When was t 34 released? History of creation

The first clashes between Red Army combat vehicles and German invaders in the summer of 1941 caused great surprise among the latter. And there was something to be surprised about: the T-34 was superior to any of the German tanks in armament, armor and maneuverability. The Germans gave the invulnerable machine the nickname "wunderwaffe" or "wonder weapon". Most military historians agree that the T-34 was the most successful tank of World War II. So what was the secret of the Soviet “miracle”?

The birth of the "thirty-four"

From about mid-1931, wheeled-tracked high-speed tanks (BT) or BT of various modifications began to enter service with the Red Army. These tanks were not much different from their ancestor - the American tank created by Walter Christie. The main advantage of the BT series vehicles was their high maximum speed and maneuverability, the ability to move on both tracked and wheeled vehicles. BT-2 and BT-5 received their first baptism of fire in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War, followed by the Soviet-Finnish War.

Despite the overall successful use of the vehicles, there were many complaints about them: the armor protection was clearly insufficient, and the gun was weak. Moreover, Soviet intelligence reported on a possible conflict with Germany, which was armed with armored tanks PzIII and PzIV. The BT series of tanks required deep modernization, and in 1937 the country's leadership gave the task to the design bureau of the Kharkov plant to create a tank capable of eliminating the engineering shortcomings of the prototypes. The design of the new tank began at the end of 1937, the work was headed by the famous designer and engineer Mikhail Koshkin.

By the beginning of 1938, the new tank was ready, it received the double factory name BT-20/A-20, 25-mm frontal armor, an innovative engine, a new gun and, like its “ancestors,” could move on both wheeled and tracked vehicles. . In general, the combat vehicle turned out to be good, however, it still bore the shortcomings of its predecessors - armor of 25 millimeters could not be perceived as a worthy means of protection against guns of 45 millimeters or more. Therefore, in May 1938, at a meeting of the USSR Defense Committee, a plan for modernizing the A-20 prototype was announced - another increase in armor protection and the abandonment of wheel travel for the sake of simplicity of design.

The new tank received the index A-32, it was similar in weight to the A-20, but after all the upgrades it received a 76-mm cannon, reinforced armor - 45 mm - and an incredibly powerful engine that allowed the "thirty-four" to almost "dance" on the field battle. Subsequently, the latest modification was called A-34 or T-34, under which designation it went down in history. The first 115 T-34s rolled off the assembly line in January 1940, and before the start of the war their number increased to 1,110.

During the war, production of the T-34 was actually transferred to the Urals, since the Ural Tank Plant (UTZ, now Uralvagonzavod) was the main backup of the Kharkov plant, which, for obvious reasons, was going through hard times. From 1941 to 1945, tens of thousands of T-34s were built in Nizhny Tagil. According to historians, every third combat vehicle was made in the Urals.

The T-34-85 modification began rolling off the Uralvagonzavod assembly line 2 months after it was put into service. In the summer of 1944, Ural designers were awarded the Order of Lenin for outstanding services in creating the T-34 design and for further improving and improving its combat qualities.

Equipment of the "miracle machine"

The T-34 had a classic layout for the Soviet school of tank building - a rear-mounted transmission. Inside, the tank was divided into four compartments - control, combat, engine and transmission. In the frontal part of the hull there were seats for the driver and radio operator, observation devices, compressed air cylinders for emergency engine starting, as well as a machine gun mounted on the frontal armor. The fighting compartment was located in the middle of the tank; there were seats for the tank commander, who was also the gunner, and for the turret gunner, who also served as a loader. In addition to the gun, the turret contained part of the ammunition stowage, additional viewing devices, and a hatch for crew landing. The engine compartment was also located in the middle, but for the safety of the crew it was protected from it by a special removable partition.

The armor protection of the hull was made of rolled sheets of homogeneous steel, located at a strong angle, which caused frequent ricochets of enemy shells. The all-round protection of the hull was 45 millimeters, which, coupled with the slopes of the armor, provided protection from guns with a caliber of up to 75 millimeters.

The T-34 was armed with a 76-mm F-34 cannon, which at the first stage of the war penetrated all German tanks in any projection. Only with the advent of the “Tigers” and “Panthers” did this weapon encounter difficulties, which, however, were often solved by maneuverable combat. The arsenal of shells was as follows:

High-explosive long-range fragmentation grenade OF-350 and OF-350A

Old Russian high-explosive grenade F-354

Armor-piercing tracer projectile BR-350A

Armor-burning projectile BP-353A

Sh-354 bullet shrapnel

In addition to the tank gun, the T-34 was equipped with two 7.62 mm DT machine guns, which, as a rule, were used to suppress manpower in urban environments.

The “miracle car” was equipped with a 12-cylinder diesel engine with a capacity of 450 horsepower. Considering the small mass of the tank - about 27-28 tons - this engine made it possible to feel equally confident in the spring-autumn thaw, in the fields, and on arable land. Military reports contain many memories of the T-34 crew members, who performed real miracles in maneuverable combat - at high speed and at a short distance from the enemy tank. For example, the feat of the crew of the T-34 modification - T-34-85 under the command of Alexander Oskin. In the summer of 1944, they destroyed three of the newest Royal Tiger tanks in a maneuverable battle. Since the frontal armor of the German "cats" was too tough for Oskin's tank, he decided to get as close as possible to the enemy and hit him in the less protected sides, which he did with success.

Legend Upgrade

The last technical modification of the T-34 was the T-34-85 tank, which was adopted by the USSR in 1944 and legally withdrawn only in 1993. Despite the significantly changed appearance of the vehicle, only the turret was actually new, which carried a more powerful 85-mm cannon - hence the name of the tank. Due to the larger turret, the tank freed up space for an additional crew member - the gunner, which made it possible to "unload" the tank commander. The slightly increased weight was compensated by increased engine power, and the new gun became a worthy response to the Panthers and Tigers.

This latest modification of the legendary T-34 is considered the crowning achievement of Soviet medium tanks of the Great Patriotic War: the ideal combination of speed, maneuverability, firepower and ease of use. The tank was used in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in clashes between Israel and Egypt, and in African conflicts.

In the post-war period, the “miracle of Soviet engineering” was supplied to the countries of the Eastern Bloc, Austria, Germany, China, and is currently still in service with more than 20 countries. By the way, it is the T-34 combat vehicles of the Celestial Empire that owe their appearance. In the early 50s of the last century, the Soviet Union actually donated all the documentation for the production of the T-34 to friendly China. And the inquisitive brain of the hardworking Chinese people put into production various modifications of this tank, which until recently bore the recognizable index “34” in the name.

The Soviet, and later the Russian school of tank building designed vehicles, one way or another based on the creation of Mikhail Koshkin, which was ahead of its time - the legendary T-34.

Kharkov Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau

INIn the first years of its existence, the USSR did not have its own tank industry. The production and repair of tank equipment was carried out at various machine-building plants in the country from time to time. At the same time, ensuring the defense of the country required equipping the Red Army with military equipment, including armored vehicles.

An important event in the development of domestic tank building was the creation on May 6, 1924 in Moscow, in the system of the Main Directorate of Military Industry, of a tank bureau, which in 1926-1929 was called the “Main Design Bureau of the Gun-Arsenal Trust (GKB OAT).”

The bureau was entrusted with the tasks of designing tracked combat vehicles and assisting factories in mastering their production. The lack of a production base and necessary equipment in the State Clinical Hospital OAT greatly complicated and constrained the work of this organization.

In this regard, several machine-building plants, including the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after the Comintern, were entrusted with the organization of tank building work, and subsequently with the development of designs for domestic tanks.

This decision was facilitated by the presence at KhPZ of the production of powerful Kommunar tracked tractors, organized since 1923, which was a good production base for the development of tank building at the plant.

The official document defining the start of work on the production of tanks at the plant is the Resolution of the permanent mob meeting dated December 1, 1927, when the Main Directorate of the Metal Industry (letter No. 1159/128 dated January 7, 1928) ordered “... to urgently work out the issue on setting up the production of tanks and tractors at KhPZ..." (from materials of the Kharkov Regional State Archive, file No. 93, sheet 5).

In addition, the BT-5 was equipped with a more powerful 45mm cannon (instead of the 37mm on the BG-2). The experimental tank produced in 1935 was equipped with a 76.2 mm gun. This tank was called “artillery” and was intended for fire support of attacking tanks. BT-5 tanks, intended for command personnel, were produced equipped with a 71-TK1 radio station with a handrail antenna on the turret.

In the period 1932-1933, design developments were carried out to connect the armor parts of the hull and turret using electric welding instead of rivet joints. The BT-2 type tank with a welded hull and turret was named BT-4.

Continuing further improvement of the BT series tanks, the design team of KB T2K in 1935 created its next modification - the BT-7 tank. This tank was equipped with a more advanced M-17T carburetor aircraft engine and the transmission units underwent radical changes. Some tanks were equipped with anti-aircraft machine guns.

In the second half of 1936, KhPZ named after. The Comintern was renamed Plant No. 183. Digital indexing of services was also introduced inside the plant; the T2K tank design bureau was assigned the index KB-190.

On December 28, 1936, by order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry G.K. Ordzhonikidze M.I. was appointed chief designer of the tank design bureau of plant No. 183. Koshkin , in return for the accused of unsuitable design of the checkpoint and the repressed A.O. Firsov, although the massive failure of this unit was caused by improper operation and “hobby” by jumping on BT tanks.

Under the leadership of M.I. Koshkin, the BT-7 tank was modernized with the installation of the V-2 diesel engine, which had been created by that time at the plant. It was the first tank in the world to have a diesel engine.

According to the plant's drawings and technical documentation, the BT-7 tank with a diesel engine was given the name A-8, but it was sent to the army under the brand name BT-7M.

A tank with a larger caliber gun (76.2 mm) was produced in small quantities. It was assigned the BT-7A brand and was intended to enhance the firepower of tank units.

In parallel with BT-type tanks, plant No. 183 produced heavy five-turret T-35 tanks in very small quantities, designed by the design bureau of the Leningrad Experimental Plant named after. CM. Kirov.

To service serial production and improve the design of this tank, the plant had a separate design bureau KB-35, headed by I.S. Ber.

In October 1937, Plant No. 183 received a task from the Automotive Armored Directorate of the Red Army to develop a new maneuverable wheeled-tracked tank. To complete this serious task, M.I. Koshkin organized a new unit - KB-24.

He selected designers for this design bureau personally, on a voluntary basis, from among the employees of KB-190 and KB-35. The number of this design bureau was 21 people:

0 1. Koshkin M.I.
0 2. Morozov A.A.
0 3. Moloshtanov A.A.
0 4. Tarshinov M.I.
0 5. Matyukhin V.G.
0 6. Vasiliev P.P.
0 7. Braginsky S.M.
0 8. Baran Ya.I.
0 9. Kotov M.I.
10. Mironov Yu.S.
11. Kalendin B.C.
12. Moiseenko V.E.
13. Shpeichler A.I.
14. Sentyurin P.S.
15. Korotchenko N.S.
16. Rubinovich E.S.
17. Lurie M.M.
18. Fomenko G.P.
19. Astakhova A.I.
20. Guzeeva A.I.
21. Bleishmidt L.A.

