After posting information about this topic on some forums, an interested discussion of the problem under consideration arose on them. In particular, many opinions were expressed at VIF-RZh. This included the following message:

From: Correct VI forum, 17.03 15:35
In response to: Re: So what time did the Germans attack on 06/22/41? – Zakoretsky

Everything has already been discussed in this thread: http://vif2ne.ru:2003/nvk/forum/archive/1135/1135829.htm

K. Zakoretsky. If you decide to post part 3 “What time did the Germans attack” on Z-History using materials from the VIF2NE forum, then please provide the appropriate link.

First of all, I do. Secondly, I would like to note that I did not create any messages on this topic on the VIF2NE forum. And I was pleased to know that VIF2NE also became interested in the problem of time. However, after reading most of the opinions there, I do not agree with what is there" IT'S ALL ALREADY discussed." Such a categorical statement arose due to the fact that one of the participants provided a link to a German website that posted a list of periods when summer time was introduced in Germany:

a) DST, Universal Time + 2 hours: (Summer Time, International Time +2 hours)

Clocks were advanced one hour with respect to CET: (Periods when 1 hour was added)

1919 to 1939: No DST (No Daylight Saving Time).

Abbreviations:

UT: Universal Time ("Greenwich-Time") - Universal Time ("Greenwich Time")
DST: Daylight Saving Time
CET= UT + 1 h: Central European Time - Central European Time
CEST= UT + 2 h: Central European Summer Time - Central European Summer Time
CEMT = UT + 3 h: Central European Midsummer Time - Central European Super Summer Time

And this explanation arose:

Madame and Monsieur

>From 2:00 04/01/1940 to 3:00 02/11/1942
That is, 2 a.m. on April 1, 1940 became 3 a.m. (GMT+1 became GMT+2),
On November 2, 1942, everything returned to its place again (GMT+2 => GMT+1).
The difference with Moscow during this period was 1 (“maternity”) hour (GMT+3),
and during “Uranus” it’s already 2 hours.

>So During the Battle of Kursk and Operation Typhoon, Berlin time differed from Moscow time by 1 hour. And on June 22, 1941, the difference was also 1 hour. The Germans write that they started the war at 3 o’clock, but according to Soviet data this happened at 4 o’clock.

If I understood all your data correctly, and if our “maternity” time then stood unshakable “like a rock,” then it should be so.

Happiness is when you have everything at home (not mine), Andrey.

So, is everything settled?
Was it summer time in Germany in June 1941?
And that’s why the difference with Moscow was 1 hour?
And everything fits? And can the topic be closed?

Perhaps... But it seems somehow strange that in the winters of 1940-1941 and 1941-1942 the Germans lived according to summer time! And secondly, there is one more remark: it is known that the Germans on the morning of June 22, 1941 started the war at 3:00 AM “WITH DAWN”! But this event can be verified. And if it turns out that on the western border of the USSR, according to German summer time, sunrise began at about 3-00, and according to Soviet maternity time, accordingly, at about 4-00, then everything really comes together and the topic can be closed. You can check this, for example, using the same astronomical shareware program "SKYGLOBE 3.6".

Here the green horizontal line is the horizon.
Letter " N" - direction north.
Letters " NE" - northeast.
Letter " E" - East (" East" - 90 degrees from the direction north).
Yellow circle of the Sun (" SUN") coincides with the direction to the northeast (" NE").
To the left below the horizon is the star "Castor", to the right and above are the positions of the planets of Jupiter ( JUP), Uranus ( URA), Saturn ( SAT), Moon ( MOO), as well as some stars, for example, Aldebaran.
Although, of course, they were no longer really visible, since they were overshadowed by the light of the Sun rising from the horizon.

But what is this time (3-43)?
Time zone GMT+1? Or summer for this zone GMT+1+1?

In order to understand, it would first be useful to familiarize yourself with the general theory of sunrise on June 22 within any time zone at different latitudes. The fact is that the Earth is round and has been rotating at almost the same speeds for many thousands of years. And the meanings of these movements are not secret. For example, you can carry out calculations for the Greenwich meridian (0 degrees longitude), starting from the equator. The results can be summarized in the following table:

Sunrise on June 22 at the latitudes of the Earth’s northern hemisphere (values ​​+ - several minutes)

What time are the values ​​indicated? Belt or summer?

This can be verified using known data for known coordinates.
For example, in Kyiv ( 50 deg. 25 min. northern latitude, 30 deg. 32 min. eastern longitude) June 22, 2006 The sun should rise at 4-46 summer time (or 3-46 , respectively, standard time).

But how to link its coordinates with the created table?

In terms of latitude, it’s simple - take the line for latitude 50-00.
And it remains to determine what Kyiv is closer to - to the borders of the belt or to its middle (for GMT+2).
This can be done according to the rule:

The Greenwich meridian is the midpoint of the zero time zone (GMT). After 7 deg. 30 min. to the east is its eastern border. Further, after 15 degrees, the boundaries of other belts are located. Well, the middle between the two borders is the middle of the time zone.

So: 0 deg. + 7.5 (eastern limit of GMT) + 15 (GMT+1) + 7.5 (half GMT+2) = 30 degrees.
Those. meridian 30 degrees east longitude is the middle of the 2nd time zone.
Those. Kyiv is practically located on it.
And we find in the table the value of sunrise for the middle of the belt in the line for 50-00: 3-45 , which practically coincided with the time indicated in the tear-off calendar (plus 1 hour for the summer).
CONCLUSION: in the created table the sunrise times for different latitudes are indicated WAIST.

And you can notice that the time of sunrise at the borders of any time zone differs from the middle by 30 minutes, which agrees with the theory: through each time zone, the time should change by 1 hour (and from the middle - by half an hour, i.e. by 30 minutes).

And another conclusion: the closer to the Equator, the later the Sun rises, and the closer to the North Pole, the earlier. And starting from a certain latitude (66 degrees 33 minutes - “Arctic Circle”) the Sun does not set beyond the horizon at all in summer.

TSB, 3rd ed., volume 20:

Arctic Circle, an earthly parallel spaced from the equator by 66°33" (the angle of inclination of the earth's axis to the ecliptic plane). The Arctic Circle, located in the Northern Hemisphere of the Earth, is called the Northern Arctic Circle, in the Southern Hemisphere - the Southern P. k. On the day of the summer solstice (June 21 or 22) to the north of the P. k. The sun does not set, and on the day of the winter solstice (December 21 or 22) it does not rise. - the Sun does not descend below the horizon or rise above it, it increases as it approaches the pole, where day and night last for six months (polar day and polar night). A similar phenomenon is observed in the southern hemisphere of the Earth. Refraction of light complicates this somewhat. phenomenon, increasing the duration of the polar day at the expense of the night and increasing the number of days with the sun not setting. P. k. are considered the boundaries of cold climate zones.

