Golden Horde cavalry that had broken through. The attack by the Ambush Regiment came as a complete surprise to the Tatars. “I fell into great fear and horror of wickedness... and cried out, saying: “Alas for us!” ... the Christians have become wise over us, the daring and daring princes and governors have left us in hiding and have prepared plans for us that are not tired; our arms are weakened, and the shoulders of the Ustasha, and our knees are numb, and our horses are very tired, and our weapons are worn out; and who can go against them?...” Taking advantage of the emerging success, other regiments also went on the offensive. The enemy fled. Russian squads pursued him for 30–40 kilometers - to the Beautiful Sword River, where the convoy and rich trophies were captured. Mamai's army was completely defeated. It practically ceased to exist.

Returning from the chase, Vladimir Andreevich began to gather an army. The Grand Duke himself was shell-shocked and knocked off his horse, but was able to get to the forest, where he was found unconscious after the battle under a felled birch tree. But the Russian army also suffered heavy losses, amounting to about 20 thousand people.

For eight days the Russian army collected and buried the dead soldiers, and then moved to Kolomna. On September 28, the winners entered Moscow, where the entire population of the city was waiting for them. The Battle of Kulikovo Field was of great importance in the struggle of the Russian people for liberation from the foreign yoke. It seriously undermined the military power of the Golden Horde and accelerated its subsequent collapse. The news that “Great Rus' defeated Mamai on the Kulikovo field” quickly spread throughout the country and far beyond its borders. For his outstanding victory, the people nicknamed Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich “Donskoy”, and he cousin, Serpukhov Prince Vladimir Andreevich – nickname “Brave”.

Jagiello's troops, having not reached the Kulikovo field 30-40 kilometers and having learned about the Russian victory, quickly returned to Lithuania. Mamai’s ally did not want to take risks, since there were many Slavic troops in his army. In the army of Dmitry Ivanovich there were prominent representatives of Lithuanian soldiers who had supporters in Jagiello’s army, and they could go over to the side of the Russian troops. All this forced Jagiello to be as careful as possible in making decisions.

Mamai, abandoning his defeated army, fled with a handful of comrades to Kafa (Feodosia), where he was killed. Khan Tokhtamysh seized power in the Horde. He demanded that Rus' resume the payment of tribute, arguing that in the Battle of Kulikovo it was not the Golden Horde that was defeated, but the usurper of power, Temnik Mamai. Dmitry refused. Then, in 1382, Tokhtamysh undertook a punitive campaign against Rus', captured and burned Moscow by cunning. They also suffered merciless destruction Largest cities Moscow land - Dmitrov, Mozhaisk and Pereyaslavl, and then the Horde marched through the Ryazan lands with fire and sword. As a result of this raid, Horde rule over Russia was restored.



Dmitry Donskoy on the Kulikovo field. Artist V.K. Sazonov. 1824.


In terms of its scale, the Battle of Kulikovo has no equal in the Middle Ages and occupies a prominent place in the history of military art. The strategy and tactics used in the Battle of Kulikovo by Dmitry Donskoy were superior to the strategy and tactics of the enemy and were distinguished by their offensive nature, activity and purposefulness of action. Deep, well-organized reconnaissance allowed us to make the right decisions and make an exemplary march-maneuver to the Don. Dmitry Donskoy managed to correctly assess and use the terrain conditions. He took into account the enemy’s tactics and revealed his plan.


Burial of fallen soldiers after the Battle of Kulikovo.
1380. Front chronicle of the 16th century.


Based on the terrain conditions and the tactical techniques used by Mamai, Dmitry Ivanovich rationally positioned the forces at his disposal on the Kulikovo field, created a general and private reserve, and thought through the issues of interaction between the regiments. Received further development tactics of the Russian army. The presence of a general reserve (Ambush Regiment) in the battle formation and its skillful use, expressed in the successful choice of the moment of entry into action, predetermined the outcome of the battle in favor of the Russians.