Design Bureau KB-190, led by N.A. Kucherenko, continued work on modernizing the BT-7 tank and finalizing the design documentation for the BT-7M and BT-7A tanks.

In less than a year, the new KB-24 designed a wheeled-tracked tank, which was assigned the index A-20. It was carried out in strict accordance with the technical specifications of the customer - the Automotive and Tank Directorate of the Red Army. The A-20 tank differed from the BT-7M primarily in its new hull shape; for the first time in tank building, angled armor plates were used.

Subsequently, this principle of constructing armor protection became classic and was widely used in tanks of all countries. The A-20 was also distinguished by a new drive to the drive wheels; three of the four rollers (on board) were drive.

The small gap in performance characteristics of the A-20 tank compared to the BT-7M was the reason for the creation of an “initiative” tank at KB-24, called the T-32. Its significant difference was the replacement of the wheel-tracked propulsion unit with a simpler, purely tracked one. The abolition of wheel travel on the T-32 made it possible not only to significantly simplify the design of the tank, but also to enhance armor protection due to the saved weight. This sample was equipped with a more powerful 76 mm cannon.

0 On May 4, 1938, an extended meeting of the USSR Defense Committee was held in Moscow

The meeting was chaired by V.I. Molotov, and was attended by I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov, other state and military leaders, representatives of the defense industry, as well as tank commanders who had recently returned from Spain. The participants were presented with a project for a light wheeled-tracked tank A-20, developed at the Kharkov Comintern Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). During its discussion, a discussion ensued about the advisability of using wheeled-tracked propulsion on tanks.

Participants in the battles in Spain who spoke in the debate, in particular A.A. Vetrov and D.G. Pavlov (at that time the head of the ABTU), expressed diametrically opposed points of view on this issue. At the same time, opponents of the wheeled-tracked propulsion system, who found themselves in the minority, referred to the allegedly sad experience of using BT-5 tanks in Spain, which is not entirely clear, since this experience was very limited - only 50 BT-5 tanks were sent to Spain.

References to the very low reliability of the chassis also seemed untenable: in September 1937, “beteshki”, for example, moving to the Aragonese front, made a 500-km march along the highway on wheels without significant breakdowns. By the way, a year and a half later, already in Mongolia, BT-7s of the 6th Tank Brigade made an 800-km march to Khalkhin Gol on tracks, and also with almost no breakdowns.

The essence of the contradictions, most likely, was something else: how much does a battle tank need a chassis in two forms?

After all, the wheeled propulsion device was used mainly for marching at high speeds on good roads, and such an opportunity arose quite rarely. Was it worth complicating the design of the tank's chassis for this? And if for the BT-7 this complication was still relatively small, then for the A-20, which had a drive for three pairs of road wheels, it was already quite significant. Surely, there were other reasons: production, operational and political - if the authorities are in favor of a wheeled-tracked propulsion device, then why bother?

As a result, and not without the influence of the position of I.V. Stalin, unexpectedly for many who supported the "tracked vehicles", the KhPZ Design Bureau was instructed to develop a project for a purely tracked tank, similar in weight and all other tactical and technical characteristics (of course, with the exception of the chassis) to the A -20. After producing prototypes and conducting comparative tests, it was planned to make a final decision in favor of one or another version of the machine.

Here it is appropriate to make a brief excursion into history and remind the reader of some facts related to the design of the A-20, since it was with the A-20 that the history of the tank, later called the T-34, began

So, in 1937, plant No. 183 (KhPZ received this number in the second half of 1936), in accordance with the tactical and technical requirements of the ABTU, was supposed to design wheeled-tracked tanks BT-7IS and BT-9, and in the same year it was planned to produce 100 BT-7IS units. The design bureau KB-190 of department "100" (tank production), which was headed by M.I. Koshkin from January 1937, this work was disrupted. In addition, Koshkin in every possible way hindered the work of the adjunct of the Stalin VAMM, military engineer of the 3rd rank A.Ya. Dik, who was specially sent to the KhPZ to develop several versions of the preliminary design of the BT-IS tank.

On October 13, 1937, ABTU issued a technical certificate to the plant. requirements for the design of a new combat vehicle - the BT-20 wheeled-tracked tank. Two weeks later, the director of plant No. 183, Yu.E. Maksarev, received an order from the Main Directorate with the following content:

"To the director of plant No. 183.

By Government Decision No. 94ss of August 15, 1937, the Main Directorate was asked to design and manufacture prototypes and prepare production for serial production of high-speed wheeled-tracked tanks with synchronized movement by 1939. In view of the extreme seriousness of this work and the extremely short deadlines set by the Government, the 8th Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry considers it necessary to carry out the following activities.

1. To design a machine, create a separate design bureau (OKB) at KhPZ, subordinate directly to the chief engineer of the plant.

2. By agreement with VAMM and ABTU, appoint 3rd rank military engineer Dik Adolf Yakovlevich as the head of this bureau and assign 30 VAMM graduates to work in the bureau from October 5 and an additional 20 people from December 1.

3. By agreement with the ABTU of the Red Army, appoint Captain Evgeniy Anatolyevich Kulchitsky as the main consultant on the vehicle.

4. No later than September 30, allocate 8 of the best tank designers of the plant to work in the OKB to appoint them as heads of individual groups, one standardizer, a secretary and an archivist.

5. Create a mock-up and model workshop at the OKB and ensure priority execution of work related to new design in all workshops of the plant.

As a result, the plant created a design bureau that was significantly stronger than the main one

To develop a new tank, ABTU sent captain E.A. Kulchitsky, military engineer 3rd rank A.Ya. Dik, engineers P.P. Vasiliev, V.G. Matyukhin, Vodopyanov, as well as 41 VAMM graduate students to Kharkov.

In turn, the plant allocated designers: A.A. Morozov, N.S. Korotchenko, Shura, A.A. Moloshtanov, M.M. Lurie, Verkovsky, Dikon, P.N. Goryun, M.I. Tarshinov, A.S. Bondarenko, Y.I. Barana, V.Ya. Kurasova, V.M. Doroshenko, Gorbenko, Efimova, Efremenko, Radoichina, P.S. Sentyurina, Dolgonogova, Pomochaibenko, V.S. Kalendin, Valovoy.

A.Ya.Dik was appointed head of the OKB, engineer P.N.Goryun as assistant chief, ABTU consultant E.A.Kulchitsky, section heads V.M.Doroshenko (control), M.I.Tarshinov (hull), Gorbenko (motor ), A.A.Morozov (transmission), P.P.Vasiliev (chassis).

Information about the activities of this group that has so far been discovered ends at the beginning of November 1937. However, it is reliably known that the technical specifications for the BT-20 tank (factory index - A-20) were largely based on the developments of A.Ya. Dick, made in the summer of 1937. First of all, this concerns the design of the guitar, the angles of inclination of the upper part of the sides, the longitudinal arrangement of the drive shafts of the wheel drive, the inclined arrangement of the springs, etc. Even Dick’s proposal to use five pairs of road wheels in the chassis for better distribution of the load on the chassis found its application if not on the A-20, then on subsequent vehicles.

In publications on the history of the creation of the T-34, the OKB does not appear, and there are only references to a section or bureau of advanced design headed by A.A. Morozov and practically the same team. In the album "Kharkov Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau named after A.A. Morozov", published in Kharkov for the 70th anniversary of the design bureau, it is reported that in order to fulfill the task of the ABTU to develop a new wheeled-tracked tank, M.I. Koshkin organized a new division - KB- 24. He selected the designers personally, on a voluntary basis, from among the employees of KB-190 and KB-35 (the latter was engaged in servicing the serial production of the T-35 heavy tank. - Valera). This team included 21 people: M.I. Koshkin, A.A. Morozov, A.A. Moloshtanov, M.I. Tarshinov, V.G. Matyukhin, P.P. Vasiliev, S.M. Braginsky, Ya I. Baran, M. I. Kotov, Y. S. Mironov, V. S. Kalendin, V. E. Moiseenko, A. I. Shpeichler, P. S. Sentyurin, N. S. Korotchenko, E. S. Rubinovich, M. M. Lurie, G. P. Fomenko, A. I. Astakhova, A. I. Guzeeva, L. A. Bleishmidt.

At the above-mentioned meeting of the Defense Committee, the A-20 project was represented by M.I. Koshkin and A.A. Morozov

However, let's go back to 1938. The technical design of the tracked tank, designated A-32, was completed quickly, since outwardly it was no different from the A-20, with the exception of the chassis, which had 5 (not 4, like the A-20) road wheels per side. In August 1938, both projects were presented at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army under the People's Commissariat of Defense. The general opinion of the participants was again inclined in favor of the wheeled-tracked tank. And again Stalin’s position played a decisive role: he proposed to build and test both tanks and only after that make a final decision.

In connection with the urgent development of drawings, the question arose about attracting additional design forces. At the beginning of 1939, the three tank design bureaus available at plant No. 183 (KB-190, KB-35 and KB-24) were merged into one unit, which was assigned the code - department 520. At the same time, all experimental workshops were merged into one. The chief designer of department 520 was M.I. Koshkin, the head of the design bureau and deputy chief designer was A.A. Morozov, and the deputy head was N.A. Kucherenko.

By May 1939, prototypes of new tanks were made in metal

Until July, both vehicles underwent factory testing in Kharkov, and from July 17 to August 23, testing grounds. However, the test report indicated that neither vehicle was fully equipped. This concerned the A-32 to the greatest extent. It did not have the OPVT equipment provided for by the project and the stowage of spare parts; 6 out of 10 road wheels were borrowed from the BT-7 (they were already “original”), and the ammunition rack was not fully equipped.

As for the differences between the A-32 and the A-20, the commission that conducted the tests noted the following: the first does not have a wheel drive; the thickness of its side armor is 30 mm (instead of 25 mm); armed with a 76 mm L-10 cannon instead of a 45 mm one; has a mass of 19 tons. The ammunition stowage both in the nose and on the sides of the A-32 was adapted for 76-mm shells. Due to the lack of a wheel drive, as well as the presence of 5 road wheels, the interior of the A-32 hull was somewhat different from the interior of the A-20. In terms of other mechanisms, the A-32 did not have any significant differences from the A-20.

During the tests, the performance characteristics of both tanks were clarified.

During factory tests, the A-20 covered 872 km (on tracks - 655, on wheels - 217), A-32 - 235 km. During field testing, the A-20 covered 3,267 km (of which 2,176 were on tracks), the A-32 covered 2,886 km.