Let's return to Berlin: its latitude is 52 degrees. 32 min. Longitude - 13 degrees. 25 min.
In longitude, this is approximately the middle of the time zone:
0 deg. + 7.5 (eastern limit of GMT) + 7.5 (half GMT+1) = 15 degrees.
We find in the table the lines of 50 and 55 degrees. and in the cells in the middle of the belt we read: 3-45 and 3-17.
Those. in Berlin, the time of sunrise in standard time can be estimated as 3-35 (but this is 2 degrees east). The program shows the time - 3-43. error - 8 minutes (quite acceptable). The main thing is that the hour is shown as one - 3 .

So, in Berlin, standard time on June 22, the Sun rises at 3:43,
and if they introduced daylight saving time, then at 4:43.
And on the eastern border of this time zone (near Brest) it should rise 30 minutes earlier
(i.e. at 3-10).

It remains to be seen in what latitudes the Germans attacked on 06/22/41.
As the map shows, they advanced in the geographical zone from 49 degrees. up to 55 degrees north latitude:
(Hereinafter information from the "ATLAS OF THE WORLD", Moscow, "State Geodesy of the USSR", 1991)

More information from Atalas, from the time zone map on page 14:

Mid GMT: Paris, London.
Mid GMT+1: Berlin, Rome.
Eastern border GMT+1: western border of the USSR.
Western border GMT+2: western border of the USSR.
Mid GMT+2: Leningrad, Kyiv, Ankara, Cairo.
Eastern border GMT+2: Moscow, Murmansk.
Mid GMT+3: Volgograd, Tbilisi.

Thus, in the German offensive zone on June 22, 1941, the Sun should have risen according to Berlin standard time at 2-47 - 3-20 . (Or in 3-47 - 4-20 according to summer, if there was one).

Those. rounded, dawn on the border of the USSR with Germany on June 22, 1941 according to German clocks should have been either 3 hours (zone time) or 4 (according to summer, if there was one).

Accordingly, on the Soviet side, the clock had to show or 4 by waist or 5 according to summer ("maternity leave").

MATERNITY TIME standard time plus one hour; Unlike summer time, this excess is constant throughout the year. Introduced by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 16, 1930 with the aim of more rational use of the daylight hours (cancelled in February 1991). In Russia, maternity time was re-adopted in October 1991. Thus, the time of a given time zone in Russia differs from universal time by the number of the time zone (in hours) plus one hour (in the summer - an additional hour).

This is where the problem arises:

If the Germans attacked at 3:00 a.m. summer time, then it’s 2:00 a.m. time zone time. And there is still 1 hour left until dawn in the Brest area. Those. the Germans would have to use searchlights, car headlights, flashlights, flare bombs, mines, rocket launchers, and tracer bullets. But in this case, all the memoirs should clearly contain all this pandemonium.
But she's not there. Because everyone writes that the war has begun" HAPPY DAWN".

But according to geo-astronomical data, the dawn of June 22 at 2-00 on the eastern border of zones according to standard time (or at 3-00 according to summer time) occurs only in latitudes of at least 60-00 degrees north latitude ( Leningrad, Helsinki, Oslo, Magadan, Stockholm is a little further south - 59 degrees).
And at 2-00 in the middle of the time zone, the Sun rises even further north - at 62-00 degrees [this is exactly the latitude of the upper reaches (from where it flows) of the Kolyma, and the capitals of Karelia (Petrozavodsk) and Komi (Syktyvkar) are slightly to the south].
Well, almost the whole of Great Britain is south of not only 62-00, but also 60-00.

AND "SKYGLOBE 3.6" persistently shows...

Or maybe this program is all lying?
Is it possible to check it?

For example, it is known that on March 22, day is equal to night. Those. Sunrise in the middle of any time zone should begin at 6-00 standard time (daylight saving time is not yet used at this time!) or at 7-00 maternity time, if one was used (as now in Russia or as in 1941 in the USSR). And, accordingly, on the western border - in 6-30 by waist or in 7-30 according to summer.

For control in "SKYGLOBE 3.6" We take the coordinates of Moscow for 06/22/41 and shift them to Brest, setting the position of the Sun on the horizon. We get 7-28 :

IT CONVERGES!

Similarly, according to Berlin time for Brest (Berlin is in the middle of GMT+1, and in Brest sunrise should be 30 minutes earlier, i.e. somewhere at 5-30):

IT CONVERGES!

Well, in Berlin itself, sunrise should be around 6-00:

IT CONVERGES!

Yes, that means "SKYGLOBE 3.6" isn't he lying?

We open the tear-off calendar for Kyiv for March 22 (also the middle of the time zone and should be approximately 6-00). We read: "Sunrise - 5:57"

IT CONVERGES!

We reveal the memoirs of Marshal G.K. Zhukov, "MEMORIES AND REFLECTIONS", 7th edition, 1986, volume 2, p. 8-9:
=====

Sorry, at 3:30 to dry the dew near Rovno on June 22 The sun can only be in German standard time! And nothing else! No summer time! In summer time this means 2:30 a.m. standard time. And at 2:30 a.m. on June 22, the Sun can dry the dew only near Leningrad or Helsinki...

Ooh! What confusion, however!...
By the way, if the Germans attacked at 3:00 a.m. summer time, can this be compared with someone else who attacked the USSR together with them? (At what time did they attack?)
For example, when did the Romanians start the war? Any data?

There is one site" CORNER OF THE SKY"(Aviation Encyclopedia), where the article by A. Gulyas is posted -
The first days of the war (June 22, 1941)

And it provides information about the combat work of Soviet pilots on June 22, 1941 in the Odessa Military District. In particular:
======================
Events unfolded completely differently in the Odessa Military District. The enemy attacked 11 airfields; but almost everywhere he received a decisive rebuff and suffered losses. The greatest success was achieved by the 67th IAP of Major Rudakov. ..... At 4 in the morning The regiment was alerted. Soon in the direction Bolgarika airfield a scout appeared. Lieutenant Ermak took off from the interception and shot him down with two bursts. Some time later, 9 (according to other sources - 10) bombers appeared over the airfield. A group of Lieutenant A. Moklyak rose to meet them in I-16 fighters. ....

Having suffered two failures in a row and being convinced, that Bulgarian - a tough nut to crack, the German command launched a massive raid, which involved about 50 bombers and 30 fighters. The bombers came in waves at intervals of 2-3 minutes. Each nine was covered by six Bf-109s. The entire regiment - fifty I-16s - entered the battle with them. Dividing into groups, our pilots simultaneously attacked the bombers and their cover. The enemy's formation immediately broke down. 5 bombers and 2 fighters were shot down. Alexander Moklyak showed himself brilliantly in this battle. With well-aimed fire he shot down two He-111s (according to other sources - S.M.81), and the third rammed and died. All this happened between 5 and 6 a.m.. So at the end of the second hour of the war A. Moklyak became the leader among Soviet pilots in terms of the number of victories. ....