Assessing the results of the Battle of Kulikovo and the activities of Dmitry Donskoy preceding it, a number of modern scientists who have most fully studied this question, do not believe that the Moscow prince set himself the goal of leading the anti-Horde struggle in the broad sense of the word, but only spoke out against Mamai as a usurper of power in the Golden Horde. So, A.A. Gorsky writes: “Open disobedience to the Horde, which developed into an armed struggle against it, occurred during a period when power there fell into the hands of an illegitimate ruler (Mamai). With the restoration of “legitimate” power, an attempt was made to limit ourselves to a purely nominal, without payment of tribute, recognition of the supremacy of the “king,” but the military defeat of 1382 thwarted this. Nevertheless, the attitude towards foreign power has changed: it has become obvious that, under certain conditions, its non-recognition and successful military opposition to the Horde are possible.” Therefore, as other researchers note, despite the fact that protests against the Horde occur within the framework of previous ideas about the relationship between the Russian princes - “ulusniks” and the Horde “kings”, “The Battle of Kulikovo undoubtedly became a turning point in the formation of a new self-awareness of the Russians people,” and “the victory on the Kulikovo field secured Moscow’s role as the organizer and ideological center of the reunification of the East Slavic lands, showing that the path to their state-political unity was the only path to their liberation from foreign domination.”


Monument-column, made according to the design of A.P. Bryullov at the Ch. Berd plant.
Installed on the Kulikovo field in 1852 on the initiative of the first explorer
battles of the Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod S. D. Nechaev.


The times of the Horde invasions were becoming a thing of the past. It became clear that in Rus' there were forces capable of resisting the Horde. The victory contributed to the further growth and strengthening of the Russian centralized state and raised the role of Moscow as a center of unification.

September 21 (September 8 according to the Julian calendar) in accordance with Federal law dated March 13, 1995 No. 32-FZ “On the days of military glory and memorable dates of Russia” is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the victory of Russian regiments led by Grand Duke Dmitry Donskoy over the Mongol-Tatar troops in the Battle of Kulikovo.
A chronicle collection called the Patriarchal or Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. St. Petersburg, 1897. P. 27.
Quote by: Borisov N.S. And the candle would not go out... Historical portrait Sergius of Radonezh. M., 1990. P.222.
Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. P. 56.
Kirpichnikov A.N. Battle of Kulikovo. L., 1980. P. 105.
This number was calculated by the Soviet military historian E.A. Razin based total number population of Russian lands, taking into account the principles of recruiting troops for all-Russian campaigns. See: Razin E.A. History of military art. T. 2. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 272. The same number of Russian troops is determined by A.N. Kirpichnikov. See: Kirpichnikov A.N. Decree. Op. P. 65. In the works of historians of the 19th century. this number varies from 100 thousand to 200 thousand people. See: Karamzin N.M. History of Russian Goverment. T.V.M., 1993.S. 40; Ilovaisky D.I. Collectors of Rus'. M., 1996. P. 110.; Soloviev S.M. History of Russia from ancient times. Book 2. M., 1993. P. 323. Russian chronicles provide extremely exaggerated data on the number of Russian troops: Resurrection Chronicle - about 200 thousand. See: Resurrection Chronicle. PSRL. T. VIII. St. Petersburg, 1859. P. 35; Nikon Chronicle - 400 thousand. See: Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. P. 56.
See: Skrynnikov R.G. Battle of Kulikovo // Battle of Kulikovo in the cultural history of our Motherland. M., 1983. S. 53-54.
Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. XI. P. 60.
Right there. P. 61.
“Zadonshchina” talks about the flight of Mamai himself-nine to the Crimea, that is, about the death of 8/9 of the entire army in the battle. See: Zadonshchina // Military stories Ancient Rus'. L., 1986. P. 167.
See: The Legend of Mamaev’s Massacre // Military Tales of Ancient Rus'. L., 1986. P. 232.
Kirpichnikov A.N. Decree. Op. P. 67, 106. According to E.A. Razin’s Horde lost about 150 thousand, the Russians killed and died from wounds - about 45 thousand people (See: Razin E.A. Op. cit. T. 2. pp. 287–288). B. Urlanis speaks of 10 thousand killed (See: Urlanis B.Ts. History of military losses. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 39). The “Tale of the Massacre of Mamaev” says that 653 boyars were killed. See: Military stories of Ancient Rus'. P. 234. The figure given there total number 253 thousand deaths of Russian combatants is clearly overestimated.
Gorsky A.A. Moscow and Horde. M. 2000. P. 188.
Danilevsky I.N. Russian lands through the eyes of contemporaries and descendants (XII-XIV centuries). M. 2000. P. 312.
Shabuldo F.M. The lands of Southwestern Rus' as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Kyiv, 1987. P. 131.