The chairman of the commission, Colonel V.N. Chernyaev, not daring to give preference to one of the vehicles, wrote in the conclusion that both tanks successfully passed the tests, after which the question again hung in the air

On September 23, 1939, a demonstration of tank equipment to the leadership of the Red Army took place, which was attended by K.E. Voroshilov, A.A. Zhdanov, A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Voznesensky, D.G. Pavlov and others, as well as the main designers of the tanks being presented. In addition to the A-20 and A-32, heavy tanks were delivered to the training ground near Moscow K.B., C.M. K and T-100, as well as light BT-7M and T-26.

The A-32 “performed” very impressively. Easily, even gracefully and at a good pace, the tank crossed a ditch, a scarp, a counter-scarp, a spear bridge, forded the river, climbed a slope with a rise of more than 30° and finally knocked down a large pine tree with the bow of the armored hull, causing the admiration of the spectators.

Based on the results of tests and demonstrations, the opinion was expressed that the A-32 tank, which had a reserve for increasing mass, would be advisable to protect with more powerful 45-mm armor, correspondingly increasing the strength of individual parts

However, at this time, in the experimental workshop of plant No. 183, the assembly of two such tanks was already underway, receiving the factory index A-34. At the same time, during October - November 1939, tests were carried out on two A-32s, loaded with 6830 kg, that is, up to the weight of the A-34.

The plant was in a hurry to assemble new tanks by November 7th, putting all its efforts into it

However, technical difficulties that arose, mainly with power plants and power transmissions, slowed down the assembly. And this despite the fact that all units and components were carefully assembled, all threaded connections were treated with hot oil, and rubbing surfaces were impregnated with purified grease. Ignoring the protests of military representatives, only imported bearings were installed in the gearboxes. The external surfaces of the buildings and towers were also subjected to unprecedented finishing.

The very complex technology for manufacturing armor parts for these two tanks did not help speed up production either. In particular, the frontal part of the hull was made of a solid armor plate, which was first tempered, then bent, straightened and again submitted for heat treatment. The workpieces warped during tempering and hardening, became cracked during bending, and their large sizes made the straightening process difficult. The turret was also welded from large bent armor plates. Holes (for example, a gun embrasure) were cut out after bending, which caused great difficulties in machining.

Meanwhile, even before the vehicle was manufactured in metal, on December 19, 1939, by resolution of the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 443ss, the A-34 was recommended for adoption under the designation T-34 in the event of successful completion of state tests with a mileage of 2000 km.

Assembly of the first A-34 was completed in January 1940, the second in February. And immediately military trials began, the progress of which was reflected in the reports:

“The first A-34 vehicle passed 200 km of testing. The cross-country ability is good. The accompanying armored vehicle often gets stuck, and the 34th has to be pulled out.

Visibility in traffic is terrible. The glass sweats and becomes clogged with snow within 7-10 minutes. Further movement is impossible; the glass needs to be cleaned from the outside.

The tower is cramped with this system.

On February 15, 1940 we returned from the run. The machine was set to install the mask.

A-34 second - we ran it in, the mechanisms are working normally."

After 250 km of travel, the engine on the first A-34 failed, having worked for only 25 hours.

It had to be replaced with a new one. By February 26, this car had covered only 650 km, and the second – 350 km. It became obvious that it would not be possible to complete the entire 2,000 km test run before the government show scheduled for March. And without this, the tanks could not be allowed to demonstrate. It was then that the idea arose to transport both A-34s from Kharkov to Moscow under their own power and thus “increase” the required mileage. At a special meeting of the plant's party committee, M.I. Koshkin was appointed responsible for the run.

On the morning of March 5 (according to other sources, on the night from the 5th to the 6th), a convoy of two A-34s and two Voroshilovets tractors, one of which was equipped for housing, and the other was packed to capacity with spare parts, set course to Moscow. For reasons of secrecy, the route of the run was laid out bypassing large settlements and main roads. Bridges over rivers were allowed to be used only if it was impossible to cross the river on ice and at night. The mileage schedule took into account not only travel and rest times, but also the train schedule on the intersecting railway lines, and the weather forecast along the route. The average speed of the column should not exceed 30 km/h.

Troubles began not far from Belgorod. While moving through the virgin snow, one of the tanks had its main clutch broken off. In a number of publications, this is attributed to the lack of experience of one of the drivers, which seems unlikely, since the tanks were driven by the best test drivers of the plant, who drove hundreds of kilometers on them. Yu.E. Maksarev in his memoirs gives a different interpretation of this fact. According to him, “a representative of the GABTU, sitting at the levers, forced the car to turn around in the snow at full speed and disabled the main clutch.” M.I. Koshkin decided to continue moving with one tank, and a repair team was called from the factory to repair the one that was out of order.

In Serpukhov the column was met by the deputy. People's Commissar of Medium Engineering (in 1939 all tank factories were transferred from the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry to the People's Commissar of Medium Machine Building) A.A. Goreglyad. A serviceable tank arrived in Moscow, or more precisely at plant No. 37, located in Cherkizovo, then near Moscow. For several days, while they were waiting for the lagging car, a real pilgrimage continued to the plant: representatives of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the GABTU, VAMM named after Stalin, the General Staff of the Red Army - everyone was interested in looking at the new product. During these days, M.I. Koshkin felt ill, his temperature rose - during the run he caught a serious cold.

On the night of March 17, both "thirty-fours" arrived at Ivanovo Square in the Kremlin. In addition to M.I. Koshkin, only two employees of plant No. 183 were allowed into the Kremlin. Tank No. 1 was driven by N.F. Nosik, and No. 2 - I.G. Bitensky (according to other sources - V. Dyukanov). Next to them, in the place of the shooter, were NKVD officers.

In the morning, a large group of party and government figures approached the tanks - I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, M.I. Kalinin, L.P. Beria, K.E. Voroshilov and others. The head of the GABTU D.G. Pavlov gave a report. Then M.I. Koshkin took the floor. Despite the medications he had taken, he could not control the cough that was choking him, which caused dissatisfied glances from I.V. Stalin and L.P. Beria. After the report and inspection, the tanks drove off: one to Spassky, the other to the Trinity Gate. Before reaching the gate, they turned sharply and rushed towards each other, effectively striking sparks from the paving stones. After making several circles with turns in different directions, the tanks stopped at the same place on command. The leader liked the new cars, and he ordered that plant No. 183 be provided with the necessary assistance to eliminate the shortcomings of the A-34, which were persistently pointed out to him by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense G.I. Kulik and D.G. Pavlov. Moreover, the latter boldly told Stalin: “We will pay dearly for producing vehicles that are not combat-ready enough.”

After the Kremlin show, the tanks headed to the NIBT Test Site in Kubinka, where they were tested by firing from a 45-mm cannon. Then the combat vehicles went further: along the route Minsk - Kyiv - Kharkov.

On March 31, 1940, a protocol of the Defense Committee was signed on putting the T-34 (A-34) tank into mass production at plant No. 183 and preparing its release at STZ. True, there was a clause “in the event of the successful completion of all military tests.”

Upon arrival of the cars in Kharkov after 3,000 km, a number of defects were discovered during disassembly: the ferrodo on the main clutch discs was burnt, cracks appeared on the fans, chips were found on the gear teeth of the gearboxes, and the brakes were burnt. The design bureau worked on a number of options to eliminate defects. However, it was clear to everyone that 3000 km - the guaranteed mileage without defects - even after corrections, the A-34 would not pass.

Meanwhile, the plant adopted a production program for 1940, which provided for the production of one and a half hundred A-34 tanks.

At the Main Military Council in August 1938, where the results of the task of the ABTU of the Red Army were considered, M.I. Koshkin managed to obtain permission to manufacture in metal, along with the wheeled-tracked A-20 tank, a purely tracked T-32

By mid-1939, prototypes of the A-20 and T-32 tanks were manufactured and presented to the State Commission for testing. The commission noted that both tanks were “higher in strength and reliability than all prototypes produced previously,” but neither of them was given preference.

The secondary tests of the experimental A-20 and T-32 tanks in the fall of 1939, and most importantly the combat operations taking place in Finland at that time, clearly confirmed that only tracked vehicles can provide tactical mobility in rough terrain, especially in the autumn-winter period. cars. At the same time, the need was determined to further improve the combat parameters of the T-32 tank and especially to strengthen its protection.

Serial production of T-34 tanks began in June 1940, and by the end of the year 115 vehicles were produced

His premature death was a heavy loss for the design team and the plant. Student and colleague M.I. was appointed chief designer of the tank design bureau. Koshkina - A.A. Morozov.

By the end of 1940, despite the heavy workload on finalizing the T-34 tank, the design bureau began work on its modernization. On a modernized sample, to which the index was conditionally assigned T-34M, it was planned to significantly strengthen the armor protection of the hull and turret, use torsion shafts in the suspension instead of springs and road wheels with internal shock absorption, increase the amount of fuel, shells, cartridges, etc.

The drawing and technical documentation for the T-34M tank was fully released and released into production for the production of a prototype. Zhdanovsky Metallurgical Plant Armor plates for the hull of the T-34M tank (five sets) were manufactured and sent to plant No. 183. However, at the beginning of 1941, due to the sharply increased workload of production with the production of serial T-34 tanks, work on the T-34M tank was practically stopped.

In 1941, the tank design bureau of plant No. 183 (department 520) consisted of 106 people(12 design groups) headed by Chief Designer A.A. Morozov and his two deputies - N.A. Kucherenko and A.V. Kolesnikov.

Nand on the basis of government Decree No. 667/SGKO dated September 12, 1941, the director of the plant Yu.E. Maksarev [ In 1938-42, the director of the Kharkov Machine-Building Plant, supervised its evacuation to the Urals and the organization of production. In 1942, the chief engineer of the Kirov plant, evacuated to Chelyabinsk. In 1942, chief engineer, in 1942-46 director of the Ural Carriage Plant, Nizhny Tagil ] gave the order to close down the plant and immediately evacuate it to the rear.

The first echelon left the plant on September 19, 1941 and headed to Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk region. He took away the designers of the tank design bureau, the drawing and technical documentation of the tank and the most valuable equipment.

The Kharkov plant, evacuated to Nizhny Tagil, and the local Uralvagonzavod were merged into one enterprise, which became known as the Ural Tank Plant. №183 . At this plant, the numbering of workshops and departments, adopted even before the war in Kharkov, was retained. The tank design bureau was still called "department 520". The chief designer, as in Kharkov, was A.A. Morozov.

0 On December 8, 1941, the Ural Tank Plant produced the first T-34 tank, and in April 1942, the plant exceeded the pre-war level of production of these combat vehicles. The military situation and the loss for various reasons of many factories supplying components and materials created enormous difficulties in the conditions continuous increase in tank production. There was a shortage of rubber, non-ferrous metals, electrical equipment, etc.