Failure befell the enemy during the raid on Grosulovo airfield. At 5 o'clock 10 minutes three nine Ju-88s, under the cover of nine Bf-109s, tried to bomb the SB and Pe-2 parking lots. The first group of attackers missed, and Afanasy Karmanov interfered with the second. He ended up in the Grosulovo area by chance, ferrying a MiG-3 from a field camp to main airfield in Chisinau. Captain A. Karmanov was not embarrassed by the enemy's multiple superiority. He shot down one Junkers on the move and scattered the rest. However, all nine covering fighters immediately fell on him. ... Surviving with the plane is a skill. .... A. Karmanov’s plane resembled a sieve, but landed at its airfield, but one of the Messerschmitts was burning out in the vicinity of Grosulovo. IN 4th IAP Other pilots also distinguished themselves. A.I. Pokryshkin writes that over Grigoriopol, Tiraspol and Chisinau The regiment's pilots shot down about 20 enemy aircraft.

55th IAP was based under the command of Mr. V.P. Ivanov in Balti. In April, as at many airfields on the western border, construction of a concrete runway began there, and three squadrons of the regiment flew to Mayaki. One of the experienced pilots was Art. l-t A.I. Pokryshkin. The war caught up with him at the airfield in Grigoriopol. He returned to Mayaki after the first enemy raids. Based in Balti The 1st squadron of Mr. F. Atrashkevich turned out to be understaffed - in addition to Pokryshkin’s unit, Figichev’s unit, which was on patrol at the very border, was missing near Ungheni. F. Atrashkevich was also summoned there. In Chisinau Third level commander K. Seliverstov was at the headquarters. The remaining 5 ordinary pilots, led by flight commander Mironov and squadron adjutant Ovchinnikov, did everything to repel the raid of a large group of bombers under the cover of Messerschmitts (more than 20 He-111s and 18 Bf-109s). But the forces were unequal, and it was not possible to prevent the raid. 2 people died at the airport, fuel warehouse burned down, Three MiGs were damaged. .... F. Atrashkevich especially distinguished himself by shooting down the Messerschmitt of the group commander - a major with the Iron Cross. Only the lack of accurate information about the location of the headquarters of the 27th Fighter Squadron (JG-27) does not allow us to say with complete confidence that the downed major was the commander of JG-27, Wolfgang Schelmann...

Along with the above 4th IAP over Chisinau pilots fought 69th IAP, where is the deputy The regiment commander was one of the most famous Soviet aces in Spain, Lev Shestakov. The regiment was part of the 21st SAD and based near Odessa. On the first day of the war he did not suffer any losses, and Major L. Shestakov and Mr. Astashkin shot down 3 aircraft: 2 Ju-88s were destroyed over Chisinau, and Astashkin shot down a Do-215 on the outskirts of the airfield, winning his second victory.

Moses Stepanovich Tokarev started the war in the 131st IAP. June 22, patrolling at the head of nine I-16 near Tiraspol, he met a group of 20 Ju-88s, covered by 12 Bf-109s. ....

The combat account of the pilots of the Black Sea Fleet was opened by Jr. Lt. M.S. Maksimov. Early in the morning of June 22, the 96th squadron consisting of 16 I-153 and I-16 under the command of A.I. Korobitsyn on the approaches to Izmail met 12 Romanian bombers . Our pilots shot down 5 planes. In addition to M.S. Maksimov, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Borisov and Prince A.I. Korobitsyn also won personal victories. Two planes were shot down by B.V. Maslov and A.A. Malinovsky.
==============

It turns out that AT THE SAME TIME (why wait?) military operations began in the south of the Soviet western border, which at that time ran between the USSR and ROMANIA! And it turns out that along with German planes, Romanian planes began to cross the Soviet guardrail. More precisely, not only at the same time as the German ones in the PribOVO, ZapOVO and KievOVO zones, but German planes also took off from Romanian airfields in the direction of Moldova. AND WITH them, Romanian planes went into battle. This is illustrated by the remark that a plane was shot down over a Soviet airfield in Bolgarika S.M.81- Whose production is this? German? Which troops were equipped with such aircraft? Romanian? And when describing the battles over Izmail, this article directly talks about Romanian airplanes.

So, it must be assumed that Romanian planes flew into battle at the same time as the Germans.
What time, may I know?

It turns out that you can...
By the way, if the Germans attacked in 3-00 supposedly summer time, then we must assume that in Romania, located in the same time zone, summer time should also show the same 3-00 . Logical?
But if the Germans attacked at 3:00 according to the waist, then if Romania used daylight saving time, then the Romanians should have started at 4-00. And if they didn’t use it, then like the Germans at 3:00.

All this can be clarified on another site: Kharina V.V. "Aviators of World War II", and on it in an article by M. Zhirokhov with the participation of A. Stratulat (Moldova) - Romanian squadrons in the skies of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, June 22, 1941

In the introduction, the authors note that " the actions of the Romanian Air Force during the Second World War represent a little-studied piece of the history of air warfare"and they wanted in this article" analyze the actions of Romanian aviation on the first day of the war". As for the start time, the information there is as follows:
========
On the night of June 21-22, 1941, in all Romanian aviation formations located at the front, the commanders gathered the pilots and read out to them a message from the State Undersecretary of Aviation Gheorghe Zhienescu. At the end of this message the following was said: “Young flyers! The booms are trumpeting and their echo is heard in the forests, the sky is rumbling in the song of engines, to arms, to the helm, forward with God!” At dawn on June 22 The Second World War began for the Romanian Royal Air Force.

The main strike force of Romania was the Combat Air Group, under the command of squadron general Constantin Celareanu, a large aviation formation that included 2 bomber flotillas (11 bomber squadrons - He-111, S.M.-79, Loos, Potez 63, Bloch 210, IAR-37), .....

The Red Army concentrated significant air force forces in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In Bessarabia, at the Bolgrad airfield there were 67 IAP, and at the airfields Bulgarica-Ialoveni there were 68 and 82 air regiments. In Chisinau there was 20 SAD, which included 55 IAP (Balti airfield), 45 BAP (Tiraspol airfield) and 2 parachute regiments. In Bukovina, at airfields in the area of ​​Chernivtsi there were 87, 187 and 149 IAP. Also in this area were 86 BAP, 224 PBB and 4 parachute regiments. In total, the Red Army had at its disposal 840 bombers and 960 fighters in Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Transnistria. To this can be added 240 reconnaissance aircraft and approximately 2,500 paratroopers.

"Ardyalul" at 4.00

The General Staff of the Air Combat Group received from General Ramiro Enescu, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, the following message: " Fighting our aviation on the Eastern Front, developed jointly with the German command, will begin at dawn on June 22 1941 Directive No. comes into force. 34. The operation must be organized in such a way that so that all bombers and reconnaissance aircraft at the same time, with the call sign "Ardyalul", crossed the border at 4 o'clock in the morning. Fighter aircraft will be on combat readiness at dawn to provide air cover. I wish you success and it is also necessary to contact the IV Army regarding the conduct of aerial reconnaissance, which must be carried out, taking into account the crossing of the border by the Combat Air Force and in accordance with the plan and instructions of the German Army Air Command. I expect an operational report tomorrow, or rather this morning, after completing the first task." General Constantin Celareanu immediately responded: "The air combat group is ready and able to carry out directive No. 34".

First wave

Zilistea-Buzau airfield, 0 hours 5 minutes.

“A terrible roar broke the silence of the night, and the walls of the hangars shook so that it seemed they were about to collapse,” recalled Lieutenant Mircea Nikolaou. All 200 German bombers He-111 German 4th Fleet and 27th Flotilla under the command of General Boelcke took off and headed East. There was an indescribable noise, a fantastic performance that cannot be forgotten. After the German planes took off, at 12.30[those. at 0-30 - zhistory], we began to prepare too..."

3 hours 50 minutes.

The 5th Bomber Group, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Paul Landmann, of 17 He-111H3 aircraft of the 78th, 79th and 80th squadrons took off to bomb airfields in the area of ​​Chisinau and Tiraspol, a station and a railway siding. Each aircraft carried 4,250 kg and 16 50 kg bombs. Accompanied by 27 He-112 and Bf-109E fighters of the 5th and 7th fighter groups, at 4 o'clock in the morning, Romanian He-111N3 bombers crossed the Prut. The aircraft, tail number 21, with a crew consisting of Lieutenant Mircea Nicolau - crew commander, Junior Lieutenant Ion Padureanu and Lieutenant Sorin Tulea - flight gunner (since he was assigned to duty, he could not fly, but volunteered), was the first Romanian aircraft , who dropped bombs on the Tiraspol airfield where the aircraft of the 45th BAP were based. “Tiraspol appeared in the distance,” recalled Lieutenant Sorin Tulya. Airfield structures, warehouses and hangars were visible. We dropped half the bombs, avoiding the runway we were planning to use soon. We headed towards Chisinau and, from a height of 500 meters, struck a railway siding where there were trains with ammunition and troops. The blast wave was so powerful that the plane was thrown up. We landed at 5.20 "The bombs dropped by Romanian planes destroyed 12 Soviet planes on the ground.

Pogoanele-Buzau airfield.

At 2.45 the engines of the S.M.-79 bombers start 1st Bomb Group. Plane No. takes off first. 5 of the 71st squadron (call sign Mihai), which is controlled by the group commander himself, Lieutenant Commander Komsha Liviu. Due to soft ground, plane No. crashes during takeoff. 13, but the crew was not injured. After a twenty minute delay, the planes take off 72 Squadron (call sign Romeo). Due to a sudden stop of the left engine, aircraft No. 12 is forced to return. The disgruntled chief adjutant, pilot Ioan Kirya, could not restrain himself and began to cry. The remaining 9 bombers crossed the Prut at 4.03 , heading towards enemy airfields in Bolgrad and Bulgerika. Over the target they were attacked by Soviet I-16s and a hot battle ensued over the airfield. The crew of Captain Constantin Stoenescu shot down 2 I-16 fighters in this battle....

Of the four aircraft of the 72nd Squadron (Romeo) that took off, only three bombed the airfield in Bulgerika: at 4.45 , when the planes were heading towards Bolgrad, the formation was attacked by several I-16s. ....

The bombers of the 1st Bomb Group landed between 5.05 and 5.30. Of the 9 aircraft participating in this raid, 2 were lost, as well as 10 flight personnel.

Fighter actions

Ramnicu Sarat airfield, 3 hours 35 minutes.

He-112 fighters of the 51st squadron under the command of squadron commander Virgil Trandafirescu take off to attack the Izmail Karaklia airfield. Above the target, the leader ordered by radio to attack the airfield from south to north, where a formation of Soviet aircraft could be seen . Some I-16s began to fly across the airfield, but were attacked by the trailing pair of He-112s. Junior Lieutenant Theodore Moscu, diving onto the taking off I-16s, shot down one Soviet fighter and announced two more shot down in the ensuing air battle. His plane was seriously damaged and Moscu was forced to withdraw from the battle. He landed in Ramnicu Sarat at 4.50 . Moscu's leader, adjutant Pavel Konstantin, confirmed two and one probable victory of his leader....

18 IAR-80 aircraft of the 8th Fighter Group took off at 3.45 to cover the S.M.-79 bombers of the 72nd squadron. ....

To cover the He-111 group sent to bomb an airfield in the Chisinau region, a flight of Bf-109Es was allocated, led by Captain Alexandru Manoliu, commander of the 57th squadron. ....

Second wave

At 10.50, 12 Potez 63 aircraft of the 2nd Bomber Group, accompanied by 12 He-112s, attacked the airfield in Bolgrad, railway and an airfield in the south and, accordingly, southeast of Bulgerik. As a result, at least 200 meters of the railway were destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb. The Romanian group encountered fierce opposition from Soviet anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft...
===========

Thus, Romanian planes crossed the border with the USSR at approximately 4:00 and at that time the Sun was already illuminating targets on the ground, since some Romanian planes landed back at 4:45 having completed the task visually without illumination by spotlights visible Soviet planes (and not those in the dark). Question: what time of sunrise in the area of ​​the Soviet border along the Prut (say, in its northern part) can the program show "SKYGLOBE 3.6"? Theoretically - approximately 4-00 (Romanian summer time):

or 5-00 Moscow maternity leave:

IT CONVERGES!

Another question: where did the German He-111 bombers fly, which took off at 0-30 from the Zilistea-Buzau airfield? It can be assumed that to Sevastopol. Then the next question is: when could they reach it?

TTX Heinkel-111:

Takeoff weight - 14000 kg
Maximum speed - 400 km/h
Ceiling - 8400 m
Flight range - 2800 km

At a cruising speed of 370 km/h, the Germans could fly to Sevastopol in an hour and a half. Those. by 2-00 Romanian summer time or by 3-00 Moscow maternity leave - IT FITS! Conclusion: Zhukov used MOSCOW DECREE TIME when describing the morning of June 22, 1941! No objections?

Then whose planes bombed Soviet cities at 2:30 Berlin summer time or at 1:30 Berlin standard time? They haven't crossed the border yet! After 30 minutes (or 1-30) they were only supposed to fly up to the Soviet western border! Who's lying? Whose planes did Zhukov tell Stalin about when he woke him up at 3:45 Moscow maternity time? Or is this whole conversation the marshal’s invention?

And the question remains regarding the following words of Zhukov:

. . . . . . .
At 4 hours 10 minutes, the Western and Baltic special districts reported the start of hostilities by German troops on the ground sectors of the districts.
At 4:30 a.m. S.K. Timoshenko and I arrived at the Kremlin. All the summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. The People's Commissar and I were invited into the office.
JV Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding a pipe filled with tobacco in his hands. He said:
– We urgently need to call the German embassy...

If the Germans attacked in the dark at 3-10 in their summer time (and at 4-10 in Moscow) under the light of searchlights, headlights, flashlights, illuminating them with light bombs, shells, tracer bullets and launching flare guns (did they have night vision devices? ), then we can agree that at 4:30 Moscow time a meeting in Stalin’s office could theoretically begin in Moscow (after all, 4:30 is later than 4:10 or 4:20 - not earlier, after all!).