In order not to stop the production of tanks under any circumstances, the design bureau announced the mobilization of all forces to fight for saving non-ferrous metals, rubber, armor steel, wires, and for further technological development of the vehicle. Absolutely all the details of the tank were revised, the designers used cast iron instead of bronze, replaced riveting with welding, transferred stamped parts to casting, and canceled intermediate parts.

As a result of this work, the designers managed to completely eliminate 765 types of parts, which significantly simplified the process of manufacturing the vehicle and was a significant contribution to the organization of mass production of tanks. The simplicity of the design, mass production and high combat characteristics of the T-34 tank created an excellent reputation for it. Subsequently, it began to be considered the best tank of the Second World War.

NDespite the heavy workload of the design bureau for the T-34 tank, on the initiative of A.A. Morozov, in the second half of 1942, work began on the design of a new tank, which was given the code name T-43. This project was based on developments made back in Kharkov for the T-34M tank. In addition, the tank provided:

• use of a five-speed gearbox;
• installation of a commander's cupola on the main turret;
• simplification of the housing design in order to facilitate automatic welding conditions;
• increasing the capacity of fuel tanks;
• use of torsion bar suspension, etc.

The tank project, even by those standards, was completed quite quickly, and already in the third quarter of 1943, the plant produced a prototype of the T-43 tank. The T-43 tank did not go further than the prototype, because There was no big leap in performance compared to the T-34, but there were many changes.

In 1943, new Tiger and Panther tanks appeared in service with Hitler's army. They had thicker armor, which in most cases was not penetrated by 76-mm T-34 shells. Urgent response measures were needed.

The designers had to do a tremendous amount of work to eliminate the superiority of German tanks. In an extremely short time, the task set by the State Defense Committee was successfully completed. At the end of 1943, a more powerful 85 mm caliber gun was installed on the T-34 tank, which practically equalized the firepower of the T-34 with the new German tanks. A commander's cupola was also introduced, which significantly improved visibility from the tank. The tank with the specified changes received the index T-34-85 and was put into service on December 15, 1943.

The first samples of the T-34-85 tank began to roll off the assembly line of the Ural Tank Plant in March 1944

INAt the end of 1942, in parallel with the development of the T-43 tank, which, as is known, represented a deep modernization of the T-34, the design bureau began working on the design of a completely new tank. This tank was designed in three versions: with a 122, 100 and 85 mm caliber gun.

In addition to artillery weapons, the tank being developed (later it received the name T-44) differed from the T-34 in the following design features:

• the engine is installed transverse to the longitudinal axis of the machine, which made it possible to reduce the volume of MTO;
• the turret is shifted to the stern, which made it possible to shorten the vehicle;
• the overall height of the tank was reduced by 300 mm;
• The armor protection of the frontal part of the hull has been enhanced by increasing the thickness of the frontal plate and moving the driver's hatch from the frontal plate to the roof of the hull;
• torsion bar suspension is used;
• the radio operator-machine gunner was excluded from the crew to increase the tank's ammunition load.

The design of the tank was completed by the end of 1943. Prototypes were manufactured in the first half of 1944. Tests of prototypes showed that, for a number of reasons, high-caliber 122 and 100 mm guns were unacceptable for the T-44 tank, and further work on them was stopped.

Testing and modification of the T-44 tank with the 85mm cannon adopted for the T-34-85 continued throughout 1944 and was successfully completed by the end of the year. A new medium tank was created

PSince mass production of T-34-85 tanks was well established at the Ural Tank Plant and the Great Patriotic War was still going on, it was decided to produce the new T-44 tank at the former factory No. 183, restored after the liberation of Kharkov, to which No. 75 was assigned. The assembly of serial T-44 tanks at this plant began in June 1945. The first batch of T-44 tanks was sent to the Far East in August 1945, where hostilities with Japan were taking place at that time.

The designers of KB-520, along with work on the T-34-85 and T-44 tanks, began at the end of the war to create a more advanced tank, the design of which was supposed to use the vast experience of operating tanks in combat conditions on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Constructive studies were mainly carried out in the following directions:

• enhancing the tank's firepower;
• increasing its armor protection;
• the ability of the tank to overcome water obstacles along the bottom.

Two prototypes of the new tank, designated T-54, were manufactured in the first quarter of 1945 and tested in the same year. The finalization of the drawing and technical documentation based on comments identified during the manufacturing and testing of prototypes was completed at the beginning of 1946.

The main armament of this tank was a 100 mm caliber tank gun; as additional weapons - a 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun, three 7.62mm machine guns and one 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. The tank's turret is cast with a frontal thickness of 190 mm. The frontal plate of the hull had a thickness of 100 mm. To partially compensate for the increased weight, a high-power diesel engine (B-54) was installed on the tank.

The T-54 tank was put into serial production at the Ural Plant No. 183 in 1947 and at the Kharkov Plant No. 75 in 1948. Thus, the Kharkov Design Bureau (department 520), headed by Chief Designer A.A. Morozov, while in evacuation, created, in addition to the T-34-85 tank, also the T-44 and T-54 tanks.

The evacuation of plant No. 183 and the design bureau to Nizhny Tagil made it possible to create another large design bureau and tank factory in the Urals. After the end of the war, and especially after the completion of work on the creation of the T-54 tank, a gradual return of tank designers evacuated in 1941 from Nizhny Tagil to Kharkov began.

The current name of the tank factory isState Enterprise (SE) "Plant named after V.A. Malyshev"

Great tank drama

In the summer of 1940, at the Kubinka training ground, the new T-34 tank was compared with the German T-III. Having noted the advantages of the Soviet vehicle in armor and weapons, they began to count the disadvantages. The tower is tighter than that of the “German” (this is true).

The optics are worse (what does tank builders have to do with this?). The engine is unreliable (the V-2 tank diesel, which has no analogues in the world, has not yet overcome “childhood illnesses”) and roars loudly (even if it is 200 “horses” more powerful than the German one). Finally, on the highway, the “German” accelerated to almost 70 km/h, and the “thirty-four” didn’t even reach the rated 50 (what else were they expecting if its armor was one and a half times thicker and its weight was 7 tons more?).

However, we still had to look for a highway in Russia

Therefore, in a future war, the German T-III will not show off its speed, but will get stuck in the mud, in plowing and on virgin snow. Even anti-tank rifles will penetrate its 30 mm armor. It will become obvious that although the T-III in weight (19.5 tons) reached the level of a medium tank, it is light in capabilities. A medium tank is something completely different. This is a vehicle with strong armor and a powerful cannon, capable of winning a duel with enemy field artillery and tanks, breaking through to the rear and going into a deep raid, crushing convoys and shooting troops in columns. In short, the medium tank is the T-34. The standard until the end of the war and later times.

But then, in the summer of 1940, the fate of the legendary “thirty-four” hung in the balance. Marshal Kulik suspended production of the tank, demanding that all shortcomings be eliminated. Voroshilov intervened: “Continue to make cars; hand them over to the army, establishing a 1000-km warranty mileage.” This is just one episode in the dramatic fate of the "thirty-four". The sad fact is that the best medium tank of World War II had to be literally forced on the military.

The Armored Directorate did not give instructions for its development. They demanded a high-speed wheeled-tracked tank. They ordered it to the Kharkov Locomotive Plant.

In January 1937, the head of the factory design bureau, A.O. Firsov, was executed. replaced by Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin

Here he is, Koshkin, managed to discern and put at the head of the design team the 33-year-old Alexander Alexandrovich Morozov, who had stood out from the draftsmen. He supported the designers who proposed, in addition to the wheeled-tracked A-20, to also develop a tracked tank - a prototype of the T-34.

The idea was brought to a meeting of the Defense Committee. The designers emphasized the complexity and unreliability of the wheel-tracked propulsion system. Many military personnel had not yet gotten over the idea of ​​a high-speed tank and stood behind the A-20. Corporal Pavlov, at that time the head of the armored department - an experienced tanker, Hero of the Soviet Union, spoke out against the future "thirty-four". Stalin made Solomon's decision: "Let's see which tank is better."

Three months later, both projects were ready. And again the military is against a purely tracked tank, and Stalin says “we’ll see.” They began to look, that is, the Morozovites were working, the informers were informing, the security officers were arresting, and Koshkin had a hard time helping out his designers.

The tanks had already passed factory tests, but the country's main tank crews still couldn't decide what kind of vehicle they needed. Koshkin made his way to the very top, and on September 23, 1939, samples of both tanks were shown to the army leadership. We chose, thank God, a tracked vehicle.

The plant was already preparing a tank with reinforced armor. The Finnish war was going on, so in December 1939 the Defense Committee accepted the "thirty-four" into service without waiting for test results. Two pre-production T-34s reached Moscow under their own power: the tanks covered the required mileage, hurrying to the government inspection.

In this run Koshkin got pneumonia. Six months later, heart complications and continued intrigue around the “thirty-four” finished off the designer: he died on September 26 at the age of 42. And the heads of two Red Army headquarters - armored (Fedorenko) and artillery (Kulik) continued to insist on stopping the production of the T-34. They were supported by Pavlov, who became commander of the Western Special Military District. Once again this issue was discussed the day before the war.

The military was disingenuous

They were not waiting for the improved T-34, but for another tank, which at first was listed as T-126SP (SP - infantry escort). At the end of 1940, the Leningrad plant named after Voroshilov (No. 174) gave them what they ordered. The coveted tank, which was predicted to be the most popular tank in the future war, turned out to be... improved in terms of combat qualities of the German T-III. The cross-country ability is higher, the armor is thicker, the three-man turret is a twin of the German one. At the same time, the new tank weighed 6 tons less and did not leave the light category.

Wow. This was understandable. Heavy tanks break through the defenses, light tanks enter the gap and destroy the rear. What is average? Some kind of indistinct tank: either a reinforced light one, or a weakened heavy one. You can wait a bit with the middle one.

Already in the spring of 1941, the new product was put into service under the name T-50. In addition to twenty-four thousand other light tanks. And what? Not prevent.

Soon after the start of the war, General Pavlov would be blamed for the failures of the first battles. He will be recalled to Moscow and shot. Who knows, maybe in his last hours the demoted commander regretted that he opposed the “thirty-four”, which his armies now so lacked. But the T-50 turned out to be expensive and difficult to produce. After producing 65 cars, its production was stopped forever.

"Bars" - flying armor

Footage of a flying tank is shown on television whenever they talk about new weapons. Each exhibition of Russian military equipment replenishes the arsenal of television crews with new spectacular shots: a tank not only flies, but also shoots while in flight.

Our young grandfathers watched a similar chronicle before the war. Then they also showed flying tanks. They jumped over trenches and trenches. The grandfathers took their breath away, just like us, when they saw such a picture.