But if you try to time it...
If Zhukov’s call to Stalin at 3:45 was a lie, then they could have woken him up no earlier than 4:20. Where was Stalin at this time? In the country? How long does it take him to get to the Kremlin? (Wake up the driver, start the car, drive out onto the highway, get there, go up to the office...) In 10 minutes? INCREDIBLE! It will take 10 minutes just to wake up the driver and start the car...

Thus, even if the Germans started at 4-10 Moscow maternity time, Zhukov’s meeting with Stalin at 4-30 in the Kremlin is a lie. And it’s even more of a lie that, judging by the log of visitors to Stalin’s office, this meeting began at... 5-45.("Robin", volume 2, p. 300):

And by this time, the German ambassador Count von der Schulenburg had already read out a statement from the German government (ibid. p. 432):

In view of the further intolerable threat created for the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and preparation of all armed forces of the Red Army, the German government considers itself forced to immediately take military countermeasures.

The corresponding note will be simultaneously transmitted to Dekanozov in Berlin.

WUA of the Russian Federation. F.06. Op.Z. P. 1. D.5. Ll. 12-15. \433\
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The next CONCLUSIONS:

1) The description of events given in Zhukov’s memoirs on the morning of June 22, 1941, before the phrase; " At 7:15 am on June 22, Directive N: 2 People's Commissars of Defense was transmitted to the districts" - LIES!

2) The Germans attacked at dawn at 3:00 a.m. Berlin summer time (or 4:00 a.m. Moscow maternity time).

3) The question (in 2006) remains: What time did the watches of Soviet soldiers show on the western border of the USSR, if at the SAME TIME it read 4:00? (And why?)
(in 2016 it was shown at 4-00)

Attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR began at 4 a.m. on June 22, 1941, when German military aircraft launched the first strikes on a number of Soviet cities and strategic military and infrastructure facilities. By attacking the USSR, Germany unilaterally broke the non-aggression pact between the countries, concluded two years earlier for a period of 10 years.

Prerequisites and preparation for the attack

In mid-1939, the USSR changed the course of its foreign policy: the collapse of the idea of ​​“collective security” and the deadlock in negotiations with Great Britain and France forced Moscow to move closer to Nazi Germany. On August 23, the head of the German Foreign Ministry, J. von Ribbentrop, arrived in Moscow. On the same day, the parties signed a Non-Aggression Pact for a period of ten years, and in addition to it, a secret protocol that stipulated the delimitation of the spheres of interests of both states in Eastern Europe. Eight days after the treaty was signed, Germany attacked Poland and World War II began.

The rapid victories of German troops in Europe caused concern in Moscow. The first deterioration in Soviet-German relations occurred in August-September 1940, and was caused by Germany providing foreign policy guarantees to Romania after it was forced to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR (this was stipulated in the secret protocol). In September, Germany sent troops to Finland. By this time, the German command had been developing a plan for a lightning war (“blitzkrieg”) against the Soviet Union for more than a month.

In the spring of 1941, relations between Moscow and Berlin deteriorated sharply again: not even a day had passed since the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty when German troops invaded Yugoslavia. The USSR did not react to this, as well as to the attack on Greece. After the defeat of Greece and Yugoslavia, German troops began to concentrate near the borders of the USSR. Since the spring of 1941, Moscow received information from various sources about the threat of an attack from Germany. Thus, at the end of March, a letter to Stalin warning that the Germans were transferring tank divisions from Romania to southern Poland was sent by British Prime Minister W. Churchill. A number of Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats reported on Germany's intention to attack the USSR - Schulze-Boysen and Harnack from Germany, R. Sorge from Japan. However, some of their colleagues reported the opposite, so Moscow was in no hurry to draw conclusions. According to G.K. Zhukov, Stalin was confident that Hitler would not fight on two fronts and would not start a war with the USSR until the end of the war in the West. His point of view was shared by the head of the intelligence department, General F.I. Golikov: on March 20, 1941, he presented Stalin with a report in which he concluded that all data about the inevitability of the imminent outbreak of the Soviet-German war “must be regarded as disinformation coming from the British and even, maybe German intelligence."

In the face of the growing threat of conflict, Stalin took formal leadership of the government: on May 6, 1941, he took over as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. The day before, he spoke in the Kremlin at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies, in particular, saying that it was time for the country to move “from defense to offense.” On May 15, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the newly appointed Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov presented to Stalin “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies.” It was assumed that the Red Army would strike the enemy at a time when the enemy armies were in the process of deployment. According to Zhukov, Stalin did not even want to hear about a preventive strike on German troops. Fearing a provocation that could give Germany a pretext for attack, Stalin forbade opening fire on German reconnaissance aircraft, which had increasingly crossed the Soviet border since the spring of 1941. He was convinced that, by exercising extreme caution, the USSR would avoid war or at least delay it until a more favorable moment.

On June 14, 1941, by order of the Soviet government, TASS published a statement in which it was stated that rumors about Germany’s intention to break the non-aggression pact and start a war against the USSR were devoid of any basis, and the transfer of German troops from the Balkans to eastern Germany was probably associated with other motives . On June 17, 1941, Stalin was informed that Soviet intelligence officer Schulze-Boysen, an employee of the German aviation headquarters, said: “All German military measures to prepare an armed attack against the USSR are completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time.” The Soviet leader imposed a resolution in which he called Schulze-Boysen a disinformer and advised him to be sent to hell.

On the evening of June 21, 1941, a message was received in Moscow: a sergeant major of the German army, a convinced communist, crossed the Soviet-Romanian border at the risk of his life and reported that the offensive would begin in the morning. The information was urgently transferred to Stalin, and he gathered the military and members of the Politburo. People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, according to the latter, asked Stalin to accept a directive to put troops on combat readiness, but he doubted it, suggesting that the Germans could have planted the defector officer on purpose in order to provoke a conflict. Instead of the directive proposed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, the head of state ordered another, short directive, indicating that the attack could begin with a provocation of German units. On June 22 at 0:30 am this order was transmitted to the military districts. At three o'clock in the morning everyone gathered at Stalin's left.

Start of hostilities

Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, German aviation destroyed a significant part of Soviet aviation with a surprise attack on airfields. western districts. The bombing of Kyiv, Riga, Smolensk, Murmansk, Sevastopol and many other cities began. In a declaration read out on the radio that day, Hitler said that Moscow allegedly “treacherously violated” the treaty of friendship with Germany because it concentrated troops against it and violated German borders. Therefore, the Führer said, he decided “to oppose the Judeo-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and their assistants, as well as the Jews from the Moscow Bolshevik center” in the name of “the cause of peace” and “the security of Europe.”

The offensive was carried out according to the previously developed Barbarossa plan. As in previous military campaigns, the Germans hoped to use the tactics of “lightning war” (“blitzkrieg”): the defeat of the USSR was supposed to take only eight to ten weeks and be completed before Germany ended the war with Great Britain. Planning to end the war before winter, the German command did not even bother to prepare winter uniforms. German armies consisting of three groups were supposed to attack Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv, having previously encircled and destroyed enemy troops in the western part of the USSR. The army groups were led by experienced military leaders: Army Group North was commanded by Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group Center by Field Marshal von Bock, Army Group South by Field Marshal von Rundstedt. Each army group was assigned its own air fleet and tank army; the Center group had two of them. The ultimate goal of Operation Barbarossa was to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. The Germans hoped to paralyze the work of industrial enterprises located east of this line - in the Urals, Kazakhstan and Siberia - with the help of air strikes.

Giving instructions High Command armed forces, Hitler emphasized that the war with the USSR should become a “conflict of two worldviews.” He demanded a “war of destruction”: “the carriers of the state political idea and political leaders” were ordered not to be captured and shot on the spot, which was contrary to the norms international law. Anyone who offered resistance was ordered to be shot.

By the time the war began, Soviet borders 190 divisions of Germany and its allies were concentrated, of which 153 were German. They included more than 90% of the armored forces of the German army. The total number of armed forces of Germany and its allies intended to attack the USSR was 5.5 million people. They had at their disposal more than 47 thousand guns and mortars, 4,300 tanks and assault guns, and about 6 thousand combat aircraft. They were opposed by the forces of five Soviet border military districts (at the beginning of the war they were deployed on five fronts). In total, there were over 4.8 million people in the Red Army, who had 76.5 thousand guns and mortars, 22.6 thousand tanks, and approximately 20 thousand aircraft. However, in the border districts of the above there were only 2.9 million soldiers, 32.9 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and more than 9 thousand aircraft.

After 4 o'clock in the morning, Stalin was awakened by a phone call from Zhukov - he said that the war with Germany had begun. At 4:30 am, Tymoshenko and Zhukov again met with the head of state. Meanwhile, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov, on Stalin's instructions, went to a meeting with the German Ambassador V. von der Schulenburg. Until Molotov returned, Stalin refused to order counterattacks against enemy units. The conversation between Molotov and Schulenburg began at 5:30 am. On instructions from the German government, the ambassador read out a note with the following content: “In view of the further intolerable threat created for the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and training of all armed forces of the Red Army, the German government considers itself forced to take military countermeasures.” The head of the NKID tried in vain to dispute what the ambassador said and convince him of the innocence of the USSR. Already at 5 hours 45 minutes, Molotov was in Stalin’s office along with L. P. Beria, L. Z. Mehlis, as well as Timoshenko and Zhukov. Stalin agreed to give a directive to destroy the enemy, but emphasized that Soviet units should not violate the German border anywhere. At 7:15 a.m. the corresponding directive was sent to the troops.

Stalin's entourage believed that it was he who should speak on the radio with an appeal to the population, but he refused, and Molotov did it instead. In his address, the head of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs announced the beginning of the war, noted that German aggression was to blame, and expressed confidence in the victory of the USSR. At the end of his speech, he uttered the famous words: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!" In order to prevent possible doubts and rumors about the silence of Stalin himself, Molotov added several references to him in the original text of the address.

On the evening of June 22, British Prime Minister W. Churchill spoke on the radio. He stated that in the current situation, his anti-communist views are receding into the background, and the West must provide “Russia and the Russian people” with all the help it can. On June 24, F. Roosevelt, President of the United States, made a similar statement in support of the USSR.

Retreat of the Red Army

In total, on the first day of the war alone, the USSR lost at least 1,200 aircraft (according to German data - more than 1.5 thousand). Many nodes and lines of communication were rendered unusable - because of this, the General Staff lost contact with the troops. Due to the inability to fulfill the demands of the center, the commander of the aviation of the Western Front, I. I. Kopets, shot himself. On June 22, at 21:15, the General Staff sent a new directive to the troops with instructions to immediately launch a counteroffensive, “disregarding the border,” to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces within two days and to capture the areas of the cities of Suwalki and Lublin by the end of June 24. But the Soviet units failed not only to go on the offensive, but also to create a continuous defensive front. The Germans had a tactical advantage on all fronts. Despite the enormous efforts and sacrifices and the colossal enthusiasm of the soldiers, the Soviet troops failed to stop the enemy’s advance. Already on June 28, the Germans entered Minsk. Due to the loss of communication and panic at the fronts, the army became almost uncontrollable.

Stalin was in a state of shock for the first 10 days of the war. He often interfered in the course of events, summoning Timoshenko and Zhukov to the Kremlin several times. On June 28, after the surrender of Minsk, the head of state went to his dacha and for three days - from June 28 to 30 - stayed there continuously, not answering calls and not inviting anyone to his place. Only on the third day his closest associates came to him and persuaded him to return to work. On July 1, Stalin arrived in the Kremlin and on the same day became the head of the newly formed State Committee defense (GKO) - an emergency governing body that received full power in the state. In addition to Stalin, the GKO included V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria. Later, the composition of the committee changed several times. Ten days later, Stalin also headed the Supreme Command Headquarters.

To rectify the situation, Stalin ordered to send Marshals B.M. Shaposhnikov and G.I. Kulik to the Western Front, but the former fell ill, and the latter himself was surrounded and had difficulty getting out, disguised as a peasant. Stalin decided to shift responsibility for failures on the fronts to the local military command. The commander of the Western Front, Army General D. G. Pavlov, and several other military leaders were arrested and sent to a military tribunal. They were accused of an “anti-Soviet conspiracy”, of deliberately “opening the front to Germany”, and then of cowardice and alarmism, after which they were shot. In 1956, they were all rehabilitated.

By the beginning of July 1941, the armies of Germany and its allies occupied most of the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Belarus, and approached Smolensk and Kyiv. Army Group Center advanced the deepest into Soviet territory. The German command and Hitler believed that the main enemy forces had been defeated and the end of the war was near. Now Hitler was wondering how to quickly complete the defeat of the USSR: continue to advance on Moscow or encircle Soviet troops in Ukraine or Leningrad.

The version of Hitler's "preventive strike"

In the early 1990s, V. B. Rezun, a former Soviet intelligence officer who fled to the West, published several books under the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov, in which he claimed that Moscow planned to be the first to strike Germany, and Hitler, having started the war, only forestalled the attack Soviet troops. Rezun was later supported by some Russian historians. However, an analysis of all available sources shows that if Stalin was going to strike first, then it would be more favorable situation. At the end of June and beginning of July 1941, he sought to delay the war with Germany and was not ready for an offensive.

In 1939, planning an attack on Poland and anticipating the possible entry into the war on its side of Great Britain and France, the leadership of the Third Reich decided to protect itself from the east - in August a Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded between Germany and the USSR, dividing the spheres of interests of the parties in Eastern Europe. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. On September 17, the Soviet Union sent troops into Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and later annexed these territories. A common border appeared between Germany and the USSR. In 1940, Germany captured Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and defeated France. The victories of the Wehrmacht gave rise to hopes in Berlin for a quick end to the war with England, which would allow Germany to devote all its strength to defeating the USSR. However, Germany failed to force Britain to make peace. The war continued.