It has always been believed that a tank was born to crawl. Initially, he intended it that way. It's not his place to fly. This branch of development of tank capabilities was considered a dead end. Tank freestyle was constantly being pushed back, turning it into just a high-speed run.

Meanwhile, the army continued to set records behind the scenes. This is how Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Semyon Krivoshein recalls it.

“Comrade Krivoshein, in other units everyone is jumping on tanks, soon they will jump over the barracks, but we have never even tried,” regimental commissar Lutai advanced on me.

In Bobruisk, one tanker jumped 20 meters, and in Arman’s battalion they made such a springboard that the tank traveled 40 meters through the air.”

The tank command turned a blind eye to such recklessness. The country was saturated with records - why are tankers worse? True, nothing was reported in the newspapers about record jumps, but they were shown in the movies. What kind of dead-end branch is this if the whole country sees the capabilities of tanks and is proud of its tankers?

To be fair, it is worth noting that the flying abilities of high-speed tanks were developed by the American designer Walter Christie

It was he who proposed the idea of ​​a double wheeled-tracked propulsion system. On good roads the tank could run on wheels, but if it was off-road, it would sit on tracks. Built in 1928, Christie called this tank the “tank of 1940,” believing that it was at least ten years ahead of all tank designers.

Christie tried to offer the built and almost tested tank to the Ministry of Defense, but the military reacted coolly to the new product. The price requested by the designer completely scared them away. The designer had no choice but to look for buyers on the side.

In 1930, three Russians dressed in civilian clothes came to him. One of them was the head of the motorization and mechanization department of the Red Army I. Khalepsky. The other two were his employees. They found a common language with the designer. For a long time it was believed that Christie “transferred his invention to the USSR, not wanting to give it to the capitalists.” His nobility and selflessness were magnified and appreciated by Soviet historians. Although in fact the designer received 135 thousand dollars from the state treasury.

Soon, two purchased tanks disguised as tractors arrived in the USSR

The Revolutionary Military Council decided to begin their serial production at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant, assigning them the index BT - “high-speed tank”. The first three cars were immediately shown at the parade on November 7, 1931.

Tanks BT-2, BT-5, BT-7 became the heroes of many feature films. The directors did not hide their admiration for tank stunts and inserted them into the canvas of films. The ease of flight, smooth landing, instantaneous jerk, and high speeds were impressive. Spectators believed in the omnipotence of technology, and the brave generals imagined lightning attacks by tanks that replaced the warhorse. For flying, jumping and floating cars, no bridges are needed. Water ceased to be an obstacle for them.

But behind the scenes of the gallant chronicle there remained a major misunderstanding, which was noted in the diary entry of the German General Mellenthin in the summer of 1941. “As for the training of Russian tank crews, especially in the mechanized corps, it seemed as if they had not undergone any training at all...” Why is this so? It’s very simple: there was a great distance between the movie stunt and reality.

Not every tanker could master the art of tank jumps. And the chassis of the tank did not always withstand enormous loads. So the trick remained a trick, and the tanks were ordered to crawl for many years, snarling with fire and protected by armor. But over time, the unexpected happened: leaves suddenly appeared on a dead-end branch of the tank tree.

A trick that became a maneuver

An ideal tank is a harmonious combination of three components: armor, fire and maneuver. Light tanks were nimble in battle, but weak in firepower and armor. Heavy tanks were slow, but they covered the crews with armor and crushed the enemy with fire. Both tanks were vulnerable. The main component of harmony was missing - maneuver.

The legendary "thirty-four" showed that achieving the ideal is not such an elusive task. Post-war tank building confirmed: yes, this is so!

But, as you know, you can only strive for the ideal. Although this is not small. Twenty years after the war, a serious crisis emerged in tank building. The diesel engines used in tanks have exhausted their usefulness. They could not give lightness to forty-ton vehicles. On April 16, 1968, the government of the USSR adopted a “closed” resolution, which states: “...Consider the creation of a tank with a gas turbine engine as the most important state task.”

At the Kirov plant in Leningrad An experimental batch of “object 219” was laid down. The tank with the new engine was tested in the operating mode of military equipment in the offensive operation of 1944-1945.

It took eight years to create the tank, and on June 6, 1976 it was put into service, receiving the T-80 designation. The first tanks entered the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The Americans, having learned about the new product, urgently threw huge amounts of money and effort into creating a similar tank. This is how the Abrams appeared, which the Americans also sent to Germany, only to Western Germany.....

MEMORIAL COMPLEX - COMPLETION OF THE MUSEUM RING

A project has been developed for a memorial complex dedicated to history and modernity, to the creators and tankmen of the T-34 tank and its modification, which will be located 17 kilometers from the Ring Road near the village of Lugovaya in the city of Lobnya.

The idea of ​​creating a memorial complex was initiated by his daughter ON THE. Kucherenko, Head of the Design Bureau of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after. Comintern (where the T-34 tracked tank was created) - poetess Larisa Vasilyeva, with whom the Azindor construction and financial group has long-standing friendly relations.

The memorial complex will consist of two main parts: the T-34 tank on a pedestal and the House Museum. For the first time, the museum will present in detail the history of the creation of the T-34 tank, including a story about the first victories of the Thirty-Four during the defense of Moscow in December 1941.

The creation of a memorial complex of a museum and a tank-monument should complete the museum “ring” around the capital, dedicated to the historical victory of Soviet troops over the Nazis near Moscow.

Most experts are of the opinion that the T-34 tank was the best in World War II, it achieved victory, but there are other opinions. A whole staff of developers worked on the creation of this tank even before the start of World War II.

It is believed that the history of the T 34 tank began with the creation of the experimental A-20 tank. Since 1931, wheeled-tracked tanks of the BT type began to appear in service; they were considered high-speed. After experience had been gained in combat operations, the Kharkov Locomotive Plant was tasked with creating a project for a wheeled-tracked tank that would be able to replace the BT in the future. According to historical data, the design began in 1937 by the technical department under the leadership of Koshkin. It was assumed that the new tank would have a 45 mm gun and 30 mm thick armor. The diesel version of the B-2 was offered as an engine. The engine was supposed to reduce the vulnerability of the tank and the fire hazard of the equipment. Three drive wheels were also provided on each side due to the noticeably increased weight of the equipment. The weight of the car became more than 18 tons, the entire structure was complicated.

T-34 tank prototypes

The production of a tank engine began on the basis of aviation oil engines. The engine received the B-2 indexation during wartime, and many progressive ideas were incorporated into its design. Direct fuel injection was provided, there were 4 valves in each cylinder, and a cast aluminum head. The engine passed state tests for one hundred hours. Diesel mass production began in 1939 at a special plant headed by Kochetkov.

During the creation process, the design of the A-20 seemed too complicated, so it was planned to create a purely tracked tank, but it had to have anti-ballistic armor. Due to this idea, the weight of the tank was reduced, which made it possible to increase the armor. However, initially it was planned to create two vehicles of equal weight in order to conduct an equivalent test and determine which tank is better.

In May 1938, the design of a wheeled-tracked tank was nevertheless considered; it had a fairly rational shape, was created from rolled armor plates, and had a conical turret. However, after consideration, it was decided to create exactly such a model, but only on caterpillar tracks. The main thing for the tank was to be able to create excellent anti-ballistic armor. Such tanks were already created in 1936. They had a mass of 22 tons, but the armor was 60 mm. The experimental tracked tank was named A-32.

Both models A-32 and A-20 were fully completed in 1938. Most military commanders were inclined towards the A-20 version; it was believed that a wheeled-tracked tank was more effective in battle. However, Stalin intervened in the consideration of the projects and ordered the proactive construction of two models to begin in order to test them in comparative tests.

More than a hundred employees were involved in the development of both models, since both tanks had to be completed in the shortest possible time. All experimental workshops were combined into one and all employees worked under the best tank developer - Koshkin. Both projects were completed in May. All tanks were submitted for testing in 1939.

Features of the A-32 tank

Tank A - 32 had the following characteristics:

• very high speed
• machine body made of rolled steel sheets,
• rational armor angles,
• 45 mm gun,
• DT machine gun.

In 1939 A-32 was modified again. The armor was strengthened by adding various cargoes to the armor of the tank, which increased the weight of the vehicle to 24 tons. A new L-10 tank gun, developed at the Kirov plant, was installed. In December 1939, the Defense Committee decided to build several test models with reinforced 45 mm armor and a 76 mm tank gun.

It is this model that will become the famous T-34; in the process of creating the design of this machine, special attention was paid to simplifying the design. Specialists from the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and specialists from the Technology Bureau helped a lot with this. It was thanks to them that the T-34 tank model was finally developed for mass production. The production of the first experimental models began in Kharkov in the winter of 1940. On March 5 of the same year, the first two models left the plant and were sent on their first march from Kharkov to Moscow under the strict control of M.I. Koshkina.

Start of production of T-34

On March 17, the tanks were shown to the entire Kremlin leadership, after which ground testing of the vehicles began. The tanks were subjected to a full armor test by firing direct-fire armor-piercing and high-explosive shells at the tanks. In the summer, both tanks were sent to a training ground to cross anti-tank barriers. After this, the cars went to their home plant in Kharkov. On March 31, the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party for mass production of the tank was approved. It was planned to build about 200 T-34s by the end of the year.

By the summer their number had increased to five hundred. Production was constantly slowed down due to poor recommendations and data from specialists from the testing site, which was added to the GABTU test report. As a result, only three cars were produced by the fall, but after modifications were made based on comments, another 113 cars were produced by the new year.

After the death of Koshkin, the management of KhPZ A.A. Morozov not only managed to correct the serious problems that had arisen with the tank, but also managed to improve the firepower of the tank by installing a much more powerful F-34 gun than the L-11. After this, tank production increased significantly, with 1,100 vehicles built in the first six months of 1941. In the fall of 1941, KhPZ was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk region.

Already in December, the first T-34 tanks were produced at the new location. Due to the military situation, there was a shortage of rubber and non-ferrous metals so as not to stop the production of tanks, the designers reworked all the design details and were able to significantly reduce the number of parts. Soon the development of a new T-43 vehicle began.

Tank 34 was a great achievement in tank building. The design of the tank was very reliable, had very powerful weapons and reliable armoring of the hull and turret of the tank. Most importantly, the car was very dynamic.

Video history of the creation of the T-34

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On the labor front, a struggle unfolded to increase the production of tanks

At the end of 1941 - the first half of 1942, the production of T-34 tanks was carried out at three factories: No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil, Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) and No. 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" in Gorky. Plant No. 183 was considered the head plant, as was its design bureau - department 520. It was assumed that all changes made to the design of the thirty-four by other enterprises would be approved here. In reality, everything looked somewhat different. Only the performance characteristics of the tank remained unshakable, but the details of the vehicles from different manufacturers differed significantly from each other.

BIRTH CHARACTERISTICS

For example, on October 25, 1941, plant No. 112 began manufacturing prototypes of simplified armored hulls - without machining the edges of the sheets after gas cutting, with the parts connected in a “quarter” and a tenon connection of the front sheet with the sides and fender liners.

According to the drawings of the head plant, received at Krasnoye Sormovo, there was a hatch in the rear wall of the turret, closed by a removable armor plate fastened with six bolts. The hatch was intended for dismantling a damaged gun in the field. The metallurgists of the plant, using their technology, cast the rear wall of the tower as solid, and the hole for the hatch was cut out on a milling machine. It soon became clear that when fired from a machine gun, vibration occurs in the removable sheet, leading to the bolts coming off and tearing it out of place.

Attempts to abandon the hatch were made several times, but each time representatives of the customer objected. Then the head of the weapons sector, A.S. Okunev, proposed using two tank jacks to raise the rear part of the turret. At the same time, through the hole formed between its shoulder strap and the roof of the hull, the gun, removed from the trunnions, freely rolled out onto the roof of the MTO. During testing, a stop was welded to the leading edge of the hull roof, which protected the turret from sliding during lifting.

The production of such towers began at plant No. 112 on March 1, 1942. Military representative A. A. Afanasyev proposed, instead of a thrust bar across the entire width of the hull roof, to weld an armored visor, which would simultaneously serve as a stop and protect the gap between the end of the turret and the hull roof from bullets and shrapnel. Later, this visor and the absence of a hatch in the rear wall of the turret became distinctive features of Sormovo tanks.

Due to the loss of many subcontractors, tank builders had to show miracles of ingenuity. Thus, due to the cessation of supplies from Dnepropetrovsk of air cylinders for emergency engine starting at Krasny Sormovo, they began to use artillery shell casings rejected by machining for their production.

They got out as best they could at STZ: in August 1941, there were interruptions in the supply of rubber from Yaroslavl, so from October 29, all thirty-fours at STZ began to be equipped with cast road wheels with internal shock absorption. As a result, a characteristic external feature of the Stalingrad tanks was the absence of rubber tires on all road wheels. A new track design with a straightened treadmill was also developed, which made it possible to reduce noise when the machine was moving. The “rubber band” was also eliminated on the drive and guide wheels.

Another characteristic feature of STZ tanks was the hull and turret, which were manufactured using simplified technology developed by Plant No. 264 following the example of Krasny Sormovo. The armored parts of the hull were connected to each other into a “spike”. The “lock” and “quarter” options were preserved only in the connection of the upper frontal sheet of the hull with the roof and the bottom with the lower sheets of the bow and stern. As a result of a significant reduction in the volume of machining of parts, the housing assembly cycle was reduced from nine days to two. As for the turret, they began to weld it from sheets of raw armor, followed by hardening it in assembled form. At the same time, the need for straightening parts after hardening was completely eliminated and it was easier to fit them when assembling “on site.”

The Stalingrad Tractor Plant produced and repaired tanks until the moment when the front line approached the factory workshops. On October 5, 1942, in accordance with the order of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP), all work at the STZ was stopped, and the remaining workers were evacuated.

The main manufacturer of thirty-fours in 1942 remained plant No. 183, although after the evacuation it was not immediately able to reach the required mode. In particular, the plan for the first three months of 1942 was not fulfilled. The subsequent increase in tank production was based, on the one hand, on a clear and rational organization of production, and on the other, on a reduction in the labor intensity of manufacturing the T-34. A detailed revision of the machine's design was carried out, as a result of which the production of 770 items was simplified and the production of 5641 items of parts was completely eliminated. 206 purchased items were also cancelled. The labor intensity of machining the body decreased from 260 to 80 standard hours.

The chassis has undergone significant changes. In Nizhny Tagil, they began to cast road wheels similar to those in Stalingrad - without rubber bands. Starting from January 1942, three or four such rollers were installed on one side of the tank. The scarce rubber was removed from both the guide and drive wheels. The latter, in addition, was made in one piece - without rollers.

The oil cooler was removed from the engine lubrication system and the oil tank capacity was increased to 50 liters. In the power supply system, the gear pump was replaced with a rotary-type pump. Due to a shortage of electrical components, until the spring of 1942, most tanks were not equipped with some instrumentation, headlights, tail lights, electric fan motors, signals and TPUs.

It should be especially emphasized that in a number of cases, changes aimed at simplifying the design and reducing the labor intensity of manufacturing combat vehicles were not justified. Some of them subsequently resulted in a decrease in the performance characteristics of the T-34.

SCIENCE AND INVENTION HELPED

The increase in production of thirty-fours in 1942 was facilitated by the introduction, first at plant No. 183, and then at other enterprises, of automatic submerged arc welding, developed by academician E. O. Paton. It was not by chance that the 183rd plant turned out to be a leader in this matter - by decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil, and to the territory of the Ural Tank Plant.

In January 1942, as an experiment, a hull was made, one side of which was welded by hand, and the other side and nose were under a layer of flux. After this, to determine the strength of the seams, the body was sent to the test site. As E.O. Paton said in his memoirs, “the tank was subjected to brutal fire from a very short distance with armor-piercing and high-explosive shells. The very first hits on the hand-welded side caused significant destruction of the seam. After that, the tank was turned and the second side, welded by a machine gun, came under fire... Seven hits in a row! Our seams held up and did not give way! They turned out to be stronger than the armor itself. The seams of the bow also withstood the fire test. It was a complete victory for automatic high-speed welding.”

At the factory, welding was put on a conveyor belt. Several carriages left over from pre-war production were rolled into the workshop and bevels were cut out in their frames according to the configuration of the sides of the tank hull. A tent of beams was placed over the line of carts so that the welding heads could move along the beams along and across the body, and by connecting all the carts together, we got a conveyor. At the first position, the transverse seams were welded, at the next - the longitudinal ones, then the body was rearranged on the edge, first on one side, then on the other. We completed the welding by turning the body upside down. Some places where it was impossible to use a machine were cooked by hand. Thanks to the use of automatic welding, the labor intensity of manufacturing the body has decreased by five times. By the end of 1942, only six automatic welding machines were operating at plant No. 183. By the end of 1943, their number in tank factories reached 15, and a year later - 30.

Along with welding problems, a bottleneck remained in the production of cast towers that were molded into the ground. This technology required a greater amount of work on cutting and gas trimming of sprues and fills into the seams between the mold blocks. The chief metallurgist of the plant, P. P. Malyarov, and the head of the steel foundry, I. I. Atopov, proposed introducing machine molding. But this required a completely new tower design. Its project in the spring of 1942 was developed by M. A. Nabutovsky. It came in as a tower of the so-called hexagonal or improved shape. Both names are very arbitrary, since the previous tower also had a hexagonal shape, albeit more elongated and plastic. As for “improved,” this definition relates entirely to manufacturing technology, since the new turret still remained very cramped and inconvenient for the crew. Among tankers, for its close to a regular hexagonal shape, it received the nickname “nut”.

MORE MANUFACTURERS, WORSE QUALITY

In accordance with the State Defense Order of October 31, 1941, Uralmashzavod (Ural Heavy Engineering Plant, UZTM) was connected to armored hull production for the T-34 and KV. However, until March 1942, he only produced cuttings of hulls, which he supplied to Krasnoye Sormovo and Nizhny Tagil. In April 1942, complete assembly of hulls and production of thirty-four turrets for plant No. 183 began here. And on July 28, 1942, UZTM was instructed to organize the production of the entire T-34 tank and double the production of turrets for it due to the shutdown of plant No. 264.

Serial production of the T-34 began at Uralmash in September 1942. At the same time, many problems arose, for example with the towers - due to the increase in the program, the foundries could not ensure the implementation of the plan. By decision of the plant director B. G. Muzurukov, the free capacity of the 10,000-ton Shleman press was used. Designer I.F. Vakhrushev and technologist V.S. Ananyev developed the design of a stamped tower, and from October 1942 to March 1944, 2050 units were produced. At the same time, UZTM not only fully provided for its program, but also supplied a significant number of such towers to the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (ChKZ).

However, Uralmash did not produce tanks for long - until August 1943. Then this enterprise became the main manufacturer of self-propelled guns based on the T-34.

In an effort to compensate for the inevitable loss of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, in July 1942 the State Defense Committee gave the order to begin production of thirty-fours at ChKZ. The first tanks left its workshops on August 22. In March 1944, their production at this enterprise was stopped in order to increase the production of heavy IS-2 tanks.

In 1942, plant No. 174 named after K. E. Voroshilov, evacuated from Leningrad to Omsk, also joined the production of the T-34. The design and technological documentation was handed over to him by plant No. 183 and UZTM.

Speaking about the production of T-34 tanks in 1942-1943, it should be noted that by the autumn of 1942 there was a crisis in their quality. This was led to the constant quantitative growth in the production of thirty-fours and the attraction of more and more new enterprises to it. The problem was considered at a conference of NKTP factories, held on September 11-13, 1942 in Nizhny Tagil. It was led by Deputy People's Commissar of the Tank Industry Zh. Ya. Kotin. In the speeches of him and the chief inspector of the NKTP G. O. Gutman, severe criticism was voiced against the factory teams.

The spacing had an effect: during the second half of 1942 - the first half of 1943, many changes and improvements were introduced to the T-34. In the fall of 1942, external fuel tanks began to be installed on tanks - aft rectangular or side cylindrical (on ChKZ vehicles) shape. At the end of November, the drive wheel with rollers was returned to the thirty-four, and stamped road wheels with rubber tires were introduced. Since January 1943, tanks have been equipped with Cyclone air purifiers, and from March - June - with five-speed gearboxes. In addition, the ammunition load was increased to 100 artillery rounds, and an exhaust tower fan was introduced. In 1943, the PT-4-7 periscope sight was replaced by the PTK-5 commander's panorama, and many other, smaller improvements were introduced, such as landing rails on the turret.

Serial production of T-34 tanks of the 1942 model (as they are unofficially, but most often referred to in the literature) was carried out at factories No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil, No. 174 in Omsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and ChKZ in Chelyabinsk. Until July 1943, 11,461 tanks of this modification were produced.

In the summer of 1943, they began installing a commander's cupola on the T-34. An interesting detail: three plants - No. 183, Uralmash and Krasnoye Sormovo - defend priority in this issue in their reports on tank building during the Great Patriotic War. In fact, the Tagil residents proposed placing the turret at the rear of the turret behind the hatches and placing a third tanker in the turret, as on the experimental T-43 tank. But even two crew members were cramped in the “nut”, what a third! The Uralmash turret, although it was located above the left commander's turret hatch, was of a stamped design, and it was also rejected. And only the cast Sormovo “registered” on the thirty-four.

In this form, the T-34 was mass-produced until mid-1944, with Plant No. 174 in Omsk being the last to complete its production.