The decision to war with the USSR and the general plan for the future campaign were announced by Hitler at a meeting with the high military command on July 31, 1940, shortly after the victory over France. The Fuhrer planned to liquidate the Soviet Union by the end of 1941.

The General Staff took the leading place in planning Germany's war against the USSR ground forces(OKH) of the Wehrmacht, led by its chief, Colonel General F. Halder. Along with the General Staff of the Ground Forces, an active role in planning the “eastern campaign” was played by the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), headed by General A. Jodl, who received instructions directly from Hitler.

On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, which received the code name “Barbarossa Option” and became the main guiding document in the war against the USSR. The German armed forces were tasked with “defeating Soviet Russia during one short-term campaign,” for which it was planned to use all ground forces with the exception of those performing occupation functions in Europe, as well as approximately two-thirds of the air force and a small part of the navy. With rapid operations with deep and rapid advance of tank wedges, the German army was supposed to destroy the Soviet troops located in the western part of the USSR and prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready units into the interior of the country. Subsequently, quickly pursuing the enemy, German troops had to reach a line from where Soviet aviation would not be able to carry out raids on the Third Reich. The ultimate goal of the campaign is to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line.

The immediate strategic goal of the war against the USSR was the defeat and destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine. It was assumed that during these operations the Wehrmacht would reach Kyiv with fortifications east of the Dnieper, Smolensk and the area south and west of Lake Ilmen. The further goal was to timely occupy the militarily and economically important Donetsk coal basin, and in the north to quickly reach Moscow. The directive required operations to capture Moscow to begin only after the destruction of Soviet troops in the Baltic states and the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt. The task of the German Air Force was to disrupt the opposition of Soviet aviation and support its own ground forces in decisive directions. The naval forces were required to ensure the defense of their coast, preventing a breakthrough Soviet fleet from the Baltic Sea.

The invasion was scheduled to begin on May 15, 1941. The estimated duration of the main hostilities was 4-5 months according to plan.

With the completion of the development of the general plan for Germany's war against the USSR, operational-strategic planning was transferred to the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces and formations of troops, where more specific plans were developed, tasks for the troops were clarified and detailed, and measures were determined to prepare the armed forces, the economy, and the future theater of military operations for war. actions.

The German leadership proceeded from the need to ensure the defeat of Soviet troops along the entire front line. As a result of the planned grandiose “border battle,” the USSR should have had nothing left except 30-40 reserve divisions. This goal was supposed to be achieved by an offensive along the entire front. The Moscow and Kiev directions were recognized as the main operational lines. They were provided by army groups “Center” (48 divisions were concentrated on a 500 km front) and “South” (40 German divisions and significant Allied forces were concentrated on a 1250 km front). Army Group North (29 divisions on a 290 km front) had the task of securing the northern flank of Group Center, capturing the Baltic states and establishing contact with Finnish troops. Total number divisions of the first strategic echelon, taking into account the Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian troops, amounted to 157 divisions, of which 17 tank and 13 motorized, and 18 brigades.

On the eighth day, German troops were supposed to reach the line Kaunas - Baranovichi - Lvov - Mogilev-Podolsky. On the twentieth day of the war, they were supposed to capture territory and reach the line: Dnieper (to the area south of Kyiv) - Mozyr - Rogachev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Velikiye Luki - south of Pskov - south of Pärnu. This was followed by a pause of twenty days, during which it was planned to concentrate and regroup formations, give rest to the troops and prepare a new supply base. On the fortieth day of the war, the second phase of the offensive was to begin. During it, it was planned to capture Moscow, Leningrad and Donbass.

In connection with Hitler's decision to expand the scope of Operation Marita (attack on Greece), which required the involvement of additional forces, changes were made to the war plan against the USSR in mid-March 1941. The allocation of additional forces for the Balkan campaign required postponing the start of the operation to a later date. All preparatory measures, including the transfer of mobile formations necessary for the offensive in the first operational echelon, had to be completed by approximately June 22.

To attack the USSR, by June 22, 1941, four army groups were created. Taking into account the strategic reserve, the group for operations in the East consisted of 183 divisions. Army Group North (commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) was deployed in East Prussia, on the front from Memel to Goldap. Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal Feodor von Bock) occupied the front from Gołdap to Wlodawa. Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt), under the operational subordination of the Romanian Ground Forces Command, occupied the front from Lublin to the mouth of the Danube.

In the USSR, on the basis of the military districts located on the western border, according to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 21, 1941, 4 fronts were created. On June 24, 1941, the Northern Front was created. According to a certificate compiled on the eve of the war by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General Vatutin, there were a total of 303 divisions in the ground forces, of which 237 divisions were included in the group for operations in the West (of which 51 were tank and 25 motorized). The group for operations in the West was built into three strategic echelons.

The North-Western Front (commanded by Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov) was created in the Baltic states. The Western Front (commanded by Army General D. G. Pavlov) was created in Belarus. The Southwestern Front (commanded by Colonel General M.P. Kirponos) was created in Western Ukraine. The Southern Front (commanded by Army General I.V. Tyulenev) was created in Moldova and Southern Ukraine. The Northern Front (commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov) was created on the basis of the Leningrad Military District. The Baltic Fleet (commanded by Admiral V.F. Tributs) was stationed in the Baltic Sea. The Black Sea Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) was stationed in the Black Sea.

Seventy-five years ago, on June 22, Hitler ordered his troops to begin Operation Barbarossa: the war against Stalin's Soviet Union. It was the largest military operation ever carried out, and it remains so to this day. It marked the end of the Third Reich and Hitler's dream of a “thousand-year empire.”

For the Führer, this was an all-or-nothing enterprise that predictably ended in nothing.

The fate of World War II was decided by Eastern Front. Two thirds of Germany's resources were deployed here. During cold war Western propaganda only briefly mentioned the contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory over Germany; accordingly, the main attention in the West was paid to the Allied air war, their actions in the Atlantic, North Africa, Sicily and the landing of Allied troops in Normandy with the subsequent attack on German territory. These were all important events, but the outcome of the war was decided on the Eastern Front.

Hitler began planning Operation Barbarossa shortly after the end of the Western Offensive in the summer of 1940. Any major military operation depends on clearly defined objectives, a thorough and reliable analysis of the enemy's capabilities, and an equally thorough analysis of one's own resources and capabilities. None of these conditions were met. Therefore, it is completely incomprehensible why none of the German generals decided to go to Hitler and explain the situation to him.

The German General Staff developed several outline plans with various main and secondary objectives, directions of main attacks and operational principles. And even according to the final plan, “The Barbarossa Case,” there was no consensus on strategic goals. Only the final decision was made. As a result of this, the operation was stopped, and discussions began on strategic goals, which lasted three weeks from August to September 1941. Unheard of, it was a recipe for operational suicide.