MEETING WITH THE "TIGERS"

It was these vehicles that bore the brunt of the fierce tank confrontation on the Kursk Bulge (in parts of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, thirty-fours accounted for 62%), including the famous Battle of Prokhorov. The latter, contrary to the prevailing stereotype, did not take place on any single field, like Borodino, but unfolded on a front stretching up to 35 km and represented a series of separate tank battles.

On the evening of July 10, 1943, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Supreme Command Headquarters to launch a counterattack against a group of German troops advancing in the Prokhorovsk direction. For this purpose, the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov (the first tank army of homogeneous composition) were transferred from the reserve Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front. Its formation began on February 10, 1943. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, it was stationed in the Ostrogozhsk area (Voronezh region) and included the 18th and 29th tank corps, as well as the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

On July 6 at 23.00 an order was received requiring the concentration of the army on the right bank of the Oskol River. Already at 23.15 the forward detachment of the association set off, and 45 minutes later the main forces followed it. It is necessary to note the impeccable organization of the redeployment. Oncoming traffic was prohibited along the column routes. The army marched around the clock, with short stops to refuel vehicles. The march was reliably covered by anti-aircraft artillery and aviation and, thanks to this, remained unnoticed by enemy reconnaissance. In three days the association moved 330-380 km. At the same time, there were almost no cases of combat vehicles failing due to technical reasons, which indicates both the increased reliability of the tanks and their competent maintenance.

On July 9, the 5th Guards Tank Army concentrated in the Prokhorovka area. It was assumed that the association with two tank corps attached to it - the 2nd and 2nd Guards at 10.00 on July 12, would attack German troops and, together with the 5th and 6th Guards combined arms armies, as well as the 1st Tank Army, would destroy the wedged on in the Oboyan direction, the enemy group, preventing its retreat to the south. However, preparations for a counterattack, which began on July 11, were thwarted by the Germans, who delivered two powerful blows to our defense: one in the direction of Oboyan, the other on Prokhorovka. As a result of the partial withdrawal of our troops, the artillery, which played a significant role in the counterattack, suffered losses both at deployment positions and in movement towards the front line.

On July 12, at 8.30, the main forces of the German troops, consisting of the SS motorized divisions “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Reich” and “Totenkopf”, numbering up to 500 tanks and assault guns, went on the offensive in the direction of Prokhorovka station. At the same time, after a 15-minute artillery barrage, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which led to the development of an oncoming tank battle, in which about 1,200 armored vehicles took part on both sides. Despite the fact that the 5th Guards Tank Army, operating in the 17-19 km zone, was able to achieve a density of battle formations of up to 45 tanks per 1 km, it was unable to complete the assigned task. The army's losses amounted to 328 tanks and self-propelled guns, and together with the attached formations reached 60% of the original strength.

So the new German heavy tanks turned out to be a tough nut to crack for the T-34. “We were afraid of these “Tigers” on the Kursk Bulge,” recalled the former commander of the thirty-four, E. Noskov, “I honestly admit. From his 88-mm cannon, he, the “Tiger,” pierced through our thirty-four with a blank, that is, an armor-piercing projectile from a distance of two thousand meters. And we, from a 76-mm cannon, could hit this thickly armored beast only from a distance of five hundred meters and closer with a new sub-caliber projectile...”

Another testimony from a participant in the Battle of Kursk - the commander of a tank company of the 10th Tank Corps, P.I. Gromtsev: “At first they fired at the Tigers from 700 meters. shoots our tanks. Only the intense July heat was favorable - the Tigers caught fire here and there. It turned out later that gasoline vapors accumulating in the engine compartment of the tank often flared up. It was only possible to directly hit a “Tiger” or “Panther” from 300 meters away, and then only on the side. Many of our tanks burned out then, but our brigade still pushed the Germans back by two kilometers. But we were at the limit; we couldn’t withstand such a fight anymore.”

Veteran of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps N. Ya. Zheleznov shared the same opinion about the “Tigers”: “...Taking advantage of the fact that we have 76-mm guns, which can take their armor head-on only with 500 meters away, they stood in the open. Why don't you try and come over? He will burn you at 1200-1500 meters! They were impudent. Essentially, while there was no 85-mm cannon, we, like hares, ran away from the “Tigers” and looked for an opportunity to somehow wriggle out and hit him in the side. It was hard. If you see that a “Tiger” is standing at a distance of 800-1000 meters and begins to “baptize” you, then as long as you move the barrel horizontally, you can still sit in the tank. As soon as you start driving vertically, you better jump out. You'll burn! This didn’t happen to me, but the guys jumped out. Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one-on-one...”

T-34 is the first mass-produced Soviet medium tank. In the 30s, there were two extremes in domestic tank building. On the one hand - light tanks. They had speed, mobility and maneuverability, but on the other hand they had poor protection from projectiles and the low firepower of the installed weapons. At the opposite extreme were heavy tanks with strong armor and powerful weapons, but at the same time slow and slow. The T-34 combined the maneuverability of a light tank with a high level of armor protection and powerful weapons at the level of a heavy tank. The T-34 is also considered the most popular tank of World War II - from 1940 to 1947, seven factories in the USSR, and after the war, more than 60 thousand T-34 tanks of various modifications were produced in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The T-34 tank was designed at Design Bureau No. 183 at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after the Comintern under the leadership of chief designer Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin. In the production program of this plant and in service with the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, the T-34 replaced the popular BT light tanks of the 1930s. Their pedigree goes back to the American Christie tank, a sample of which was imported into the USSR in 1931 without a turret, documented according to documents as an “agricultural tractor.” Based on this imported vehicle, a whole family of high-speed tanks was developed in the Soviet Union. In the 30s, the machines of this series were modernized and improved; production models bore the indices BT-2, BT-5 and BT-7. Of course, BT-7 and T-34 are tanks of different classes. The difference in their combat weight is very large - 13.8 tons for the BT versus 30 tons for the T-34. However, firstly, for the first manufacturer of the T-34, the Kharkov Locomotive Plant named after the Comintern, the BT-7 was the previous “old”, and the T-34 the subsequent “new” basic model - the “thirty-four” replaced the BT at the same production capacities. Secondly, both the BT series before the war and the T-34 during the war were the most popular tanks of the USSR Armed Forces. Thirdly, the T-34 inherited the general layout from the BT. Finally, fourthly, it was on the later releases of the BT-7 that the V-2 diesel engine first appeared, which will be installed on all T-34s.

Tank BT

By 1937, extensive experience in operating BT tanks had accumulated, and the participation of Soviet tank crews in the Spanish Civil War made it possible to test these tanks in real combat conditions. As a result, three cardinal shortcomings were revealed. Firstly, the light armored vehicle turned out to be too vulnerable to enemy artillery, because its armor was designed primarily for bulletproof protection. Secondly, due to the wheeled-tracked propulsion, the tank's cross-country ability left much to be desired. Thirdly, a gasoline engine is more dangerous in combat than a diesel engine - when a projectile hits, a gasoline tank ignites much easier and stronger than a diesel tank.

The Armored Directorate (ABTU) of the Red Army issued a technical assignment to the Kharkov plant for the design of a medium tank, initially designated A-20 or BT-20 on October 13, 1937. Initially, it was planned that the new tank, with its combat weight increased from 13 to 19 tons and a new V-2 diesel engine, would retain the wheeled-track type of chassis, like the previous BT models. While working on the A-20, M.I. Koshkin came to the conclusion that in order to increase the thickness of the armor, the power of weapons, and improve off-road capability, it is necessary to abandon the wheel-tracked chassis design in favor of a tracked one. Koshkin had many influential opponents who advocated the preservation of the wheeled-tracked propulsion system. Several of Koshkin’s colleagues, tank designers, were arrested by the NKVD as enemies of the people. Nevertheless, despite the risk, in case of failure, of becoming a victim of accusations of sabotage, Mikhail Ilyich boldly, decisively and uncompromisingly advocated a new tracked propulsion unit.

To evaluate the advantages of this or that scheme in practice, it was necessary to design two prototype tanks - the wheeled-tracked A-20 and the tracked A-32 with a combat weight of 19 tons and an armor thickness of 20-25 mm. These two projects were discussed at a meeting of the Defense Committee on May 4, 1938, in which I.V. participated. Stalin, members of the Politburo, military personnel and designers. Tank engineer A.A., a participant in the battles in Spain. Vetrov, in his report, based on personal combat experience, spoke in favor of a tracked tank - the wheeled propulsion unit proved to be unreliable and difficult to repair. Vetrov was actively supported by Koshkin - he emphasized that the tracked design is less metal-intensive, simpler and cheaper to produce, and, therefore, the scale of serial production of tracked tanks at equal costs will be much greater than the production volume of wheeled-tracked tanks. At the same time, there were supporters of the wheeled version - the head of the ABTU, corps commander D.G. Pavlov and other speakers actively campaigned for the usual wheeled-tracked tank. The result was summed up by Stalin, who proposed building and testing tanks of both types.

So, in 1938, prototypes of two tanks were tested, differing in the type of propulsion - the wheeled-tracked A-20 and the tracked A-32. The dimensions of the hull, power unit and turret of these tanks were the same. But the A-32 chassis has already received five road wheels, like the future production T-34. At first, comparative tests of the A-20 and A-32 did not reveal any clear advantages of either design.

Koshkin was still looking for an opportunity to prove the advantage of the tracked undercarriage. He pointed out that even with the construction of two single prototypes, the manufacture and assembly of the wheeled-tracked undercarriage took much more time and effort than the manufacture of the tracked one. In addition, during sea trials, Mikhail Ilyich argued that by eliminating heavy wheel gearboxes, it was possible to increase the thickness and weight of the tank’s armor and the power of the installed weapons. The tracked propulsion system makes the tank better protected and armed. At the same time, on wheels the tank catastrophically loses cross-country ability in off-road conditions.

In September 1939, at a demonstration of new models of tank equipment to government members - K.E. Voroshilov, A.A. Zhdanov, A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Voznesensky Design Bureau, headed by Koshkin, presented the second modified model of the tracked A-32. The light, elegant tank easily overcame all obstacles, forded the river, climbed a steep, steep bank, and easily knocked down a thick pine tree. The admiration of the audience knew no bounds, and the director of the Leningrad Kirov plant N.V. Barykov said: “Remember this day - the birthday of a unique tank.”

In the fall of 1939, construction began in Kharkov of two prototypes of the improved A-34 tracked tank, which differed from the A-32 in the armor thickness of 40-45 mm. This was the maximum possible for the existing engine and chassis. Such armor increased the weight to 26-30 tons and confidently protected the vehicle from anti-tank guns with a caliber of 37 and 45 mm. A significant improvement in the security of the new product became possible only thanks to the tracked drive.

An important role in the birth of the T-34 was played by the creation of a new generation engine. Kharkov designers K.F. Chelpan, I.Ya. Trashutin, Ya.E. Vickman, I.S. Behr and their comrades designed a new 12-cylinder V-shaped diesel engine V-2 with a power of 400-500 hp. The engine was distinguished by a gas distribution scheme that was progressive for its time. Each cylinder head had two camshafts (like modern cars). The drive was carried out not by a chain or belt, but by shafts - one for each head. The timing shaft transmitted torque to one of the camshafts, which, in turn, rotated the second camshaft of its head using a pair of gears. An interesting feature of the B-2 was the dry sump lubrication system, which required an additional oil reservoir. It should be added that the B-2 was an original development, and not a copy of any foreign model. Unless the designers could have borrowed a set of technical solutions from the then piston aircraft engines.

The layout of the T-34 turned out to be as follows. Ahead is the fighting compartment for the crew. The driver sat on the left, like a driver in a domestic car. Next to him was the place of the radio operator, in front of whom stood a machine gun in the inclined frontal plate of the turret. At the rear of the turret there were seats for the crew commander and the main caliber gun loader. Since communications did not always work well, the commander often gave orders to the driver in a peculiar way. He simply pushed him with his boots in the left or right shoulder, in the back. Everyone understood perfectly well that this meant that they had to turn right or left, accelerate, brake, and turn around.

The engine and transmission compartment was located behind the fighting compartment. The engine was mounted longitudinally, followed by the main clutch, which plays the same role in a tracked vehicle as the clutch in a car. Next was a four-speed manual transmission. From it, through the final drive gearboxes, torque was supplied to the side clutches and the driving rear sprockets of the tracks. Already during the war, by 1943, a 5-speed gearbox began to be gradually introduced into production instead of a 4-speed one.

The chassis consisted of five large double road wheels on each side, drive wheels at the rear and idler wheels (idlers) at the front. Four rollers on each side were equipped with individual spring suspension. The springs were installed obliquely in shafts along the sides of the armored hull. The suspensions of the first rollers in the bow were protected by steel casings. Over the years and at different factories, at least 7 types of road wheels were produced. At first they had rubber tires, then due to the wartime shortage of rubber they had to produce rollers without tires with internal shock absorption. The tank equipped with them rumbled louder. When rubber began to arrive through Lend-Lease, bandages appeared again. The caterpillar consisted of 37 flat and 37 ridge tracks. The vehicle was supplied with two spare tracks and two jacks.

On March 17, 1940, a demonstration of new models of tank equipment was scheduled in the Kremlin to the country's top leaders. The production of two T-34 prototypes had just been completed, the tanks were already moving under their own power, all their mechanisms were working. But the speedometers of the cars were just counting down the first hundreds of kilometers. According to the standards in force at that time, the mileage of tanks allowed for display and testing had to be more than two thousand kilometers. In order to have time to run-in and complete the required mileage, Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin decided to drive the prototype cars from Kharkov to Moscow under his own power. This was a risky decision: the tanks themselves were a secret product that could not be shown to the population. One fact of traveling on public roads could be regarded by the NKVD as a disclosure of state secrets. On a thousand-kilometer route, equipment that had not been tested and was not really familiar to the driver-mechanics and repairmen could break down due to any breakdowns and get into an accident. Besides, the beginning of March is still winter. But at the same time, the run provided a unique chance to test new vehicles in extreme conditions, check the correctness of the chosen technical solutions, and identify the advantages and disadvantages of the tank’s components and assemblies.

Koshkin personally took enormous responsibility for this run. On the night of March 5-6, 1940, a convoy left Kharkov - two camouflaged tanks, accompanied by Voroshilovets tractors, one of which was loaded with fuel, tools and spare parts, and on the second there was a passenger body like a “kung” for the participants to rest. Part of the way, Koshkin himself drove the new tanks, sitting at their levers alternately with the factory driver mechanics. For the sake of secrecy, the route ran off-road through snow-covered forests, fields and rough terrain in the Kharkov, Belgorod, Tula and Moscow regions. Off-road, in winter, the units worked to the limit; many minor breakdowns had to be repaired and the necessary adjustments made. But the future T-34s still reached Moscow on March 12. One vehicle’s main clutch failed. Its replacement was carried out at the tank repair plant in Cherkizovo.

On the appointed day, the 17th, both vehicles were transported from the tank repair plant to the Kremlin. During the run M.I. Koshkin caught a cold. At the show, he coughed heavily, which even members of the government noticed. However, the show itself was a triumph of the new product. Two tanks, led by testers N. Nosik and V. Dyukanov, drove around Ivanovskaya Square of the Kremlin - one to the Troitsky Gate, the other to the Borovitsky Gate. Before reaching the gate, they spectacularly turned around and rushed towards each other, striking sparks from the paving stones, stopped, turned around, made several circles at high speed, and braked in the same place. I.V. Stalin liked the sleek, fast car. His words are conveyed differently by different sources. Some eyewitnesses claim that Joseph Vissarionovich said: “This will be the swallow in the tank forces,” according to others, the phrase sounded different: “This is the first swallow of the tank forces.”

After the display, both tanks were tested at the Kubinka training ground, test fire from guns of different calibers, which showed the high level of security of the new product. In April there was a return trip to Kharkov. M.I. Koshkin proposed again to travel not on railway platforms, but under his own power through the spring thaw. Along the way, one tank fell into a swamp. The designer, who had barely recovered from his first cold, got very wet and cold. This time the disease turned into complications. In Kharkov, Mikhail Ilyich was hospitalized for a long time, his condition worsened, and he soon became disabled - doctors removed one of his lungs. On September 26, 1940, Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin died. The T-34 had to be mastered under the new chief designer A.A. Morozov.

The introduction of the new tank was faced with numerous difficulties; GABTU and the People's Commissariat of Medium Engineering twice tried to curtail the development of production. Only with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was the final decision made to put the T-34 into mass production.

The first T-34 releases had different weapons. The main caliber gun, which is mounted on the turret and is an important visual detail of any tank, was initially a 76.2 mm L-11 gun with a 30.5-caliber barrel. It was soon replaced by a more advanced F-32 gun with a length of 31.5. Later, in 1941, especially for the T-34, the design bureau of V.N. Grabina designed the F-34 cannon of the same 76.2 mm caliber, with a 41-caliber barrel, which was significantly superior to its predecessors. The standard machine gun was a 7.62 caliber DT. The telescopic sight for direct fire was called TOD-6. It is for the caliber of the main gun that tanks produced before December 1943 are called T-34-76.

In addition to the Kharkov Locomotive Plant, production of the T-34 was planned even before the war at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. In total, until June 22, 1941, 1225 T-34s entered service with the Red Army, of which 967 ended up in the western districts. With the beginning of the war, according to the decree of July 1, 1941, production was also launched at the shipbuilding plant No. 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo" in Gorky. The choice fell on this enterprise, since it had processing bases, crane facilities and workshop bays suitable for the production of T-34. It was in Sormovo that tank production continued continuously throughout the war. T-34s from different factories were noticeably different from each other - it was evident that in Kharkov, Stalingrad and Gorky there was a different machine park.

Production of the T-34 in Kharkov continued until October 19, 1941. With the approach of the front, under continuous bombing, the plant’s equipment had to be loaded onto railway platforms and evacuated to Nizhny Tagil to the Ural Carriage Works, while the plant retained its Kharkov number 183. At first, the new location did not even have enough workshop space. Sometimes it happened that a crane unloaded a machine from a platform onto a steel sheet, a tractor pulled the sheet with the machine from the railway track under the nearest pine trees, power was supplied from a nearby energy train, and workers began to manufacture tank parts right in the open air in frost and snow. True, we managed to bring a large supply of components from Kharkov.

But when production at Uralvagonzavod was put in order, it was there, in Nizhny Tagil in 1942, that a huge amount of work was carried out to optimize the tank’s production technology, which made it possible to make its production truly widespread. First of all, we are talking about a fundamentally new technology for welding armored hulls - automatic, under a layer of flux. It was designed by the Electric Welding Institute, which was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil. The work was headed by Academician E.O. Paton.

Academician E.O. Paton

With the introduction of automatic welding, productivity increased sharply - T-34 bodies came off the assembly line in a continuous stream. It turned out that the tank’s protection had also improved radically. For testing, a body of two halves was welded. One side panel was welded the old fashioned way by hand. The second and the nose are under a layer of gumboil. The corps was subjected to severe shelling with high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. The very first hits - and the hand-welded side cracked along the seam. The hull was deployed, and the submerged seam withstood seven direct hits in a row - it turned out to be stronger than the armor.

In 1942, for the creation of the T-34 tank, its three leading designers - Mikhail Koshkin (posthumously), Alexander Morozov and Nikolai Kucherenko were awarded the Stalin medal awards.

M.I. Koshkin A.A. Morozov N.A. Kucherenko

The T-34 used at least seven types of turrets - cast, welded, stamped. The earliest version is a small tower, commonly called a “pie”. In 1942, under the leadership of M.A. Nabutovsky developed a new hexagonal tower, the so-called “nut”. It was more technologically advanced in production. Both towers were considered cramped for the two crew members sitting in them.

In 1942, again due to the advance of enemy troops, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant failed. At the same time, production of the T-34 was also mastered at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant and in Omsk at plant No. 174. The production of tanks at several factories further diversified the number of options. In combat conditions this created additional difficulties. Whenever possible, damaged tanks were evacuated from the battlefield, sometimes dismantled for spare parts right on the spot. They tried to assemble one from the surviving parts, components, and assemblies of several machines. But sometimes, to the horror of tankers and repairmen, identical spare parts for different vehicles did not fit together! It all ended with Stalin calling the Chief Designer of Plant No. 183 A.A. Morozov, and categorically demanded that parts of different plants be brought to a single standard. Therefore, in 1943, unified technical documentation for all factories was issued.

In 1941, a special modification was developed and mastered in 1942 - the OT-34 flamethrower tank. In December 1943, the T-34 was modernized, received a new turret, a new main caliber gun and, accordingly, was renamed T-34-85. This modification became the main one at the end of the war and in the early post-war years. Most of the tanks of this family that have survived today are either T-34-85 or former T-34-76 with the turret plate, turret and gun from the “eighty-five” installed during repairs.

After the war, the V-2 diesel not only became the basis for post-war tank engines. It has also found application in the automotive industry. 25-ton MAZ-525 dump trucks worked on the restoration of the national economy and the great construction projects of the five-year plan. To transport new types of weapons, primarily missiles, as well as the heaviest economic cargo, MAZ-535/537, then MAZ-543 tractors were developed. All of them were equipped with modernized diesel engines of the T-34 tank.

The T-34 tank is considered the most famous Soviet tank and one of the most recognizable symbols of the Great Patriotic War. Thanks to its combat qualities, the T-34 was recognized as the best medium tank of the Second World War and had a huge influence on the further development of world tank building. During its creation, Soviet designers managed to find the optimal balance between the main combat, operational and technological characteristics.