Tank units were withdrawn from the Moscow direction and sent to the south, where they managed to capture Kyiv and capture 665 thousand Soviet soldiers. The bill was paid three months later by a catastrophic defeat near Moscow. It is well known that the German command did not take care of the winter equipment of its units, which led to the death of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. Sloppy planning - Germany did not even develop a “Plan B” - led to the fact that the original goal - the destruction of the striking force of the Red Army - was not achieved. Therefore, the next three years were aimless, blind fencing, since the main strategic leadership was absent. Hitler wanted to decide everything himself with his crazy ideas that had absolutely nothing to do with the real world. The Führer was convinced that Providence had chosen him to be as Grösster Feldherr aller Zeiten (“ Greatest Commander of all times") saved Germany.

Lack of supply

How did the German military command plan to supply more than three million German soldiers? There was only enough planning for the first three weeks of the trip. The invading troops were then required to "live off the occupied country." Once grain and livestock are taken from the local population, millions of people will be doomed to a long and painful death of starvation. This was part of the planning. It was expected that 10-15 million people would die of starvation.

From the very beginning, Operation Barbarossa was the catalyst for "die Endlösung" ("the final solution"), the extermination of Jews and other peoples.

Context

Hitler's War of Extermination

The myth of the "Barbarossa Plan"

How Hitler made Russia a superpower

Franz Halder - author of Plan Barbarossa

Multimedia

Great Patriotic War: photo chronicle

For Hitler, Barbarossa was the implementation of his confused social Darwinist ideas about the right of the strong to destroy the weak. There was no way to unite with groups opposed to the regime, to win over the enemy population, giving them a chance to survive, not to mention negotiated peace. According to the Fuhrer's twisted thoughts, everything had to be decided by the brutal use of force.

The principle of destruction was to be carried out by the “Einsatzgruppen” (“Einsatzgruppen”, “ deployment groups"), following the attackers military units. The task of these SS and police units was to exterminate Jews and political commissars. The victims were shot in open mass graves. The Einsatz groups could only operate with transport and logistical support from regular troops in the area. This practice was introduced already during the Polish campaign. At the time, the German commander of occupied Poland, Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz, protested in writing against these crimes and refused to support the SS murder gangs. Blaskowitz was naturally removed from his post, but earned respect for himself by being decent enough to make such an attempt. I don't know anyone else who tried to follow his example after that.

Prisoners of war

Hitler's directive on the conduct of military operations on the Eastern Front was characteristic. This war must be different from all previous wars. Here you need to ignore all the laws of war. According to the order on commissars, representatives of the Communist Party in the Red Army captured by German units were to be shot immediately. This order was carried out in different ways depending on the local command, but no one was found to prohibit it, although the execution of this order was a clear war crime. In addition, the directive emphasized that German soldiers could not be prosecuted for alleged war crimes, which in itself was an invitation to commit war crimes.

The same attitude was towards Soviet prisoners of war. In 1941 alone, the Germans captured three million Soviet soldiers. Four out of five people did not survive, which in itself is a war crime. In general, no one could imagine what needed to be done with such a large number of prisoners. In conditions where not enough attention was paid to supplying their own units, prisoners of war were not particularly thought about at all, and they died of hunger, thirst or epidemics that broke out due to the terrible conditions of detention. In winter, many died from the cold while being transported by rail.

Hitler was obsessed with the idea of ​​"Lebensraum" ("living space"), the conquest of territories that could be used for colonization and plunder. At first, the length of the front was 1,500 kilometers (excluding Finland), but soon it stretched 2,200 kilometers from north to south and 1,000 kilometers in depth from west to east. This was more than what a German army of three million and half a million allied troops could handle. The problem worsened as losses mounted.

After the defeat near Moscow in 1941-1942, the Germans could carry out large offensive operations only in certain sectors of the front. In 1942, this area became the southern sector of the front, where Hitler's goal was the oil fields of the Caspian Sea around Baku. When Stalingrad became another target, the units spread out in a too thin chain along the front. As a result, Hitler received neither oil nor Stalingrad. The result of this overestimation of one's own strength was the Stalingrad disaster of 1942-1943. Hitler's strict order not to break out of the encirclement led to the death of the 6th Army. This was an example that was then repeated more and more often until the fall of Berlin. Hitler showed that the fate of his soldiers was completely indifferent to him.

Major German losses

After the failed "Operation Citadel" on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943, the German offensive force was exhausted, and German troops from that point on went on the defensive. With great difficulty, it was only possible to evacuate the German units advancing from the Caucasus to the west along the path that was blocked by the advancing units of the Red Army. Hitler prohibited any retreat on all sectors of the front, which led to gigantic losses in manpower and equipment. Likewise, troops were not withdrawn from the Crimean peninsula in time, and on the central front, the entire Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center) was completely destroyed in June-July 1944 because Hitler forbade retreat. The price was the loss of 25 divisions, approximately 300 thousand soldiers.

Between June and September 1944 alone, German losses ranged from 1 to 1.5 million people, as well as a huge amount of military equipment. The Red Army now had the initiative and had complete freedom of maneuver combined with air supremacy. Hitler made the situation even worse with his absurd orders, which made it impossible to conduct reasonable defensive battles. The generals now had to pay for their helpfulness. However, there was strong opposition to Hitler within the military. In Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the opposition found a leader ready to take action.

On July 20, 1944, Stauffnberg was given the opportunity to plant a mine under the table in Hitler's office in Rastenburg, East Prussia. Unfortunately, the bastard didn't die. Thus, the war extended for another nine terrible months. Hitler took brutal revenge on the conspirators and their families. The failed assassination attempt was a decisive attempt to stop the war, which at that moment was becoming completely meaningless. At the same time, it showed that there were decent people among the German officers.

Unprovoked aggression

The attack on June 22, 1941 was an unprovoked aggression and a flagrant violation of the non-aggression pact known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This pact was Hitler's last attempt to use political and military means to provide himself with a reliable rear for an attack on Poland. At the same time, it provided effective advantages, since according to this pact, raw materials were supplied to Germany from the Soviet Union. They continued until the day of the attack.

The Blitzkrieg that Hitler had planned turned into a deadly four-year struggle. 26-27 million Soviet people died.

Hitler did not need politics, diplomacy and trade treaties. He wanted war, and above all war with Soviet Union, Jewish-Bolshevik mortal enemy. He wanted to show that he could win with military force alone.

75 years after the start of this unimaginable nightmare, it is worth remembering that Hitler's unilateral and fanatical use of military force led directly to the complete defeat of Germany. This happened despite the fact that Hitler initial stage had at its disposal the most professional and effective military apparatus for that time.

Another important lesson is that ignoring the laws of war, military conventions and ordinary morality, even in war, leads to fatal consequences. The execution of individual prisoners of war becomes the road leading to the murder of millions. Crimes were committed not only by special SS units, but also by soldiers of regular army units.

Operation Barbarossa became possible only because Hitler arrogated to himself the right to unlimited control over all means of power. Today we must ensure that war becomes possible only as a result of a transparent and democratic process.